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Choregia and trierarchy as profit-oriented entrepreneurships

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Abstract

With regards to the model of the homo oeconomicus this paper argues that incentives for performing liturgies in classical Athens were based on profit-oriented calculation rather than desire to gain support for public offices. In classical Athens democratic measures diminished the power of single-person offices which led to a decrease in the desire to hold such offices by the aristocracy. Simultaneously, recourse to altruistic incentives is incompatible with the costs of liturgies and the effort some members of Athens society made in order to perform them. Careful examination of past research on liturgical spending in classical Athens and an analysis of coeval conditions show the validity of economic instruments that lead to a rational-actor perspective on public spending under the incentive of financial gain rather than non-monetary profit.

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Notes

  1. For further elaboration see: Meyer (1895), Wagner-Hasel (2011).

  2. For a detailed analysis of market economics see Mankiw and Taylor (2010).

  3. See Kirsch (2004), 170–175.

  4. For a detailed examination of the direct democracy of Athens using a political economy perspective see Tridimas (2011).

  5. For detailed information cf. Herodotus (2003) VII. 138–144.

  6. Lysias (2004) XIX. 42, XXI. 2; (Gabrielsen 1994, 216).

  7. For an economic perspective on Athenian trade policies see Woolmer (2016).

  8. Cf. FGrH 328 F33 Atthis; (Wilson 2011, 40).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Kiel, Kiel, Germany

    Joshua Günther & Felix Hahn

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  1. Joshua Günther
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  2. Felix Hahn
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Correspondence to Joshua Günther.

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Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

We wish to thank the anonymous reviewers for their comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this paper. Special thanks hereby to Roland Oetjen, who introduced us to New Institutional Economics and supported us throughout our research. Responsibility for any errors remaining is ours alone.

Glossary

Glossary

Archon:

One of the nine highest offices in archaic Athens

Areopagus:

Aristocratic council. Oversaw laws and magistrates

Arete:

Moral virtue

Basileus:

High priest of ancient Athens

Choregia:

Theatrical liturgy that enables the carrier to train and finance a chorus for a festival

Cleisthenes’ reforms:

Reorganization of the Athenian political structure in democratic fashion in order to break up existing power-bases in the society

Club good:

Good bound by excludability, not rivalness

Common property resource:

Good bound by rivalness, not excludability

Council of Five Hundred:

Executive power in classical Athens

Delian League:

Association of Greek city states 478–404, members numbering between 150 and 330 with purpose to uphold the hegemony in the Mediterranean

Demos:

Citizens of a polis

Eisphora:

War tax that was introduced in times of need. Poll tax implemented on the richest citizens

Ekklesia:

Assembly of Athens, carrying out legislative powers

Free riding:

Act of gaining utility of a good without paying for it

Heliaia:

Supreme court of ancient Athens

Lamian War:

War that led to Athens final defeat against Macedonia in 322

Liturgy:

Appropriation of goods by the richest members of a society as alternative to poll tax

Metic:

Foreigner currently or permanently residing in Athens

Pentecontaetia:

Fifty years between Persian Wars and Peloponnesian War

Polemarch:

Commander in chief

Polis:

Greek city state

Private good:

Good bound by both, excludability and rivalness

Public good:

Good bound by neither excludability, nor rivalness

Solon’s reforms:

Reorganization of the Athenian polis in order to overcome disparity. Allocation of citizens in four classes according to emblements. Political rights varied between the classes

Thesmothetai:

Six junior archons. Mainly organizational character for trials

Trierarchy:

Liturgy that enables the carrier to finance and command a warship for a year

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Günther, J., Hahn, F. Choregia and trierarchy as profit-oriented entrepreneurships. Const Polit Econ 30, 177–193 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-019-09276-4

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