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The Contradictions of Conscience: Unravelling the Structure of Obligation in Equity

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Abstract

Conscience rests within the heart of equity, yet it is a manifestly nebulous and contradictory concept. In particular, equity has never been clear about exactly whose conscience we are concerned with: the Chancellor or judge, or the court, or the defendant? Furthermore, in some lights conscience appears to compel obedience to the authority of law, whilst in others it gives expression to ethical drives that escape the formal strictures of legal rules. Contextualised within the broader history of ideas of Western modernity, this article sets out to understand the rhetorical significance of conscience in equity, making the argument that its disparate and contradictory modes of expression do not undermine its significance, and instead are essential to its construction of juridical obligations. By invoking conscience as a contradictory expression of both vertical state authority and personal ethical autonomy, equity asserts not only a unique normative structure, but also a distinct mode of power.

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Notes

  1. Alternatively: ‘the language of conscience conveys the message that the defendant is being compelled to do [what] she “really ought to do”, and not simply what she “ought to do according to the law”’ (Agnew 2018, p. 504).

  2. Alternatively, see Sinead Agnew’s (2018) analysis of the explanatory base that conscience provides to modern doctrine. Additionally, see Pawlowski (2018).

  3. Specifically, ‘dishonest’ accomplices: Royal Brunei Airlines v Tan (1995) 2 AC 378.

  4. The doctrine of notice continues to govern the enforceability of equitable interests in many cases, despite being usurped by land registration.

  5. Per Lord Browne-Wilkinson, Westdeutsche (pp. 705–706). Cf Chambers, Resulting Trusts (1997, pp. 207–209).

  6. See Westdeutsche.

  7. See: Taylors Fashions v Liverpool Victoria Trustees (1982) 1 QB 133; Gillett v Holt (2001) Ch 210.

  8. De Bruyne v De Bruyne (2010) EWCA Civ 519, [49] per Patten LJ.

  9. On conscience and fiduciary relationships, see: Hospital Products v US Surgical Corp (1984) 55 ALR 417, p. 430; Indata Equipment Supplies Ltd v ACL Ltd (1998) FSR 248, pp. 255–256. On the scope of the rule, see Boardman v Phipps (1966) 2 AC 46.

  10. Hart v O’Connor (1985) AC 1000; Credit Lyonnais Bank v Burch (1997) 1 All ER 144.

  11. See Watt (2009), p. 111. On the tension between subjective and objective standards in conscience generally, see Samet (2012).

  12. E.g. Pennington v Waine (2002) EWCA Civ 227, and see Halliwell’s (2003) commentary.

  13. Courtney v Glanvil (1614) 79 ER 294, p. 294; Edmunds v Povey (1683) 1 Vern 187, p. 187.

  14. Carpenter v Tucker (1635) 1 Rep Ch 78, p. 79; Hunt v Matthews (1686) 1 Vern 408, p. 408.

  15. Salsbury v Bagott (1677) 2 Swans 603, p. 606.

  16. Crisp v Bluck (1674) 2 Rep Ch 88, p. 91; Nourse and others v Yarworth (1674) Rep t Finch 155, p. 160.

  17. Luke v Bridges and Christy (1700) Prec Ch 146, pp. 148–149; Sheffield v Lord Castleton (1700) 2 Vern 393, p. 393; Keen v Stuckely (1718) Gilb Ch 155, p. 156; Countess of Coventry v Earl of Coventry (1721) Gilb Ch 160, pp. 165–166.

  18. Hopkins alias Dare v Hopkins (1738) 1 Atk 581, p. 591; Le Neve v Le Neve (1747) 1 Ves Sen 64, p. 69; Garth v Sir John Hind Cotton (1750) 1 Ves Sen 546, p. 555.

  19. Attorney-General v Day (1749) 1 Ves Sen 218, p. 221.

  20. Barnesly v Powel (1749) 1 Ves Sen 284, p. 289.

  21. The Earl of Kildare v Sir Morrice Eustace (1686) 1 Vern 405, p. 405.

  22. Ayliffe v Murray (1740) 2 Atk 58, p. 60.

  23. Rochefoucauld v Boustead (1897) 1 Ch 196.

  24. For a critique of the association of conscience with freedom, see Stone (2018).

  25. I should also add, for the benefit of clarity, that the breach of such incontestable standards is not on its own sufficient to invoke liability. The unconscientious behaviour must also be of a recognised type deserving a remedy (e.g. wilful lying is an example of bad conscience, but is not itself an equitable wrong). Conversely, there are cases where equity imposes liability despite ostensibly good conscience, such as Boardman v Phipps (1966).

  26. Nietzsche’s outlook, however, is predictably more cynical than Freud’s. The Genealogy of Morals (2003) depicts conscience as a way of dignifying our powerlessness behind a façade of pious ethics. And by telling ourselves that all other people are bound by the same rules, we feel able to judge others.

  27. See also Ojakangas (2013, pp. 203–204).

  28. By the time of the Judicature Acts, taking evidence was no longer held in secret and could be taken by the parties themselves following the Chancery Practice Amendment Act 1852. See Kessler (2005, p. 1236 n. 297).

  29. This article consciously avoids debating the distinction between ‘inference’ and ‘imputation’. It suffices to say both rest on the same legal fiction. Asserting an intention that the court believes the party should hold (imputation) is equivalent to saying they did hold it (inference) if both judgements derive from normalised ideas of familial behaviour.

  30. Per Lord Diplock, Pettitt v Pettitt (1970) AC 777, p. 824.

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    Matthew Stone

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Stone, M. The Contradictions of Conscience: Unravelling the Structure of Obligation in Equity. Law Critique 30, 159–178 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10978-019-09239-6

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