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Reforming Finance Under Fragmented Governments

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Abstract

The last decades have been characterized by a global drive to reform finance, but the process has not been homogeneous across countries and over time. What can explain the observed differences in financial reform zeal? This paper investigates the role of government cohesiveness in explaining this heterogeneity, finding that fragmented governments breed stalemate. This phenomenon has often been assumed in the literature based on circumstantial observations, but a formal, systematic assessment was still lacking. We fill this gap by exploiting a panel dataset covering the OECD countries over 30 years and undertaking several robustness checks. Our results show that the number of parties and the presence of small, decisive coalition partners slow down financial reforms. This is consistent with theoretical models in which decision making requires cooperation among different agents with conflicting policy preferences.

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Notes

  1. Ample evidence shows that structural financial reforms are conducive to higher levels of development. Tressel and Enrica (2008) find that banking sector reforms led to financial deepening only in countries allowing sufficient checks and balances against political power. Klein and Olivei (2008) examine the relationship between capital account liberalization and financial depth and find a positive and significant effect among OECD countries. Focusing on equity markets, Bekaert et al. (2005) show that the growth effect from equity market liberalization remains important even after controlling for capital account liberalization. Interestingly, equity market liberalizations are most successful in countries with good political institutions. Porta et al. (1997) document that countries with legislations better protecting outside investors have more developed equity and debt markets.

  2. Boeri and Tito (2005) discusses the political economy of structural reforms in the labor and product markets.

  3. Structural financial reforms refer to reforms that increase the role of market forces and competition in the financial sector (i.e., financial liberalizations), while maintaining appropriate regulatory frameworks to deal with market failures.

  4. It should be noted that different definitions of government strength and cohesiveness can be found in the literature, which are not based on the party composition of ruling coalitions. Government fragmentation is usually measured either by the number of parties in a coalition or by their relative size (as approximated by a Herfindahl index).

  5. Notice that it would be extremely difficult to use the same war of attrition framework used in the literature on stabilization efforts in the context of the analysis of financial reforms. The reason is that one of the main ingredients of the stabilization war of attrition game is that waiting is costly for all the agents and time just unveils the most impatient by raising costs. When studying delays in financial reforms, though, it may be claimed that the agents resisting reform are not paying any costs for waiting, but their being infinitely patient would imply an instantaneous solution of the game with the counterparts paying immediately the costs of reform.

  6. See also Perotti and Volpin (2007) and Bebchuk and Neeman (2010), who use the Grossman and Helpman (1994) framework to the context of investor protection. In the context of our paper, it is not possible to directly address the causal relation between government fragmentation and the effectiveness of lobbying because unfortunately we are not aware of any source of reliable and comparable data on lobbying activities outside the USA, but this is the only country in our sample that has never been ruled by a coalition of parties (see Table 8).

  7. On the literature connecting the nature of political institutions and financial policies, Bortolotti and Faccio (2009) show that privatization programs tend to be incomplete in countries with proportional electoral systems and centralized political authority. Pagano and Volpin (2005) find that strong shareholder protection is more likely in countries with majoritarian electoral systems. Lambert et al. (2018) survey this literature on the nature of political institutions and financial outcomes.

  8. The countries included in the analysis are reported in Table 8. The following OECD member countries are not included due to data availability: Iceland, Luxembourg, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia.

  9. Democratic institutions have to ensure, among others, political competition and openness—i.e., the existence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can effectively express their preferences about alternative leaders and policies, the presence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive, and other aspects of the political environment, such as the rule of law, freedom of the press, systems of checks and balances (see Polity IV project for further developments).

  10. More details can be found in the Polity IV handbook.

  11. This restriction implies that some countries are not considered since 1975. As an example, Chile and Turkey are not included before 1989 and 1983, respectively. We treat the censored observations as randomly missing, and we do not attempt to model this aspect of sample selection.

  12. Of the seven dimensions, this dimension is the only one where a greater degree of government intervention is coded as a reform (see Abiad et al. 2010).

  13. Out of the 788 observations of \(\Delta\)FR reported in Table 2, we identify 18 cases of reversals, that is a negative \(\Delta\)FR.

  14. See Beck et al. (2001) for further information.

  15. Indeed, a few relatively big parties can have the same Herfindahl as one big and many small parties. However, after having checked by hand each coalition government in our dataset, we did not detect cases where a same Herfindahl value is reported for different compositions of government.

