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Rethinking Augustine’s Misunderstanding of First Movements: the Moral Psychology of Preliminary Passions

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An Author Correction to this article was published on 31 May 2021

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Abstract

Augustine’s theory of first movements (primus motus, propatheia, and propassio) has provoked many controversies over the years. When discussing Augustine’s position in preliminary passions, some scholars maintain that he misunderstands the Stoics, whereas some others argue that he grasps their works rather well and his accounts are consistent with Stoic teaching. This article examines how Augustine transforms his predecessors’ conception of first movements into his own theory, with particular focus on whether Augustine misinterprets his predecessor’s doctrine in his approach. The first section introduces the recent disputations on Augustine’s misunderstanding of the Stoic concept of the first movements. The second section compares Augustine’s opinions in his early, middle, and late writings to determine whether changes occur in his interpretation. Based on the above observations, this essay argues that Augustine is familiar with the Stoic doctrines, but in his later works, he ‘deliberately’ deviates from their concept of the first movements in order to refute their ‘pride’ and to defend his Christian position on the psychology of preliminary passions. These deliberate new changes of terms by Augustine do not derive from a misunderstanding, but rather follow from his attempt at constructing a new dynamic theological framework of addressing passions during his later thought. The article concludes with a third section that revisits the modern critiques and responds with a consideration of the significance of Augustine’s views on preliminary passions.

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Notes

  1. The term ‘emotion’ had not yet appeared during Augustine’s time. The earliest record dates back to the French word émouvoir (it refers to ‘stir up’) during the 1570s of the sixteenth century. Augustine adopts a group of Latin words, such as passio, perturbatio, affectus, libido, motus animae, and concupiscentia, to refer to the source of behavioral changes other than free choice. In this article, I prefer to use the term ‘passion’ when referring to emotions because the word ‘passion’ is close to the Latin passio and the Greek pathos. I shall also analyze the concept of passions from the dynamic perspective of Augustine's theological anthropology. For a survey of the development of the category of emotion, see Thomas Dixon, From Passions to Emotions: The Creation of a Secular Psychological Category (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 1–61; Thomas Dixon, ‘Revolting Passions,’ in Faith, Rationality and the Passions, ed. Sarah Coakley (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 181–196; Risto Saarinen, Recognition and Religion: A Historical and Systematic Study (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 54–58; Timo Nisula, Augustine and the Functions of Concupiscence (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 15–27; 35–47. For a general discussion of the psychology of passions in ancient philosophy, see also Gao Yuan, Freedom from Passions in Augustine (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2017), 21–143; Simo Knuuttila, Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 152–172.

  2. While propassio, propatheia, and primus motus were common usages in Augustine’s era, he did not adopt them, preferring expressions such as suggestio (De sermone Domini in monte 12.34–5), passio praeveniens mentis (De civitate Dei 9.4–5), or perturbatio (Quaestiones in Heptateuchum 1.30). In modern scholarly discussions, researchers often use various terms such as ‘preliminary passions,’ ‘first movements,’ ‘prepassions,’ ‘preliminary reactions,’ and ‘preliminary impulses’ interchangeably. For a survey of the terminology of preliminary passions in Augustine and his predecessors, see Simo Knuuttila, Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 152–172; 178–194.

  3. Augustine accepted the Stoic ideas of passions in his early years and blamed himself for his uncontrollable emotions on the death of his mother, Monica. In conf. 9.12, he asks, ‘did I blame the weakness of my passion, and refrain my flood of grieving?’ At last, Augustine ‘has offended’ (weeping) in bewailing his mother for some time (flevisse me matrem exigua parte horae).

  4. In order to examine Augustine’s actual positions on first movements, we divide his writings into three time periods, adopting the years 395 and 411 as approximate dividing points. The dividing points of Augustine’s writings are based upon his altering ideas of passions during various stages of his life. For the general dividing years, we adopt Peter Brown’s suggestions. See Peter Brown, Augustine of Hippo: A Biography (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2000), 177–181; 279–283. This periodization of Augustine’s writings (in three time periods), however, is neither exclusive nor arbitrary, for a discussion on the periodization by Peter Brown, see Paul R. Kolbet, Augustine and the Cure of Souls: Revising a Classical Ideal (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2009), 14–16.

