1 Introduction

On 23 January 2020, the Government of the Netherlands adopted a Royal Decree concerning the appointment of a national group at the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA Decree).Footnote 1 The PCA Decree aims to provide fairness, transparency and consistency in terms of the membership of the national group and its tasks of selecting candidate judges for election to various international courts.Footnote 2 These issues are of considerable importance in light of the requirement that international judges must act, and must be perceived to act, impartially and independently from the States over whose affairs they may pass judgment. This short contribution puts the Dutch national group in the context of the relevant international legal framework and analyses the specifics of the PCA Decree (Sect. 2), followed by an evaluation of its strengths and weaknesses (Sect. 3) and a conclusion (Sect. 4). It will be argued that while the PCA Decree offers a number of welcome procedural specifications and innovations, it contains elements that deserve refinement and improvement in order to prevent that the Dutch national group acts (or is perceived to act) as a rubber stamp institution that simply carries out the will of the Government when making nominations for the international judiciary.

2 The International Legal Framework of National Groups and the Details of the PCA Decree

Each member State to the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions must appoint up to four persons of known competency in questions of international law and available to act as arbitrators under the auspices of the PCA.Footnote 3 These persons are appointed for a term of six years and may be reappointed without limitation as to the number of consecutive terms. A group of persons accordingly constituted by each PCA member State forms a so-called national group.

National groups do not only form a pool of individuals available to act as arbitrators when called upon. Over the years, they have been assigned additional responsibilities in the field of international law and dispute settlement. In particular, the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) provides that national groups may submit nominations for candidate judges, who are then up for election by the General Assembly and by the Security Council.Footnote 4 National groups have an exclusive right to make these nominations and, subject to one (to date, still) theoretical exception,Footnote 5 a candidate cannot be elected unless nominated by at least one such group.

The choice to give this competence to national groups stems from the institutional design of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ).Footnote 6 When formulating plans for the establishment of the PCIJ, the Advisory Committee of Jurists successfully proposed that the choice of judges ‘should not be left entirely to the discretion of governments, but that […] the opinions of the enlightened few who are qualified to gauge the merits of persons to be selected for nomination, should have a great influence’.Footnote 7 As observed later by the Informal Inter-Allied Committee in 1945, this system was meant to ‘diminish the intrusion of political considerations into the nomination of candidates [and] to spread the responsibility for the choice of a candidate amongst a great number of persons’.Footnote 8 Accordingly, it was decided to bestow this responsibility on the independent national groups at the PCA, so as to separate the nomination process as much as possible from political influence or interference.

National groups may also nominate candidate judges for election to the International Criminal Court (ICC) if the relevant State party to the Rome Statute for the ICC chooses to make use of this option.Footnote 9 The Netherlands has done this in the past and will do so in the upcoming elections.Footnote 10

With the role of potential arbitrators gradually relegated to the background, the individuals in national groups are nowadays chosen more with a view to their function as members of a body nominating candidate judges at international courts.Footnote 11 This is also reflected in the PCA Decree, which is largely devoted to the composition of the national group in light of their function as a nominating body.

As for nominating candidate judges to the ICJ and the ICC, the PCA Decree offers a number of procedural specifications and innovations. First and foremost, the PCA Decree offers a list of individuals eligible for membership in the Dutch national group based on the exercise of certain predefined functions in the field of international law. Eligible are, in the order in which they are listed: (a) the Chair of the Advisory Committee on Issues of Public International Law (CAVV); the Dutch judge at (b) the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), (c) the ICJ, (d) the ICC (or, if there is none, a member of the Dutch judiciaryFootnote 12), (e) the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS); and (f) the Dutch member of the International Law Commission (ILC).Footnote 13 These individuals are deemed to possess a broad and in-depth knowledge of international law, as well as wide international judicial and/or academic experience.Footnote 14 While members were previously appointed by Royal Decree, they will now be appointed by the Minister acting alone.Footnote 15

The mandate of the previous members of the Dutch national group expired on 22 April 2020. As from 23 April 2020, the newly constituted Dutch national group would have consisted of Professor Larissa van den Herik (CAVV Chair; University of Leiden), Judge Jolien Schukking (ECHR), Judge Martin Kuijer (Supreme Court of the Netherlands) and Judge Liesbeth Lijnzaad (ITLOS). However, these new members of the PCA have been appointed as of 1 July 2020,Footnote 16 in order to prevent appointments in a period in which nominations are due. This created a brief period in which there was no Dutch national group at the PCA.

