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The Non-Compliance Mechanism Under the Aarhus Convention as ‘Soft’ Enforcement of International Environmental Law: Not So Soft After All!

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Abstract

This article engages in the exercise of measuring the ‘degree of judiciality’ of the Non-Compliance Mechanism under the Aarhus Convention by looking at the legal effect of its findings and recommendations and considering, amongst other things, the effect of Article 31(3)(a) and (b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The article also looks at the procedure of the hearings before the Compliance Committee and at the application of the domestic remedies rule especially in comparison with the human rights systems (ECtHR and IACtHR). It concludes that, at least with regard to these three features, the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee has become an enforcement mechanism capable of generating decisions with legal effect, rather than a ‘soft remedy’.

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Article Open access 21 February 2023

Sarah Monod de Froideville & Andrew Gibbs

Notes

  1. 2161 UNTS 447.

  2. Yoshida (1999), p. 95; Francioni (1996), p. 176.

  3. For the difference between ‘non-compliance’ and the more traditional principles and procedures for breach of a treaty see particularly Koskenniemi (1993). On the emergence of the non-compliance procedures see Roben (2000), Fitzmaurice and Redgwell (2000) and Marauhn (1996). More recently, see Goeteyn and Maes (2011), Fitzmaurice (2010), Treves et al. (2009) and Beyerlin, Stoll and Wolfrum (2006).

  4. Art. 1 of the Convention.

  5. On 17 February 2005 the EU, which is a regional economic integration organisation within the meaning of Art. 17 of the Aarhus Convention, acceded to it, while some of its Member States were already Parties.

  6. The Russian Federation, along with Canada and the United States, while being members of the UNECE, are among the non-Signatory States of the Convention. The status of ratification is available on the Convention’s website at https://www.unece.org/env/pp/ratification.html.

  7. Art. 19(3) of the Convention. On 1 July 2011, through Decision IV/5, the Parties to the Aarhus Convention agreed upon procedural steps for approving the accession to the Convention by non-UNECE Countries. See ECE/MP.PP/2011/CRP.3.

  8. For a case overview, see Andrusevych and Kern (2016).

  9. So far, nearly 150 cases have been triggered by the public. The full list of communications submitted is available at https://www.unece.org/env/pp/cc/com.html (6 October 2017). In the legal doctrine, see Pitea (2009) and Koester (2007).

  10. For example, Koester (2015), p. 205 argues that ‘[t]he Compliance Committee’s findings on non-compliance are not legally binding. This, however, may be remedied by an endorsement of the MOP of the decision of the Committee, because such endorsement may constitute a “subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions” which pursuant to Art. 31(3)(a) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties must be taken into account for the purposes of the interpretation of the Treaty’. Tanzi and Pitea (2009), p. 575 point out that ‘from a strictly legal perspective, any decision of a compliance body backed by the COP/MOP through its adoption by consensus, especially when the provision at stake has been consistently interpreted in a certain way in different cases without objections by the Parties, may amount to “subsequent practice in the application of the treaty” which, under Article 31(3(b) of the Vienna Convention, shall be taken into account when interpreting a treaty’.

  11. See the Commission proposal for a Council Decision on the position to be adopted, on behalf of the European Union, at the sixth session of the Meeting of the Parties to the Aarhus Convention regarding compliance case ACCC/C/2008/32, 29 June 2017, COM (2017) 366 final (no longer in force, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52017PC0366&from=EN).

  12. The Commission proposed that the EU should vote against the findings of the Committee in compliance case ACCC/C/2008/32. Parts I (ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2011/4/Add.1) and II (ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2017/7) of this case concern public access to EU remedies in order to challenge the institutions of the EU. See below Sect. 4.3.

  13. Recital (9) of the Commission’s proposal for a Council Decision, above n. 11.

  14. For example, the findings and recommendations with regard to communication ACCC/C/2012/71 have addressed the compliance by Czechia (ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2017/3) with the provisions on public participation in the decision-making in relation to the Temelín Nuclear Power Plant.