  5. Marcia Colish notes that the text of Noctes Atticae (19.1.14–20) paraphrases the argument from Epictetus’s lost fifth book of Discourses that influenced Augustine’s comments in De civitate Dei 9.4. See Marcia Colish, The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to The Early Middle Ages, vol. 2 (Leiden: Brill, 1985), 179; 221–225.

  6. ‘He [Augustine] cites the Stoics’ acceptance of first movements as if it proved that they really accepted emotion itself.’ Richard Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 10. Sorabji usually uses the term ‘first movement’ (primus motus) to refer to propassio or propatheia in his works.

  7. ‘Augustine has not noticed Seneca’s point that involuntary first movements are common to all the emotions.’ Sorabji 2000, 11.

  8. ‘Why is Augustine so blind to the Stoic distinction between involuntary first movements and willed emotion? There is more than one reason. First, by turning first movements into thoughts and suggestions, Origen obscured the distinction between them and emotions, which the Stoics saw as thoughts. Consequently, the description of first movements as the preliminaries (principia) of emotion, which had left the distinction quite clear in Seneca, leaves it unclear in Origen and subsequent Church Fathers.’ Sorabji 2000, 382. A similar argument is also emphasized in Sorabji’s Introduction chapter (Ibid., 8). For Origen’s influence on Augustine, see Joseph W. Trigg, ‘Origen,’ in Augustine through the Ages: An Encyclopedia, ed. Allan D. Fitzgerald (Michigan/Cambridge: Eerdmans, 1999), 603–605; György Heidl, Origen’s Influence on the Young Augustine: A Chapter of the History of Origenism (Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press, 2003); Simo Knuuttila, Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), 170.

  9. After a discussion of Seneca’s three cases of first movements, which Augustine also coincidently discusses, Sorabji states that Augustine did not actually read Seneca’s account of it. ‘If Augustine had read Seneca, instead of Aulus Gellius, would he have seen that he did not here have a sufficient reason to downgrade lust in comparison with anger?’ Sorabji 2000, 11.

  10. ‘I shall argue that Augustine is partly misled by Gellius’ change of the letters “ll” to “v.” The Stoic is allowed to grow pale (pallescere), but Gellius adds that he is allowed to have the jitters (pavescere), a nice literary word which hovers ambiguously between merely trembling and having real fear.’ Sorabji 2000, 10. He maintains that Gellius’ mistaken paraphrasis of pallescere in pavescere changes the conception of merely physical movement into a psychological term that misled Augustine’s judgments. Ibid., 375–384.

  11. ‘Augustine connects our inability to avoid fear and grief with original sin.’ Sorabji 2000, 166.

  12. ‘He [Augustine] is steeped in a Platonic view of the soul, which, in contrast with the Stoic view, holds that emotion is the product of irrational forces in the soul and does not have to await the assent of reason, as the Stoics suppose.’ Sorabji 2000, 10.

  13. ‘In defending moderate emotion, he cites the Stoics’ acceptance of first movements as if it proved that they really accepted emotion itself.’ Ibid., 10.

  14. Sorabji maintains that the Stoics certainly admit that they could experience first movements, but they do not consider them to be passions. Augustine’s claim that the Stoics could not resist such ‘passions’ is based on his misunderstanding that a first movement is a passion in the Stoic doctrine. Ibid., 10.

  15. ‘Augustine takes the anecdote from Aulus Gellius, noct. 19.1, paraphrasing Epictetus; Augustine cites it again in hept.1.30 to prove the same point. But Augustine is mistaken. The original anecdote seems to have concerned not the passions but the “prepassions” and to have been garbled by Gellius in transmission.’ Peter King, ‘Dispassionate Passions,’ in Emotion and Cognitive Life in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy, ed. Martin Pickavé and Lisa Shapiro (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 17 (n. 26).