The PCA Decree not only outlines the composition of the Dutch national group. It also provides certain specifics on its working methods and procedures. For instance, the national group is to follow a ‘fair, transparent and consistent procedure’,Footnote 17 such as objective decision-making and the publication of a recruitment profile with specific knowledge and experience requirements.Footnote 18 Moreover, the group is explicitly called upon to take into account the relevant international regulations.Footnote 19 Here one can think of rules governing the qualifications of candidate judges, the recommendation to consult with relevant judicial bodies and legal institutions,Footnote 20 and (for the ICC) the detailed rules of the mandatory system of minimum voting requirements.Footnote 21 The PCA Decree also stipulates that the national group must refrain from nominating one of their own members as a candidate judge for the ICJ or ICC, unless the member in question already holds the judicial position, in which case (s)he would be eligible for re-election on one occasion.Footnote 22 Finally yet importantly, the Decree envisages a regular exchange of information between the national group and the Ministry. More precisely, there will be a civil service advisor (ambtelijk adviseur) in the person of the head of the International Law Division of the Legal Affairs Department,Footnote 23 and the group ‘must consult with [the] Minister on supporting the nomination’ of a Dutch candidate judge for the ICJ or the ICC.Footnote 24

3 Evaluation

It has been bemoaned in the literature that the nomination process for the international judiciary is ‘highly politicized and lacks transparency’.Footnote 25 This is generally also the case for the composition and functioning of national groups.Footnote 26 Specific details and transparency concerning the membership and functioning of the Dutch group are thus in principle to be welcomed, given that a credible and open process for nominations and elections ‘is critical to having a strong and legitimate judiciary’.Footnote 27 However, there are some specific elements in the PCA Decree that deserve further reflection or perhaps even refinement and improvement. In what follows, comments are made in relation to aspects of the institutional design of the national group (Sect. 3.1) and its function as a nominating body (Sect. 3.2).

3.1 Institutional Aspects of the Dutch National Group

First of all, the PCA Decree is to be applauded because it unequivocally stipulates that members of the Dutch national group enjoy a full mandate of six years, even if in the meantime they cease to hold the position from which their eligibility originally derived.Footnote 28 The fact that this is noted here with such acclaim may come as a surprise, but a little known fact must be pointed out. It is accepted practice by the PCA International Bureau that even prior to the expiration of the six-year mandate, a PCA member State is free to withdraw or replace one or more members of its national group.Footnote 29 The International Bureau gives effect to this because there is no rule in the 1899/1907 Hague Conventions that explicitly excludes this. In the present author’s opinion, this is an unduly formalistic position,Footnote 30 and at least one national group has publicly criticized this practice on the ground that it allows abrupt changes ‘in order to promote or prevent the presentation of certain nominations’ for election.Footnote 31

The PCA Decree introduces a standard that has to be met before someone can be taken off the list. It provides that any member of the Dutch national group may be suspended and dismissed by the Minister ‘on grounds of unsuitability, incompetence or for other compelling reasons’.Footnote 32 This gives the members more security of mandate compared to national groups of States that lack a similar regulatory framework. Nevertheless, it would have been preferable to leave a decision on dismissal to the unanimous opinion of the other members rather than to the Minister in order to minimize the potential for undue interference with the group’s work as much as possible.Footnote 33

The considerations that are decisive for the selection of members of national groups are largely unknown.Footnote 34 It is positive to see that the PCA Decree has a predefined list of eligible members, which guarantees in a transparent manner the existence of a predictably composed Dutch group. This is quite a change from the situation that prevailed before, given that the members used to be appointed through informal procedures based on individual merit.Footnote 35 Moreover, a Dutch national group will exist as long as appointments are made on time.Footnote 36 Despite the call in the PCA’s constituent instrument, a large minority of PCA member States do not have a national group at all.Footnote 37 When these States (as well as States not party to the 1899/1907 Hague Conventions) put forward nominations for election to the ICC and/or the ICJ, they do so through ad hoc groups constituted for the particular occasion,Footnote 38 thereby exposing the process to a risk of direct governmental influence.

That said, one might question the wisdom of granting membership of the Dutch national group as the automatic result of exercising the functions as listed in the PCA Decree. Although a predefined list has merits in that it removes the absolute discretion—a wary observer could even say, arbitrariness—of appointing individuals who may be more inclined than others to echo the preferences of the Government, it may be questioned whether this particular list is the most ideal solution. To take a pertinent example, judges at the ECHR are expected to have a strong background in national law and/or human rights,Footnote 39 but there is no guarantee that they are by definition in the best position to gauge the merits of candidates who are to work in the field of public international law or international criminal law. The presence of the Dutch ECHR judge as a member of the national group is all the more surprising because the group is not given any role in the nomination of judges for the Strasbourg court. This is not to say, of course, that the persons who are eligible for membership of the Dutch national group are not competent with regard to the judicial or legal function they already exercise. However, it is an altogether different matter whether they are necessarily competent for the purpose of selecting candidates for election to the ICC and the ICJ.Footnote 40