  16. The presence of the lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side implies that the fixed-effects estimator is biased, albeit the bias is likely to disappear for a fixed number of countries as the number of time periods increases. In practice; however, Judson and Owen (1999) have shown that the bias is negligible for panels that cover more than 20 years. We have an average number of year per country equal to 24.

  17. We focus on such unit increase in NUMBER OF PARTIES because it relates to some concrete feature of the political equilibrium and it is quite close to the standard deviation of NUMBER OF PARTIES (1.449).

  18. Huang (2009) and Campos and Coricelli (2012) report similar findings.

  19. More exactly, we include in our base specification the variable POLARIZ defined as the maximum ideological polarization between the executive party and the four principle parties of the legislature (sourced from WBDPI database).

  20. We obtain qualitatively similar results by using NUMBER OF PARTIES.

  21. HERFGOV is positive and significant, with a coefficient of 0.022 (p value of 0.012), while NUMBER OF PARTIES is negative and significant, with a coefficient of − 0.002 (p value of 0.083), if we take a specification similar to columns (1) and (5) of Table 4, respectively.

  22. Claessens and Perotti (2007) review the experience with financial reform in the context of inequality.

  23. Alternatively, the difference in size between the largest government and opposition party could be used. The results still hold under this slightly different specification of the RELATIVE STRENGTH variable, but the coefficients in the second stage are somehow less significant when country fixed effects are used in the first-stage regressions.

  24. Our instruments are significantly different from zero at conventional levels in first-stage regressions. The first-stage F-statistics, reported at the bottom of Table 6, are above the 19.93 value required for a 2SLS estimation with two instruments, meaning that our instruments are strong and thus satisfy the relevance condition (Stock and Motohiro 2005). Moreover, the Hansen J-statistics as well as the difference-in-Sargan statistics suggest that our instruments are not correlated with \(\epsilon _{c,t}\), the error term of the structural Equation (2), and thus satisfy the exclusion condition.

  25. It may be argued that the presence of unobserved economic and social trends can affect election results or the perception of success or failure of previous financial reforms. However, the inclusion of a country trend in both regression stages, together with our set of control variables, does not affect our results. The table with the inclusion of country trends is available under request.

  26. For robustness purposes concerning the definition of crises variables, we also replicated these results employing measures of currency and banking crises as used by Abiad and Mody (2005) and as constructed by Bordo et al. (2001). The inclusion of these measures restricts our sample to 25 countries on the 1975–1997 period. Regardless of which indices of government fragmentation we use, we obtain results that are similar to those in Table 4. HERFGOV is always positive and significant, with a coefficient of 0.039 (p value of 0.002) if we take a specification similar to column (1) of Table 4. Similarly, NUMBER OF PARTIES shows a negative coefficient (value of − 0.004) and significantly different from zero (p value of 0.086).

  27. Indeed, by assigning various subdimensions that are then normalized between 0 and 3 for each of the seven dimensions of financial sector policy, Abiad et al. (2010) offer a more continuous-like index. See Huang (2009) who proposes a critical discussion on the use of ordered logit methods in this context.

  28. All variables introduced in this section are drawn from the WBDPI database and details on their construction can be found in the WBDPI codebook (see also Beck et al. 2001).

  29. In addition, including other indices of government fragmentation such as government and opposition vote shares and overall parliamentary fractionalization as in Mian et al. (2014), the significant effect of government fragmentation continues to hold and be highly significant. In addition, consistently with Mian et al. (2014), we find that parliamentary fractionalization per se does not seem to be a significant determinant of financial reform, and the same holds for the government vote share. Only the opposition vote share plays some role in slowing down reforms, but the results are barely statistically and economically significant. These results are not reported in the paper for the sake brevity, but are available under request.

  30. For presidential systems CHECKS is the sum of 1 (for the President), and the number of relevant legislative chambers. However, if there are closed lists and the President’s party is the main government party, then the relevant legislative chambers are not counted. For parliamentary systems, CHECKS is the sum of 1 (for the Prime Minister) and the number of parties in the coalition. If there are closed lists and the Prime Minister’s party is the main government party, then this sum is reduced by one.