  16. See King 2012, 17–18.

  17. This article is echoed in the chapter of ‘Preliminary Passions’ in Sarah Catherine Byers, Perception, Sensibility, and Moral Motivation in Augustine: A Stoic-Platonic Synthesis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 100–126.

  18. Sarah C. Byers, ‘Augustine and the Cognitive Cause of Stoic “Preliminary Passions (Propatheiai),”’ in Journal of the History of Philosophy (41: 4, 2003), 437, 438 and 441. Cf. Byers 2013, 102, 103 and 106.

  19. ‘What evidence do we have that Augustine knew and was influenced by these (Seneca’s) accounts of preliminary passions? Although he does not mention Seneca by name when he directly addresses the topic of affectivity, he indicates that he had more than average knowledge of Seneca in the Confessiones…he makes use of the same metaphors and identifies the same causes of anger as Seneca does.’ Byers 2003, 436; Byers 2013, 102.

  20. See De ira 2.1.4; 2.3.5. ‘In Seneca we find the claim that preliminaries to anger are caused by the reception of an impression (species, opinio) that one has been injured, without approval or acceptance (adprobare, capere) of the impression as true.’ Byers 2003, 436; Byers 2013, 102.

  21. Aulus Gellius, Noctes Atticae 19.1.15–21:Visa animi, quas фαντασίας (phantasias) philosophi appellant, quibus mens hominis prima statim specie accidentis ad animum rei pellitur, non voluntatis sunt neque arbitraria, sed vi quadam sua inferunt sese hominibus noscitanda…et in eo tamen brevi motu naturali magis infirmitati cedamus, quam quod esse ea, qualia visa sunt, censeamus.(For English translation, see footnote 28 below). Margaret Graver also maintains that Seneca, Epictetus, Gellius, and Cicero have nearly the same accounts on propatheiai in their works (e.g., De ira 2.1–4, Noctes Atticae 19.1, Tusculanae disputationes 3.83). M. Graver, ‘Philo of Alexandria and the Origins of the Stoic propatheiai,’ Phronesis (44:4, 1999), 301 (This article also appears in the book Philo of Alexandria and Post-Aristotelian Philosophy, ed. Francesca Alesse (Leiden·Boston: Brill, 2008), 197–222).

  22. Byers 2003, 436; Byers 2013, 61 (n. 22).

  23. Byers points out that the mens-animus distinction is presented in Seneca’s De ira 1.16.7; 2.2.2; 2.3.5; 2.4.2, Gellius’ Noctes Atticae 19.1.17–18, and Augustine’s De civitate Dei 9.4–5, which illustrates their inner connections. ‘Since Seneca regularly attributes superficial changes and preliminary passions to the animus, but judgment that constitutes a passion to the mens…Augustine is in line with his Stoic sources when he invokes a mens-animus distinction.’ Byers 2003, 437–438; Byers 2013, 104.

  24. ‘Reflecting on those accounts of preliminary passions with which he [Augustine] was familiar, he argues that a reflex reaction of panic fear to a surprise event cannot be explained except as a wavering in (though not a loss of) the virtue of the impressed person, which must be due to a momentary weakness in said person’s apprehension of the truth (“light”).’ Byers 2003, 438; Byers 2013, 104–105. I think that the reference Byers has in mind is not a sermon, but En. Ps. 37.15.

  25. ‘…he [Augustine] denies that preliminary passions are sins. Augustine thinks they are evidence of a damaged, weakened state of soul.’ Byers 2003, 438 (n. 37); Byers 2013, 104 and 111 (n. 73).

  26. ‘Augustine said that a passion is caused by a false judgment that a temporal good has the value of the eternal goods. And he held that in a preliminary passion, one doubts whether a particular temporal good has the value of eternal goods.’ See Byers 2003, 440; Byers 2013, 108.