  15. In case ACCC/S/2015/2, Lithuania alleged that Belarus had failed to provide adequate public participation in decision-making procedures with respect to the construction of the Ostrovets Nuclear Power Plant.

  16. The findings of the Committee on communications ACCC/C/2010/53 (ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2013/3) and ACCC/C/2012/68 (ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2014/5) concerned compliance by the UK in relation to the cost of access to justice.

  17. In addition, this analysis is without prejudice to the other criteria or features that typically belong to judicial bodies. For example, we do not discuss in this article the extent to which the Committee confines the scope of its review to that of the initial communication or submission.

  18. Yoshida (1999), p. 99; Francioni (1996), p. 177.

  19. A number of compliance mechanisms had already been established. The task force that commenced the work on the Aarhus procedures considered the compliance regimes in operation under the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 1987, the Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution, 1979, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 1973, and the Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats, 1979. Moreover, the task force was also aware of the continuing negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 1992 (although it was arguable that the ‘multilateral consultative process’ established under the UNFCCC was not similar to any of the other compliance regimes that the task force considered), and the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, 1989.

  20. See para. 10 of Annex IX to CEP/WG.5/2000/40.

  21. ECE/MP.PP/2/Add.8, para. 38. See also the Report of the First Meeting of the Task Force on Compliance Mechanisms (CEP/WG.5/2000/40). Subsequently, two other compliance mechanisms were based on the Aarhus mechanism: Decision I/2 of the Meeting of the Parties to the Protocol on Water and Health to the Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes (ECE/MP.WH/2/Add.3 EUR/06/5069385/1/Add.3) and Decision I/2 of the Meeting of the Parties to the Protocol on Pollutant Release and Transfer Registers to the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (ECE/MP.PRTR/2010/2/Add.1) both established, for the respective Protocols, compliance mechanisms that were based on the ‘Aarhus model’.

  22. Art. 16(2) of the Aarhus Convention, dealing with settlement of disputes, provides that a Party may declare that, for a dispute not resolved through negotiation or by any other means of dispute settlement acceptable to the Parties to the dispute, it accepts one or both of the following means of dispute settlement as compulsory in relation to any Party accepting the same obligation: submission of the dispute to the International Court of Justice and/or arbitration set out in Annex II of the Convention.

  23. This has been highlighted by Pitea (2009), p. 242.

  24. Annex to Decision I/7, para. 13(a).

  25. See para. 46 of CEP/WG.5/2000/40.

  26. Annex to Decision I/7, para. 15. There have been two submissions by Parties regarding compliance by another Party. The first case was a submission made in 2005 by Romania against Ukraine in the case regarding the construction of the Bystroe Canal in the Danube delta. The second case has been recently brought in 2015 by Lithuania against Belarus regarding the construction of a nuclear power plant. See the Committee’s webpage at https://www.unece.org/submissions.html.

  27. Annex to Decision I/7, para. 16. There has been only one submission by a Party with respect to its own compliance. In 2016 Albania made a formal submission regarding a project to be carried out in the Park of the Artificial Lake of Tirana. See the Committee’s webpage at ibid.

  28. Annex to Decision I/7, para. 17. There have been no referrals by the Secretariat.

  29. Ibid., para. 18.

  30. See the findings and recommendations with regard to request ACCC/M/2014/1 concerning compliance by the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2017/8).

  31. See the recommendations with regard to request for advice ACCC/A/2014/1 by Belarus (ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2017/11).

  32. Annex to Decision I/7, para. 35.

  33. Ibid., para. 36.

  34. Ibid., para. 37.

  35. See Annex V of UNEP (2016).

  36. Item C on the Montreal Protocol indicative list is as follows: ‘suspension, in accordance with the applicable rules of international law concerning the suspension of the operation of a treaty, of specific rights and privileges under the Protocol, whether or not subject to time limits, including those concerned with industrial rationalization, production, consumption, trade, transfer of technology, financial mechanism and institutional arrangements’.

  37. Art. 60(2) VCLT provides as follows: ‘a material breach of a multilateral treaty by one of the parties entitles: (a) the other parties by unanimous agreement to suspend the operation of the treaty in whole or in part or to terminate it […] (i) In the relations between themselves and the defaulting State’.