A related critical comment that can be raised regarding the composition of the Dutch national group is that it draws heavily from the judiciary. Apart from the Chair of the CAVV and (should there be oneFootnote 41) the ILC member, all other members of the national group exercise judicial functions. The new design for the group essentially enables an improperly intimate process by which international judges nominate persons for election to become international judges and these elected judges, in turn, become members of the national group, and so on and so forth. There is little room for academics or practitioners. For instance, conspicuously absent from the list of eligible candidates is the external legal advisor of the Minister (extern volkenrechtelijk adviseur),Footnote 42 a member of the Royal Netherlands Society of International Law (Koninklijke Nederlandse Vereniging voor Internationaal Recht),Footnote 43 or a Dutch member of the Institut de droit international.Footnote 44 The inclusion of one of them would provide not only additional subject-matter expertise in the area of public international law, it would also contribute to the national group acting (or being perceived to act) more independently. In short, the PCA Decree lacks balance in terms of professional background and contributes to maintaining the ‘old boys’ network’ to the detriment of potentially talented new blood.

By the way, the term ‘old boys’ network’ should not be taken too literally here. In fact, it is rather refreshing to see that the newly composed Dutch national group includes three women. Women are vastly underrepresented amongst the members of the PCA,Footnote 45 and in the international judiciary as a whole.Footnote 46 This is problematic, given that national groups with a mixed composition are likely to present a more balanced selection of candidates to the benefit of international courts.Footnote 47

3.2 Procedural Aspects: The Dutch National Group as a Nominating Body

3.2.1 The Nomination of Candidate Judges for Election to the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court

The general lack of independence of national groups from political influence and control is widely documented in the literature.Footnote 48 The process by which the newly composed Dutch national group is to put forward nominations is unfortunately not immune from such critique.

Arguably, the most troubling aspect of the PCA Decree relates to the actual or apparent governmental ‘steering’ of the Dutch group. One may wonder, for instance, if the members of the national group will still be able to meet and discuss amongst themselves without the presence of the civil service adviser from the Ministry even if, as the Explanatory Memorandum states, the adviser will not take part in the selection of candidates or their nomination. More importantly, though, the PCA Decree emphasises the need to maintain a continuous dialogue between the Ministry and the national group, stressing that the group is obliged to consult with the Minister before submitting the nomination of a Dutch candidate to the UN Secretary-General or to the President of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute. The instruction for the national group to consult with the Minister on supporting the nomination of a candidate is closely related to the declared strategy to have candidacies ‘in accordance with the government’s policy priorities […] viewed as whole’.Footnote 49

The Explanatory Memorandum describes the underlying process as follows. First, the Government will draw up a strategy for candidacies for international positions, aiming to have someone from the Netherlands on the ICJ, the ICC, the ITLOS, or the ILC (though not expecting to have more than one in these positions). This strategy, in turn, determines for which candidates the Government is prepared to campaign. Once the strategy is adopted, the group will be informed and the Government will make ‘detailed implementing arrangements in consultation with the national group’ to ensure that the envisaged candidate has a realistic prospect of being elected.Footnote 50

The message appears to be clear: the Government intends to commit the national group to its overall strategy concerning international judicial appointments, and once its envisaged candidate has taken the seat in one of the four institutions, it would ‘not [be] necessary for the national group to recruit, select and, where appropriate, nominate a candidate’ for other elections.Footnote 51 This appears to subdue the Dutch group to the express or implied will of the Government. It also downplays their relevance in submitting (co-)nominations of candidates of other nationalities, which is a very minimalist conception of the constitutional duty for the Government to promote the development of the international legal order.Footnote 52

3.2.2 Residual Powers of Nomination in Respect of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the International Law Commission, and the Nobel Peace Prize

The PCA Decree further provides that upon request by the Minister, the national group shall submit a nomination of a candidate for election to the ITLOS or the ILC.Footnote 53 This involvement with respect to institutions other than the ICJ and the ICC is to be commended. As observed by the Institut de droit international during its 2011 session, the practice of these groups ‘playing a role in the selection of candidates to other international courts and tribunals […] deserves to be applied more broadly’.Footnote 54 Here, the role of the national group is confined to the domestic sphere. Thus, even though the national group may be invited by the Minister to recruit and select a (presumably Dutch) candidate, the Minister remains ultimately responsible for submitting the nomination on behalf of the Netherlands.Footnote 55 The Explanatory Memorandum does not unequivocally state that the Minister is bound to submit (at the international level) the same candidate as originally proposed by the group (at the domestic level), but as a matter of good faith and collegiality one could expect that the Minister would follow up on the nomination after requesting it in the first place.