  27. Byers 2003, 442–444; Byers 2013, 104–110.

  28. The first group consists of Augustine’s early writings (before the mid-390s) such as De musica, De quantitate animae, De moribus ecclesiae Catholicae, De ordine, Contra Academicos, De beata uita, De immortalitate animae, and De libero arbitrio. Augustine’s middle period works (written approximately 395–411) include De Genesi ad litteram, De Trinitate, Confessiones, De baptismo, Contra Faustum Manichaeum, De bono coniugali, and De sancta uirginitate. The main sources from Augustine’s last period (412–430) are comprised of De civitate Dei, Quaestiones in Heptateuchum, and his polemical treatises De peccatorum meritis et remissione, De natura et gratia, De nuptiis et concupiscientia, De gratia et libero arbitrio, De correptione et gratia, and Contra Iulianum, among others. For the periodization of Augustine’s writings, see footnote 4 above.

  29. De civitate Dei 9.4: In eo libro se legisse dicit A. Gellius hoc Stoicis placuisse, quod animi visa, quas appellant phantasias nec in potestate est utrum et quando incidant animo, cum veniunt ex terribilibus et formidabilibus rebus, necesse est etiam sapientis animum moveant, ita ut paulisper vel pavescat metu, vel tristitia contrahatur, tamquam his passionibus praevenientibus mentis et rationis officium; nec ideo tamen in mente fieri opinionem mali, nec adprobari ista eisque consentiri. Hoc enim esse volunt in potestate idque interesse censent inter animum sapientis et stulti, quod stulti animus eisdem passionibus cedit atque adcommodat mentis adsensum; sapientis autem, quamvis eas necessitate patiatur, retinet tamen de his, quae adpetere vel fugere rationabiliter debet, veram et stabilem inconcussa mente sententiam. We adopt R.W. Dyson’s translation, making some modifications on the basis of T.H. Irwin’s translation when that seems more exact. See T.H. Irwin, ‘Augustine’s Criticisms of The Stoic Theory of Passions,’ in Faith and Philosophy (20: 4, 2003), 435. See also Quaestiones in Heptateuchum 1.30, where Augustine discusses the same passage from Aulus Gellius, using the terms perturbatio and affectio instead of passio. In this article, the English translation for Augustine’s De civitate Dei, if not otherwise stated, from The City of God against the Pagans, ed. and transl. R.W. Dyson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

  30. Noctes Atticae 19.1.15–20: Visa animi, quas фαντασίας (phantasias) philosophi appellant…non voluntatis sunt neque arbitraria…probationes autem, quas συγκαταθέσεις (sugkatatheseis) vocant, quibus eadem visa noscuntur, voluntariae sunt fiuntque hominum arbitratu. Propterea cum sonus aliquis formidabilis aut caelo aut ex ruina…sapientis quoque animum paulisper moveri et contrahi et pallescere necessum est, non opinione alicuius mali praecepta, sed quibusdam motibus rapidis et inconsultis officium mentis atque rationis praevertentibus. Mox tamen ille sapiens ibidem τάς τοιαύτας фαντασίας (id est visa istaec animi sui terrifica), non adprobat (hoc est οὐ συγκαταθέται οὐδέ προσεπιδοξάζει), sed abicit respuitque, nec ei metuendum esse in his quicquam videtur. Atque hoc inter insipientis sapientisque animum differre dicunt, quod insipiens, qualia sibi esse primo animi sui pulsu visa sunt saeva et aspera, talia esse vero putat et eadem incepta, tamquam si iure metuenda sint…sapiens autem, cum breviter et strictim colore atque vultu motus est, οὐ συγκαταθέται, sed statum vigorem que sententiae suae retinet... Apart from a minor revision, this translation is quoted from Irwin. See T.H. Irwin, ‘Augustine’s Criticisms of The Stoic Theory of Passions,’ in Faith and Philosophy (20: 4, 2003), 435.

  31. See Sorabji’s discussions in footnote 10 above. Cf. Sorabji 2000, 10; 375–384.

  32. See Gerard O’Daly, Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind (London: Duckworth, 1987), 84–87.

  33. De musica 6.9.24: sicut aliud est ad ea, quae corpus patitur, moueri, quod fit in sentiendo, aliud mouere se ad corpus, quod fit in operando, aliud quod ex his motibus in anima factum est continere, quod est meminisse, ita est aliud adnuere uel renuere his motibus, aut cum primitus exeruntur, aut cum recordatione resuscitantur, quod fit in delectatione conuenientiae et offensione absurditatis talium motionum siue adfectionum, et aliud est aestimare, utrum recte an secus ista delectent, quod fit ratiocinando. For the English quotation, see Martin Jacobsson, AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS.DE MUSICA VI: A Critical Edition with a Translation and an Introduction (Institutionen för klassiska språk, Stockholm 2002), 59.