  38. Although the MOP has considered using this power in one case: see para. 9 of Decision IV/9h on compliance by Ukraine with its obligations under the Convention (ECE/MP.PP/2011/2/Add.1).

  39. So far, the MOP has always endorsed Committee findings and recommendations.

  40. ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2014/12.

  41. See para. 80 and 112(a) of the findings.

  42. See the addendum to the report of the fifth session of the Meeting of the Parties (ECE/MP.PP/2014/2/Add.1).

  43. Art. 31 VCLT amounts to a single rule. It is not a succession of rules that must be balanced against each other. All three elements of Art. 31 must be considered when interpreting a treaty: its text, context and the object and purpose of the treaty.

  44. Aust (2007), p. 213. A similar point is made by Doerr and Schmalenbach (2012), p. 554: ‘it would seem that the “agreements” can very well be made informally. They do not have to be in treaty form but must be such as to show that the parties intended their understanding to be the basis for an agreed interpretation.’

  45. For example, the meaning of ‘Public Authority’ having responsibilities or functions in relation to the environment under Art. 2 has been interpreted by the Committee so as to include private entities to which national legislation delegates functions related to the maintenance and distribution of environmental information (communication ACCC/C/2004/1 dealing with the compliance with the Aarhus Convention by Kazakhstan, ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2005/2/Add.1, para. 17). Another example is the meaning of ‘public concerned’ under Article 2(5) that has been interpreted by the Committee in the context of a case dealing with the possibility for the German public to participate in a transboundary environmental impact assessment procedure related to nuclear activities conducted in the UK. In particular, the Committee found that the public might be concerned by this type of activity ‘either because of the possible effects of the normal or routine operation of the activity in question or because of the possible effects in the case of an accident or other exceptional incident, or both. In either case, the decision to permit a particular activity may not only impact measurable factors, such as the property or health of the public concerned, but also less measurable aspects, like their quality of life’ (communication ACCC/C/2013/91, ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2017/14, para. 73). In a case against Norway, the Committee elaborated on the meaning of ‘internal communications of public authorities’, which is the wording used in one of the Convention’s justifications for refusing a request for environmental information. In particular, the Committee, while noting that the expression is not defined in the Convention, stated that ‘the underlying purpose of such an exception is to give a public authority’s officials the possibility to exchange views freely. Accordingly, not every document that is communicated internally can be considered as an “internal communication”. For instance, factual matters and the analysis thereof may be distinguished from policy perspectives or opinions’ (communication ACCC/C/2013/93, ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2017/16, para. 71).

  46. For example, the obligation under Art. 7 to make appropriate practical and/or other provisions for the public to participate during the preparation of plans and programs relating to the environment, such as energy plans, when analysed in the context of the allocation of responsibilities between the EU and its Member States, has been interpreted by the Committee to the effect that the EU, in order ‘to implement [that obligation] by means other than legislative measures would be to provide a clear regulatory framework and/or clear instructions to member States on how to ensure public participation with respect to [National Renewable Energy Actions Plans], to be enforced through appropriate measures by [the EU]’ (communication ACCC/C/2010/54, ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2012, para. 87). Eventually, because of the ‘lack of an appropriate regulatory framework or evidence of other measures to ensure that public participation takes place in accordance with the Convention’, the Committee found the EU in non-compliance (ibid.).

  47. It is not suggested that an amendment is a likely response by the Parties. No amendment has ever been adopted or proposed in response to a MOP decision on Compliance Committee findings, and it is very difficult to imagine the circumstances in which there would be such a development.

  48. ECE/MP.WH/C.1/2015/4−EUDCE/1408105/1.10/2015/CC2/06.

  49. Ibid., at para. 33 of the Annex.

  50. See Decision III/6e, Compliance by Turkmenistan with its obligations under the Convention (ECE/MP.PP/2008/2/Add.13); and Decision III/6f, compliance by Ukraine with its obligations under the Convention (ECE/MP.PP/2008/2/Add.14).

