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Watchdogs in Our Midst: How Presidents Monitor Coalitions in Brazil's Multiparty Presidential Regime

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 January 2018

Carlos Pereira ,
Mariana Batista ,
Sérgio Praça  and
Felix Lopez
Carlos Pereira
Affiliation:
Brazilian School of Administration (EBAPE) at the Getúlio Vargas Foundation. carlos.pereira@fgv.br
Mariana Batista
Affiliation:
Federal University of Pernambuco. mariana.bsilva@gmail.com
Sérgio Praça
Affiliation:
School of Social Sciences (CPDOC) at the Getúlio Vargas Foundation. sergio.praca@fgv.br
Felix Lopez
Affiliation:
Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA). felixglopez@gmail.com
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Abstract

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When delegating governing tasks to a coalition partner, the president would like to give a minister ample administrative powers to be able to effectively accomplish the political mission. Due to information asymmetries, the president runs the risk that this discretion might be used to pursue policy outcomes that may harm the president's preferences. This trade-off between delegation and control is key to understanding governance strategies the president chooses to minimize agency risks and coordinate public policies. With Brazil as a case study, this article demonstrates that presidents have strategically made frequent use of junior ministers as watch-dogs of coalition partners, especially when coalition allies are ideologically distant from the president's preferences. Yet neither the portfolio salience nor the president's decision to share powers with coalition partners proportionally seems to interfere in such strategic decisions.

Type
Research
Information
Latin American Politics and Society , Volume 59 , Issue 3 , Fall 2017 , pp. 27 - 47
Copyright
Copyright © University of Miami 2017

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