  34. De musica 6.10.25–26: Deinde uidit in motibus corporum aliud esse, quod breuitate et productione temporis uariaretur, in quantum magis esset minusue diuturnum, aliud localium spatiorum percussione in quibusdam gradibus celetiratis et tarditatis. Qua diuisione facta illud, quod in temporis mora esset, modestis interuallis et humano sensui adcommodatis articulatim uarios efficere numeros eorumque genera…Postremo adtendit, quid in his moderandis, operandis, sentiendis, retinendis ageret anima, cuius caput ipsa esset…quid est, quod in sensibili numerositate diligimus? Ibid., 61.

  35. De quantitate animae 23.41: ...nam sensum puto esse, non latere animam quod patitur corpus. Placet mihi haec definitio. The English citation is from Gerard O’Daly, see O’Daly 1987, 86. O’Daly argues that Augustine’s definition of perception (or ‘under awareness,’ non latere) is influenced by the Stoic concept of ‘awareness’ (sunaisthesis). O’Daly 1987, 86 (n. 15).

  36. De quantitate animae 28.54: ...sensu enim nos multae bestiae superant…mente autem, ratione, scientia, nos illis deus praeposuit. Sed ille sensus ea quibus tales animae delectantur, accedente consuetudine cuius magna uis est, potest discernere; atque eo facilius, quod anima belluarum magis corpori affixa est, cuius sunt illi sensus quibus utitur ad uictum uoluptatem que quam ex eodem illo corpore capit. For the English quotation, see O’Daly 1987, 98.

  37. Epistulae 7.4–5: Omnes has imagines, quas phantasias cum multis uocas, in tria genera commodissime ac uerissime distribui uideo: quorum est unum sensis rebus impressum, alterum putatis, tertium ratis…In hac tota imaginum silua credo tibi non uideri primum illud genus ad animam, priusquam inhaereat sensibus, pertinere…Quo fit, ut nullo pacto animam credam nondum corpore sentientem, nondum per sensus uanissimos mortali et fugaci substantia uerberatam in tanta falsitatis ignominia iacuisse. See Augustine, Letters (1–82), translated by Sister Wilfrid Parsons, The Fathers of the Church 12 (Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 1951) [originally composed 410-420 A.D.].

  38. De Genesi adversus Manichaeos 2.14.21: si cupiditas nostra non mouebitur ad peccandum, excludetur serpentis astutia; si autem mota fuerit, quasi mulieri iam persuasum erit. Sed aliquando ratio uiriliter etiam commotam cupiditatem refrenat atque compescit. Quod cum fit, non labimur in peccatum, sed cum aliquanta luctatione coronamur. For the English translation, see Knuuttila 2004, 170.

  39. De Trinitate 9.6.10: unde etiam phantasias rerum corporalium per corporis sensum haustas et quodam modo infusas memoriae, ex quibus etiam ea quae non uisa sunt ficto phantasmate…aliis omnino regulis supra mentem nostram incommutabiliter manentibus uel approbare apud nosmetipsos uel improbare conuincimur cum recte aliquid approbamus aut improbamus. (‘Whence the images of corporeal things also, which we draw in through the bodily sense and which flow in some way into memory, and from which things that have not been seen are also presented to the mind under a fancied image…by rules that are wholly different, which remain unchangeably above our mind when we rightly approve or disapprove of anything’ [Translated by Stephen McKenna]). See Gareth B. Matthews (ed.), On the Trinity: Books 8–15 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 32.