  51. See Decision IV/9c, Compliance by Kazakhstan with its obligations under the Convention (ECE/MP.PP/2011/2/Add.1).

  52. See, for example, ACCC/C/2014/101 (ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2017/18) in Draft Decision VI/8 on General Issues of Non-Compliance, Prepared by the Bureau (ECE/MP.PP/2017/19), p. 2. The Committee may, from time to time, warn that a trend may lead to non-compliance: see for example para. 88 of the Committee’s findings and recommendations with regard to communication ACCC/C/2008/32 (Part I) concerning compliance by the EU (ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2011/4/Add) and the second sentence of para. 117 of the Committee’s findings and recommendations with regard to communication ACCC/C/2008/24 concerning compliance by Spain (ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2009/8/Add.1). Such a warning does not amount to a finding of non-compliance, although it may indicate that a Party concerned needs to take action to avoid non-compliance in the future. Therefore the Committee’s findings in Part I of case C32 did not amount to findings that the European Union was in non-compliance, and so those findings were not endorsed by the MOP, although in Part II of the case C32 there were findings of non-compliance. Similarly, although the findings in case C24 were endorsed, the MOP was very clear that it was not endorsing the second sentence of para. 117: see para. 27 of the report of the fourth session of the Meeting of the Parties (ECE/MP.PP/2011/2), which says, ‘[w]hen adopting decision IV/9f, the Parties agreed that the second sentence of paragraph 117 of the first addendum to the report of the twenty-sixth meeting of the Compliance Committee (ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2009/8/Add.1), regarding communication ACCC/C/2008/24 concerning Spain, was not a finding, and it was therefore not endorsed as such by the Meeting of the Parties’.

  53. So, for example, in Decision V/9j of the Meeting of the Parties on compliance by Romania with its obligations under the Convention (ECE/MP.PP/2014/2/Add.1) the MOP recommended that Romania took a number of necessary legislative, regulatory and administrative measures and provided adequate information and training to public authorities: see para. 2 of that Decision.

  54. Findings and recommendations with regard to communication ACCC/C/2008/32 (Part I) concerning compliance by the EU (ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2011/4/Add.1).

  55. Findings and recommendations of the Compliance Committee with regard to communication ACCC/C/2008/32 (Part II) concerning compliance by the EU (ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2017/7).

  56. Regulation (EC) No. 1367/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 September 2006 on the application of the provisions of the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters to Community institutions and bodies [2006] OJ L 264/13.

  57. Above n. 52.

  58. Council Decision (EU) 2017/1346, 17 July 2017 [2017] OJ L 186/15, on the position to be adopted, on behalf of the European Union, at the Sixth session of the Meeting of the Parties to the Aarhus Convention as regards compliance case ACCC/C/2008/32.

  59. See press release 482/17 of 17 July 2017, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/07/17-aarhus-convention/ (accessed 6 October 2017).

  60. The EU also stated that ‘in view of the separation of powers it is not possible in the EU legal order for instructions to be given to the CJEU or to the General Court regarding their judicial activities; and that the Union has an internal system of distributed competences between the Member States and the EU that must be taken into account’ (this statement is available at http://www.unece.org/env/pp/aarhus/mop6_docs.html).