  31. Note that if the returns were lower than in the rest of the world, say for a relative abundance of savings, the impact of the reform would be irrelevant for capital holders because they would not face additional competition in local financial inputs.

  32. See Perotti and Volpin (2007) whose work also uses this framework to study the conflict of interests between incumbent and new firms with respect to the level of investor protection. In their model, incumbent firms exert influence to lower investor protection insofar as it discourages entry by new firms. Putting aside entry-deterrence interests, Bebchuk and Neeman (2010) develop a model in which insiders use corporate assets they control to lobby politicians to provide a suboptimal level of investor protection and, thereby, protect their control rents. We follow here their approach of outlining a model in which semi-benevolent politicians may fail to implement welfare maximizing policy because of lobbying activities. In contrast, in our model, we look at the mechanism according to which small veto players in coalition governments can increase the probability of deviating from the socially optimal policy.

  33. For simplicity, we keep on assuming that returns on capital invested in the rest of the world are lower than in the economy considered, but the amount of capital flowing into the country is constrained by domestic policy decisions, with the share of world savings invested in the country depending on the investment opportunities opened up through financial reforms undertaken by semi-benevolent politicians who give the same weight to workers’ and savers’ welfare.

  34. The variable L can be seen as representing lobbying, but it can embrace many different activities, such as campaign contributions, business opportunities, charitable donations, and so forth. In this respect, Grossman and Helpman (1996) and Besley and Coate (2001) develop contrasted approaches on lobbying activities, while Harstad and Svensson (2011) make an interesting distinction between bribing and lobbying.

  35. This assumption prevents corner solutions in which politicians just target the largest group.

  36. Benevolence cannot be directly observed, but larger parties can be assumed to better internalize the welfare impact on their wider constituency. In addition, widespread institutional arrangements such as granting an amount of public funding support proportional to party size also help large parties better internalize general welfare concerns.

  37. Consistently with this channel of influence, we repeated our regression results using a somehow less precise but more immediately evident proxy for the smallest party in a coalition government, namely a dummy variable set to one if at least one government party holds less than 20% of the government seat shares. The results are remarkably in line to the ones obtained in “Main Results” section and are in line with the prediction that small parties, at the extreme of the size distribution in a coalition, are the drivers of the reform agenda. For a specification similar to column (1) of Table 4, the dummy variable for governments with a party holding less than 20% of the seats has a coefficient of − 0.009 (p value of 0.048). Since the threshold of 20% is arbitrarily chosen, we perform sensitivity analyses using different thresholds, and we obtain qualitatively similar results.

  38. On the notion that politicians shape their preferences on reform based on a combination of idiosyncratic ideological bias and external influence such as lobbying, see, for example, evidence from the USA provided by Mian et al. (2010).

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Acknowledgements

We would like to thank João Amaro de Matos, Marco Becht, Paul Belleflamme, Andreas Bernecker, Nauro Campos (the editor), Andrea Conte, Gianmarco Daniele, Eric de Bodt, Valerie De Bruyckere, Marc Deloof, Brandon Julio, Elias Papaioannou, Enrico Perotti, Pau Rabanal, Armin Schwienbacher, Paolo Volpin, Teng Wang, and an anonymous referee, along with audiences in Aix-en-Provence, Antwerp, Brussels, Cambridge, Chicago, Liège, Lille, Louvain-la-Neuve, Malaga, Milan, New Orleans, Rome, and Sydney for helpful comments and suggestions. The paper was completed while Thomas Lambert was visiting the London Business School. We also acknowledge financial support from the Université catholique de Louvain. The views expressed are solely those of the authors and may not in any circumstances be regarded as stating an official position of the European Commission.

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  1. Economic and Financial Affairs (General Secretariat), Council of the European Union, Rue de la Loi 175, 1048, Brussels, Belgium

    Francesco Di Comite

  2. Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University, PO Box 1738, 3000 DR, Rotterdam, The Netherlands

    Thomas Lambert

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Appendix

Appendix

See Tables 8, 9, 10, and 11.

Table 8 Descriptive statistics per country
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Table 9 Content of financial reforms
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Table 10 Financial crises
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Table 11 Ordered logit estimations
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Di Comite, F., Lambert, T. Reforming Finance Under Fragmented Governments. Comp Econ Stud 62, 105–148 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41294-019-00108-w

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