  40. Gn. litt. 12.12.25: Sed cum vigilantes, neque mente a sensibus corporis alienata, in visione corporali sumus, discernimus ab ea visionem spiritalem, qua corpora absentia imaginaliter cogitamus…Ab his omnibus ita discernimus illa corporalia quae videmus, et in quibus praesentibus sunt sensus corporis nostri. The English translation is from Hill’s edition. See Edmund Hill and John E. Rotelle (transl. and ed.), On Genesis (New York: New City Press, 2002).

  41. Gn. litt. 12.15.31: porro ipsa phantasia, quae fit in cogitatione sermocinantis, cum ita expressa fuerit in uisione somniantis, ut inter illam et ueram conmixtionem corporum non discernatur, continuo mouetur caro et sequitur, quod eum motum sequi solet, cum hoc tam sine peccato fiat, quam sine peccato a uigilante dicitur, quod ut diceretur sine dubio cogitatum est.

  42. The case of concupiscence in the marriage and baptism is complicated, since procreation is a permitted act, for which ‘the filth of marriage’ could be forgiven. In the fallen state, men easily succumb to the temptation of concupiscentia carnis and they habitually consent to unwholesome sexual suggestions. However, the love of grace, when poured into their heart, provides crucial aid to improve their control over their sexual passions in accordance with righteousness. This renewal, Augustine believes, is attained through faith, leading Christians to virtuous actions and a holy life. Thus, Augustine attributes the therapy of carnal desire/concupiscentia to the mercy and grace of God through the faith. Augustine compares Christian and non-Christian behaviors in terms of concupiscence in his anti-Julian treatise, De nuptiis et concupiscentia, in which Augustine argues that grace will aid the baptized in cultivating good habits and resisting their disobedient sexual desires. See De nuptiis et concupiscentia 1.25: ‘In the case, however, of the regenerate, concupiscence is not itself sin any longer…this guilt [concupiscence], by Christ’s grace through the remission of all sins, is not suffered to prevail in the regenerate man, if he does not yield obedience to it whenever it urges him to the commission of evil. As arising from sin, it is, I say, called sin, although in the regenerate it is not actually sin.’ Augustine states that marital sexual desire (concupiscentia nuptialis) for procreating is not a sin (Ep. 6.5–8); it seems to be a legitimate use of the damaged concupiscible part of the soul. See John M. Rist, Augustine: Ancient Thought Baptized (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 323.

  43. Expositio quarumdam propositionum ex epistula apostoli ad Romanos, PL 35, 2066. See Knuuttila 2004, 169.

  44. Knuuttila 2004, 170.

  45. Knuuttila 2004, 170. For a discussion regarding the inherited evil inclinations and their involuntary activations remaining sinful in Augustine, see Wu Tianyue, ‘Augustine on Involuntary Sin: A Philosophical Defense,’ in Augustiniana 59 (2009), 45–78; ‘Did Augustine Lose the Philosophical Battle in the Debate with Julian of Eclanum on Concupiscentia Carnis and Voluntas?’ in Augustiniana 57 (2007a), 7–30; ‘Rethinking Augustine’s Adaptation of “First Movements” of Affection,’ in The Modern Schoolman 87 (2010), 95–115; ‘Shame in the Context of Sin: Augustine on the Feeling of Shame in De civitate Dei’ in Les Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales 74 (2007b), 1–31. Cf. Simo Knuuttila, ‘The Emotion of Shame in Medieval Philosophy,’ in Spazio Filosofico 5 (2012), 243–249; Timo Nisula, Augustine and the Functions of Concupiscence (Leiden·Boston: Brill, 2012), 254–262.

  46. De civitate Dei 1.25: Quod si illa concupiscentialis inoboedientia, quae adhuc in membris moribundis habitat, praeter nostrae uoluntatis legem quasi lege sua mouetur, quanto magis absque culpa est in corpore non consentientis, si absque culpa est in corpore dormientis! Although Augustine does not use the word passio here, he mentions concupiscentia and refers lustful disobedience (concupiscentialis inoboedientia) to an involuntary passion as a sort of first movements.