  61. The proposal was followed by some interventions from delegations of Parties and other representatives. Norway, for example, warned against the deviation from a ‘long-standing and consistent practice of the MOP to endorse the findings of the Compliance Committee’. They also stated that ‘the arguments put forward by the EU do not make it clear to them that the MOP Decision challenges the fundamental principles of the Union legal order and its system of judicial review’. When it became clear that it was not possible to reach a consensus on the MOP Decision, Norway stated that ‘consensus is the main rule, it gives each Party an equal chance to influence the decision’. At the same time, Norway welcomed the fact that the findings of the Compliance Committee in case C32 were ‘not opposed or rejected, and that the parties are willing to continue the deliberations on the draft decision with a view to reach consensus in accordance with the Convention and long-standing and consistent practice at the next MOP’ (the statement by Norway is available at http://www.unece.org/env/pp/aarhus/mop6_docs.html). Switzerland ‘expressed concern that the proposal by the European Union put into peril the long-standing practice of the Meeting of the Parties to endorse findings of the Compliance Committee on a consensus basis and to take action according to its recommendations’ (this statement is available at http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/mop6/Documents_aec/ece.mp.pp.2017.2_aec.pdf, para. 58). Switzerland also stressed the equality of all Parties to the Convention, the need to maintain a strong and credible system and that if the MOP was to allow the EU to ‘act differently’, then this would have changed the landscape of all decisions in the future (the second part of the statement is on file with the Authors). Ukraine stressed that the MOP ‘had made a great effort over the years to achieve decision-making on compliance matters on a consensus basis and also that there was a specificity to the situation for each Party when implementing recommendations on how to come into compliance’ (this statement is available at http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/mop6/Documents_aec/ece.mp.pp.2017.2_aec.pdf, para. 58). Finally, Belarus asked ‘to explicitly indicate in the meeting report the “exceptional circumstances” surrounding the agreement to postpone the decision-making’ on the issue under consideration (ibid., para. 65). Other, non-State stakeholders also made statements on this issue. For example, the NGO ClientEarth, speaking on behalf of the European ECO Forum, ‘expressed a fear of introducing a double standard that would exempt the European Union from complying with the Convention. The Compliance Committee’s recommendations could be met by amending either legislation or the jurisprudence of the courts; there was no need to change the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Citing article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, [ClientEarth] also requested the delegation of the European Union to explain how it interpreted the provision that a party might not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty’ (this statement is available at http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/mop6/Documents_aec/ece.mp.pp.2017.2_aec.pdf, para. 59).

  62. ‘Nevertheless, several Parties expressed their great concern and reluctance to deviate, as an exceptional measure for that particular case only, from the long-standing and consistent practice of adopting decisions at each ordinary session of the Meeting of the Parties endorsing all of the findings issued by the Compliance Committee during the intersessional period regarding non-compliance by individual Parties. A number of statements highlighted that the agreement to postpone consideration of the draft decision was exceptional and therefore would not create a precedent for any future decision-making concerning a Party’s compliance’ (ibid., para. 62).

  63. The findings in case C32 would gain the status of official interpretation of the Aarhus Convention, therefore binding upon the Contracting Parties and the Convention Bodies. See also above the text corresponding to n. 13.

  64. A similar formulation is contained in Art. 46 of the American Convention on Human Rights. In the legal doctrine see Crawford and Grant (2012).

  65. See, for example, Pitea and Tanzi (2011), p. 369.

  66. Crawford and Grant (2012), p. 897, para. 8.

  67. Vezzani (2012), p. 65; Pisillo Mazzeschi (2000), p. 24.

  68. See, for example, ECtHR, Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, App. No. 21893/93 (16 September 1996), para. 69.

  69. Romano (2013), p. 564.

  70. Ibid., pp. 566–567.

  71. For example, only in 2017, 14,907 applications have been decided by judgment. See statistics available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=reports.

  72. This has been affirmed by Guido Raimondi, President of the European Court of Human Rights, speaking at the Conference ‘Consiglio d’Europa e Corte Europea dei diritti dell’uomo: tra giudici e diplomatici’ held at University of Trento (Italy) on 19 October 2017.

  73. Report of the Fifth Session of the Meeting of the Parties, Addendum, Decisions Adopted by the Meeting of the Parties, ECE/MP.PP/2014/2/Add.1, 15 October 2014, p. 52.

  74. ACCC/C/2004/9 against Armenia; ACCC/C/2007/19 against UK; ACCC/C/2008/32—Part I against the European Union (ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2011/4/Add.1); ACCC/C/2010/52 against the UK; ACCC/C/2013/83 against the UK; ACCC/C/2015/113 against Ireland; ACCC/C/2016/136 against UK.

  75. The majority of the other cases declared inadmissible were instead referring to lack of corroborating information on the basis of para. 20(d) in conjunction with para. 19 of Decision I/7.

  76. The case was related to the proposed construction of a railway between Oxford and Bicester. See ACCC/C/2016/136, available at the Committee’s webpage.