Finally, on account of their membership of an international ‘court’, each individual member of the PCA national groups is entitled to nominate candidates for the Nobel Peace Prize.Footnote 56 For reasons unexplained, the PCA Decree assigns this prerogative to the group as a whole, rather than to its individual members.Footnote 57 This is an unjustified restriction by domestic law of a privilege granted by a foreign body, the Norwegian Nobel Committee (a committee set up by the Norwegian Parliament). Accordingly, the members of the Dutch group are advised to pay no heed to it, all the more because the PCA Decree also stipulates that it must take into account in its activities international regulations currently in force. The Norwegian Nobel Institute adopts the position that ‘since the Norwegian Nobel Committee writes its own statutes, which are thereupon sanctioned by the Nobel Foundation in Stockholm, the right for individual PCA members to make nominations will not be altered by any changes in the official laws and regulations of [any] State’.Footnote 58 Ideally, the PCA Decree should be amended to bring it into line with paragraph 3 of the Nobel Peace Prize Regulations.

4 Conclusion

The work of the men and women who nominate candidates for election to international courts and tribunals is of paramount importance. They are the gatekeepers of the whole process. In the whole chain of selecting judges, the choice of nominees at the national level is ‘the most crucial link […] and it is potentially the weakest, since it depends on the competence and integrity of the government’.Footnote 59 Thus, in light of their function as a nominating body, the composition and procedures governing the activities of national groups do matter.

Now, how to draw a balance after all that is said and done? It is admittedly not very easy to assess the net gains or losses brought by the new Royal Decree. Nevertheless, an attempt can be made, taking as a point of departure the original idea behind the institution of national groups, namely separating the process of nominating candidates for the international judiciary as much as possible from political considerations that might range from subtle influence to outright interference. At the same time, it is apparent that the decision to depoliticize the process of elections by giving the power of nomination to an expert body has in turn subjected to politics the question as to who should be in this body in the first place.

The Netherlands is now one of the few countries where the composition and functioning of the national group is laid down in an accessible framework in the form of domestic legislation. This is a positive development. The provision that calls upon the national group to work in a fair, transparent and consistent procedure is certainly an improvement as well, as is the possible involvement of the national group in the selection of ITLOS judges and ILC members. Yet, it appears as if transparency and possibly an extended mandate has been gained at the cost of independence.

It is a matter of realpolitik that no candidate is ever likely to be successfully elected without the support of his or her Government. The campaign that is necessary to drive a candidate to the finish line is costly, time-consuming and often involves informal bartering with other Governments.Footnote 60 As noted by Shabtai Rosenne, informal consultations between the Government and the national group are ‘by no means undesirable, and [help] the smooth completion of the election process’.Footnote 61 A nomination process that lacks any consultation with the Government could result in having no international judicial posts for the Netherlands, as the members of the national group may not necessarily know which individual would have a chance of succeeding at the diplomatic level in the General Assembly and the Security Council.

However, informal consultation is one thing; it is an altogether different matter to assert that the Dutch national group has an ‘autonomous power to nominate candidates’,Footnote 62 and in the same breath to impose consultations as a matter of obligation in order to obtain the ‘right’ Dutch candidate who fits in the overall Governmental strategy concerning the international judiciary, in terms of the persons concerned as well as the positions that the Netherlands aims for. The Government does not have a monopoly on the wisdom to come up with qualified candidates who might be elected successfully. Surely, there must be a middle ground between complete non-intervention by the Government and the presentation by the Ministry of a fait accompli if the national group wants to nominate a candidate who is to enjoy any Government support at all. The latter, as outlined in the PCA Decree, is quite a far cry from what the original drafters of the PCIJ/ICJ Statute had in mind when assigning responsibilities to the independent ‘enlightened few’ in the PCA.

In the published version of his inaugural lecture, Professor Philippe Sands recounts how in 1945 the British national group played a limited role in the nomination of Arnold McNair (who was elected to the ICJ in the year that followed). The process was mostly driven by the Foreign Office, especially the Legal Adviser of the time, Sir Eric Becket. Becket was very well aware of the delicacy of the whole process: ‘We must […] be very careful not to appear to be overriding the prerogative which belongs to [the national group], otherwise we may find that one of them begins to raise objections.’Footnote 63 With the new PCA Decree, it can only be hoped that the Minister will not be too overriding and instrumentalise the Dutch national group to a breaking point concerning its independence.