  47. Augustine criticizes the Stoics for arguing that it is evil and inhuman to blame some preliminary passions such as compassions; it would be more honorable for them to experience compassion rather than the fear of shipwrecks. See De civitate Dei 9.5: Nam et misericordiam Stoicorum est solere culpare; sed quanto honestius ille Stoicus misericordia perturbaretur hominis liberandi quam timore naufragii…Nulla de virtutibus tuis nec admirabilior nec gratior misericordia est.

  48. Augustine incorporates the term passio corporis in De musica and De quantitate many times, but these terms do not convey the meaning of emotional ‘passion.’ See De musica 6.5.10: videtur mihi anima cum sentit in corpore, non ab illo aliquid pati, sed in ejus passionibus attentius agere…has operationes passionibus corporis puto animam exhibere cum sentit, non easdem passiones recipere. (‘it seems to me that the soul suffers when it has a sensation in the body, but that it merely acts with more attention when the body suffers something from objects…when it senses, it adds operations to the reactions of the body, but it never receives these same sensations’). Cf. De quantitate animae 25.48: passio corporis per se ipsam non latens animam (‘perception is something directly undergone by the body of which the soul is aware,’ see O’Daly, 1987, 86).

  49. Augustine often uses the expression of passio corporis, but this passio does not have the meaning of emotional ‘passion,’ but rather refers to the ‘suffering’ or ‘reaction’ of the body. Thus far, by combining this notion with first movements, he is in line with the Stoics. But passio has the double meaning of both ‘suffering’ and emotional ‘passion’ in his era, which provides a basis for him to move from the ‘affection of the body’ (passio corporis) terminology to the emotional use of ‘passion’ as a means of refuting the Stoic position on the first movements.

  50. Serm. 75.4: Tamen, fratres, maxima perturbatio in ista navi non est, nisi in absentia Domini. Augustine explains this by citing the example of Peter’s staggering with fear and desire in sinking into water in Serm. 80.6: ‘Peter too…staggered…he began to tremble…And yet when he grew afraid he cried out…Then the Lord took him by the hand and said… “Why did you doubt?”…This fulfilled what was said in the psalm: “If,” I said, “my foot has slipped, your mercy, Lord, came to my help.”’ Cf. Matthew 14:29–31. In Serm. 76.1, 76.8–9, 75.10, 19.4; Ep. 30, 2, 3.10–12, there are similar examples about Peter’s doubts and hesitations with fear in the stormy sea. See also Byers 2003, 443–444. In addition, to refer to temptations that are actually passions, Augustine also uses ‘being tossed about by storms of desires’ (Serm. 75.4….suis quisque tempestatibus quatitur et iniquitatibus et cupiditatibus suis). Byers maintains that Augustine adheres to the Stoic view that a first movement is not yet a passion, but she has to admit that this case (Serm. 75.4–5) makes her confused because it seems that Augustine indeed uses such storms of desires (as first movements) to refer to passions. This demonstrates that Byers’s argument is not without problems. ‘Somewhat confusingly, elsewhere in this sermon (Serm. 75.4–5), Augustine switches back and forth between using “being tossed about by storms of desires’ to signify temptations, as he does here, and using it to signify desires which are actually passions.’ Byers 2003, 444 (n. 82). Cf. ‘[being] tossed upon a sea of passions’ in De civitate Dei 9.6.

  51. Serm. 76.9: Sed cum fluctuat cupiditate cor tuum, ut vincas tuam cupiditatem, invoca Christi divinitatem. (‘But when desires fluctuating in your heart, you could win your desires by invoking the divinity of Christ’).

  52. Serm. 76.6: Ergo ambulavit Petrus super aquas in iussu Domini, sciens hoc se a se habere non posse. Fide valuit quod humana infirmitas non valeret. (‘Therefore, Peter walked on the water following the commandment of the Lord, knowing that there will be nothing to lose. Strong in faith so that the human infirmity decreases’).

