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Collaborative production networks among unequal actors

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 July 2020

Manuel Muñoz-Herrera Open the ORCID record for Manuel Muñoz-Herrera [Opens in a new window] ,
Jacob Dijkstra ,
Andreas Flache  and
Rafael Wittek
Manuel Muñoz-Herrera*
Affiliation:
New York University Abu Dhabi
Jacob Dijkstra
Affiliation:
University of Groningen (e-mails: jdikstra@rug.nl, a.flache@rug.nl, r.p.m.wittek@rug.nl)
Andreas Flache
Affiliation:
University of Groningen (e-mails: jdikstra@rug.nl, a.flache@rug.nl, r.p.m.wittek@rug.nl)
Rafael Wittek
Affiliation:
University of Groningen (e-mails: jdikstra@rug.nl, a.flache@rug.nl, r.p.m.wittek@rug.nl)
*
*Corresponding author. Email: manumunoz@nyu.edu
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Abstract

We develop a model of strategic network formation of collaborations to analyze the consequences of an understudied but consequential form of heterogeneity: differences between actors in the form of their production functions. We also address how this interacts with resource heterogeneity, as a way to measure the impact actors have as potential partners on a collaborative project. Some actors (e.g., start-up firms) may exhibit increasing returns to their investment into collaboration projects, while others (e.g., established firms) may face decreasing returns. Our model provides insights into how actor heterogeneity can help explain well-observed collaboration patterns. We show that if there is a direct relation between increasing returns and resources, start-ups exclude mature firms and networks become segregated by types of production function, portraying dominant group architectures. On the other hand, if there is an inverse relation between increasing returns and resources, networks portray core-periphery architectures, where the mature firms form a core and start-ups with low-resources link to them.

Keywords

collaborationexchangeinequalityheterogeneity
Type
Research Article
Information
Network Science , Volume 9 , Issue 1 , March 2021 , pp. 1 - 17
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

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