  77. The allegations concerning public participation did not pass the threshold of de minimis in the light of the purpose and the functions of the Committee to promote and improve compliance by the Parties with the Convention and therefore it was incompatible with the provisions of Decision I/7.

  78. Report of the Compliance Committee on its Fifty-second Meeting, ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2016/2, June 2016, p. 9.

  79. UNECE, United Kingdom Comments on the Preliminary Admissibility of PRE/ACCC/C/2016/136 (United Kingdom) (2 March 2016), http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/compliance/C2016-136_UK/frPartyC136_02.03.2016_comments_on_preliminary_admissibility.pdf, para. 35.

  80. See ACCC/C/2008/23 (ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2010/6/Add.1), ACCC/C/2008/27 (ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2010/6(Add.2) and ACCC/C/2008/33 (ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2010/6/Add.3) where the Compliance Committee found the UK in each case was in breach of Art. 9 of the Convention with respect to costs.

  81. ACCC/C/2010/45 (ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2013/12).

  82. ECtHR, Vernillo v. France, App. No. 11889/85 (20 February 1991), para. 27. See also, more recently, Laska and Lika v. Albania, App. Nos. 12315/04 and 17605/04 (20 April 2010), para. 45.

  83. See the ECtHR in Vasilkoski and Others v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, App. No. 28169/08 (28 October 2010), para. 46. The same approach was taken in the case of Laska and Lika v. Albania, above n. 82, at para. 45: ‘an applicant cannot be regarded as having failed to exhaust domestic remedies if he or she can show, by providing relevant domestic case-law or any other suitable evidence, that an available remedy which he or she has not used was bound to fail’.

  84. Reference for a preliminary ruling from High Court (Irlande) made on 22 August 2016—North East Pylon Pressure Campaign Limited, Maura Sheehy v. An Bord Pleanála, The Minister for Communications Energy and Natural Resources, Ireland Attorney General, Case C-470/16 [2016] OJ C 428/7.

  85. See Secretary of the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee, Communication to the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee concerning compliance by Ireland in connection with the cost of access to justice (ACCC/C/2014/113) (18 November 2016), available at https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/compliance/C2014-113_Ireland/toPartiesC113_18.11.2016.pdf.

  86. ACCC/C/2005/17 (ECE/MP/.PP/2008/5/Add.10), para. 38.

  87. ACCC/C/2010/52, available at the Committee’s webpage.

  88. ACCC/C/2008/32 Part I (ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2011/4/Add.1), para. 10.

  89. IACtHR, Juan Humbert Sánchez v. Honduras (7 June 2003), p. 28, paras. 64-69, at para. 65. The fact that when the IACtHR considers a case, it considers it in toto, including reconsidering admissibility questions is also highlighted by Romano (2013), p. 566.

  90. ECtHR, Fakhretdinov and Others v. Russia, App. Nos. 26716/09, 67576/09 and 7698/10 (23 September 2010), paras. 27 and 35.

  91. This has been found by the Compliance Committee in case ACCC/C/2013/93 (ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2017/16) against Norway.

  92. ECtHR, Aquilina and Others v. Malta, App. No. 25642/94 (29 April 1999), para. 39. See also ECtHR, Kozacioğlu v. Turkey, App. No. 2334/03 (19 February 2009), para. 40.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Assistant Professor in International Law, University of Trento, Trento, Italy

    Elena Fasoli

  2. Independent International Law Consultant, Alistair McGlone and Associates Ltd, London, UK

    Alistair McGlone

Authors
  1. Elena Fasoli
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  2. Alistair McGlone
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Elena Fasoli.

Additional information

This article is the result of common reflections by the two authors. Elena Fasoli is principally responsible for sections 1, 2 and 5 and Alistair McGlone for sections 3, 4 and 6. Both authors are former Members of the UNECE Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee.

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Fasoli, E., McGlone, A. The Non-Compliance Mechanism Under the Aarhus Convention as ‘Soft’ Enforcement of International Environmental Law: Not So Soft After All!. Neth Int Law Rev 65, 27–53 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40802-018-0102-0

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40802-018-0102-0

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