  53. The priority of grace permits only an uneasy role for Stoic cognitive moral therapies. For Augustine, growth in faith is not only a gift [from God] for renewing passions, but also a real morality that true saints cannot boast but humbly give thanks. This vision of a virtuous human life, based upon faith and grace, is different from the self-possession and the moral expansion endorsed by the Stoic philosophers. See Jesse Couenhoven, ‘Review of Sarah Byers’ Perception, Sensibility and Moral Motivation in Augustine,’ in the American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly (89:1, 2015), 156–159. For the Stoic philosophy as a cognitive psychotherapy, see also Donald Robertson, The Philosophy of Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy: Stoic Philosophy as Rational and Cognitive Psychotherapy (London: Karnac Books, 2010). Cf. Paul R. Kolbet, ‘Augustine among the Ancient Therapists,’ in Augustine and Psychology, ed. Sandra Lee Dixon, John Doody, and Kim Paffenroth (Maryland: Lexington Books, 2013), 91–114.

  54. See Gao Yuan, Freedom from Passions in Augustine (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2017),143.

  55. See Books IX and XIV of De civitate Dei in particular. According to Augustine’s late theology, what the Stoics and Peripatetics refer to as virtues, justice, will, and love are, in a certain sense, cool, injustice, arrogance, and even inhuman. Augustine suggests a theory of ‘the weight of will and love’ (pondus voluntatis et amoris) in addressing these conceptions. In this state, the people’s love is always directed towards themselves rather than to the supreme and immutable good. This fallen tendency in people is pride (superbia) and is regarded as a defect because they love the wrong object in the reverse order. Thus, to Augustine, Stoic, and Peripatetic love is actually self-love and pride that displays human sinfulness. Augustine argues that it is inappropriate to evaluate the quality of a passion in terms of such a distorted and disordered love. For Augustine’s notion of ‘the weight of will and love,’ see De civitate Dei 11.16; 13.18; 19.12; 22.11, De musica. 6.11.29, Gn. litt. 4.3.7–4.5.12; 4.4.8; 4.18.34, De Trin. 6.10.12; 11.11.18, Conf. 13.9.10; 4.15.27; 7.17.23. For a relevant discussion, see also Miikka Ruokanen, Theology of Social Life in Augustine’s De civitate Dei (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1993), 48–50.

  56. De civitate Dei 9.5: Nam et misericordiam Stoicorum est solere culpare; sed quanto honestius ille Stoicus misericordia perturbaretur hominis liberandi quam timore naufragii. (‘The Stoics, indeed, are wont to reproach even compassion. But how much more honorable it would have been if the Stoic in Aulus Gellius’ story had been disturbed by compassion for a fellow man, in order to comfort him, rather than by fear of shipwreck!’). For Augustine, in situations such as a shipwreck, what the Stoics refer to as the first movements without compassion for others is tantamount to a scandal. This is not a virtue, but a vice. For Augustine’s objections to the Stoic values of compassion, see T.H. Irwin, The Development of Ethics (Vol.1): From Socrates to the Reformation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 405–406.

  57. For the pride of philosophers, see Irwin 2007, 418–427; Ruokanen 1993, 131–142.

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Acknowledgements

I would like to take the opportunity to express my heartfelt thanks to my two supervisors, Professor Simo Knuuttila and Professor Miikka Ruokanen, who offered invaluable advice during the first draft of this paper. Also, special thanks to Lucy Melville from Peter Lang who kindly gave permission for the use of material from my book, Freedom from Passions in Augustine (2017). Their generous support allowed me to deepen my appreciation of, and rethink, Augustine's position from a new dynamic theological scheme of the psychotherapy of first movements. Finally, I would like to express my deep gratitude to the editors of Sophia in getting this manuscript ready for publication. Any and all errors remain my responsibility.

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Research Funds: The National Social Science Fund of China National Project: “Beyond Ancient Philosophy: Augustine’s Theory of Emotions” (19FZXB030); China’s Ministry of Education National Project of Humanities and Social Sciences: “The Maritime Silk Road: A Study of the First Latin Translations of the Confucian Classics in the Western World” (19YJC720012, China).

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Gao, Y. Rethinking Augustine’s Misunderstanding of First Movements: the Moral Psychology of Preliminary Passions. SOPHIA 60, 139–155 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-019-00733-z

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