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The Fading Boundaries of Analysis and Speculation in the Vivekacūḍāmaṇi: An Argument Recognising Advaita as a Philosophy in Praxis

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Abstract

The recent scholarship on Advaita testifies that the epistemology of Advaita Vedānta is of a special sort that warrants a philosophical process of analysis and speculation in its quest for ultimate knowledge. The aim of this paper is to make a case in favour of Advaita as a philosophy than a theological enterprise and address the philosophical process required to reach the zenith of Advaita Philosophy. This would in turn give Advaita its own identity as a perennial philosophy in praxis than to hide its uniqueness under the garb of a religion or philosophy by any other standards. The first part of this paper attempts to clarify the notion of philosophy and religion and their mutual interdependence in the system of Advaita. The second part of the paper discusses the significance of language, culture, and religion, and their subsequent sublation (tūlāvidyā) as a useful tool in enabling a state of mind unfettered from hallucinations and superimpositions that is essential for undertaking uninterrupted meditative reflections. The third part of the paper refutes any suggestion that Advaita is a religious enterprise by highlighting its philosophical significance through its analytic-deductive model as an essential contribution for attaining self-realisation. The fourth part of the paper refutes the suggestion that Advaita is merely an analytical philosophy and points out the importance of speculative element in the advanced state as a necessary substitute for analysis. The fifth part of this paper, as the conclusion, argues that though the initial path of enquiry in Advaita is somewhat loaded with religio-cultural connotations and symbols, in the later phase it is transcended and overwhelmingly identified with the methods of analysis and speculation. To sum up, the philosophical significance of Advaita significantly gains prominence than its religious counterpart, namely theology.

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Notes

  1. Vākyamapratibanddhaṁ sat prakparokṣāvabhāsite; karāmalakavadbodhamaparokṣaṁ prasūyate.PD I. 62.

  2. There is much debate and speculation on the question of authorship of the text Vivekacūḍāmaṇi. However, that does not really upset the present project provided there is no dispute on the advaitic nature of the text. For further details kindly see: ‘A Prolegomenon on the Vivekacūḍāmaṇi’ in Menezes (2017, 1–40).

  3. śāstrāṇyadhītya medhāvī abhyasya ca punaḥ punaḥ; paraṁbrahma vijñāya ulkāvattānyathosṛjet.—PD IV. 45.

  4. nirguṇamapi sat Brahma…saguṇam upāsanārtham upadiśyate, BSB I. 2. 4. In Advaita the Brahman of upāsana is determinate, known as Iśvara. Iśvara is Brahman endowed with the imperfect empirical attributes for the sake of worship.

  5. A Thousand Teachings: The Upadeśasāhasrī of Śaṅkara, 11–12; See also, Sengaku Mayeda, US II. 1. 3.

  6. Thomas Aquinas, following Peter Damian argued that philosophy is the imitative auxiliary facilitator of theology (Gracia and Noone 2003, 35).

  7. “The conviction of the truth is seen to proceed from reasoning upon the salutary counsel of the wise (men of realisation)…”—VC: 13.

  8. We do not find the question of ‘women and meditation’ addressed anywhere in the text VC. One can, as John Grimes does, defend VC on its alleged male dominance. For further details kindly see Menezes (2017, 1–40).

  9. Aparokṣānubhūti of Sri Śaṅkarācārya, Swami Vimuktananda (tr.), 102, 103, 125 & 126.

  10. Na gacchati vinā pānaṁ vyādhir auṣsadha-śabdataḥ; vinā’aparokṣa anubhavaṁ brahma-śabdair na mucyate.—VC: 62.

  11. tadvadbrahmavidopadeśamananadhyānādibhirlabhyate, VC: 65.

  12. Pañcadaśī, I. 53–54.

  13. Vijātīyadehādipratyayarahitādvitīyavastusajātīyapratyayapravāho nididhyāsanaṁ—VS: 192; Rambachan (1991, 109).

  14. BṛU II. 4. 5; BṛU IV. 5. 6.

  15. Reflection should be considered a hundred times superior to hearing, and meditation (nididhyāsana) a hundred thousand times superior even to reflection, but nirvikalpa samādhi is infinite in its results.—VC: 364.

  16. Jāgrat-svapna-suṣuptiṣu sphuṭataraṁ yo’asau samujjṛmbhate pratyag-rūpatayā sad’āham-aham ityantaḥ sphurann’ ekadhā; nān’ākāra-vikāra-bhāgina imān paśyann-ahaṁ-dhīmukhān nityānanda-cidātmanā sphurati taṁ vidhi svam etaṁ hṛdi.VC: 217.

  17. Satyaṁ jñānam anantaṁ brahma viśuddhaṁ paraṁ svatas-siddham; nity’ānand’aika-rasaṁ pratyag abhinnaṁ nirantaraṁ jayati.—VC: 225.

  18. tat sarvaṁ brahm’aiva pratyastāśeṣa-bhāvanā-doṣaṁ.—VC: 227b.

  19. Hara (2005, 30); in the verse I.1.2 of BSB one can find that the ‘Brahman is the source’. It is ‘that from which these beings take birth (Tait. III.1) where origin, continuance, and dissolution are revealed in order’. However, he is not the Western God who is the provider and listener of our prayers. For details kindly see Menezes (2014).

  20. Sarvavedāntasiddhāntagocaraṁ tam agocaram; govindaṁ paramānandaṁ sadguruṁ praṇatoasmyaham.—VC: 1; Durlabhaṁ trayam evait daivānugraha-hetukam; manuṣyatvaṁ mumukṣutvaṁ mahā-puruṣa-saṁśrayah.—VC: 3; Labdhvā kathaṁcit nara-janma durlabhaṁ tatrāpi puṁstvaṁ śruti-pāra-darśanam; yastvātma-muktau na yateta mūḍhadhīḥ sa hyātmahā svaṁ vinihanty asad-grahāt.—VC: 4.

  21. Grimes (2004, 57); also see Vedānta-sāra: 1 & Vedānta-paribhāṣā:1.

  22. Paṭhantu śāstrāṇi yajantu devān kurvantu karmāṇi bhajantu devatāḥ; ātmaikyabodhena vināpi muktiḥ-ṛna siddhyati brahmaśatāntareapi.—VC: 6.

  23. Jantūnām narajanma durlabham ataḥ puṁstvaṁ tato viprataā tasmaād vaidika-dharma mārga paratā vidvattvam asmāt param; ātm’ānātma-vivecanaṁ svanubhavo brahm’ātmanā saṁsthitiḥ muktiḥ no śatajanmakotisukṛtaiḥ puņyair vinā labhyate.—VC: 2.

  24. Sva-svarūpānusandhānaṁ bhaktir ity abhidhīyate,—VC: 31; svātma-tattvānusandhānaṁ bhaktir ity apare jaguḥ,—VC:32.

  25. Nirguṇaṁ niṣkalaṁ sūkṣmaṁ nirvikalpaṁ nirañjanam; ekam ev’ādvayaṁ brahma ne’ha nān’āsti kiñcana.—VC: 468.

  26. Kumar (2004, 102); it presupposes that all the sublated and sublatable entities are unreal, for according to Śaṅkara permanency is the distinguishing character of the real, which is trikāla-abādhita. The term ‘real’ is purported to mean ‘non-existence in triple time,’ trikāla-abādhita, and ‘unreal’ to mean non-existence in triple time,’ trikāla-bādhita (Kumar 2004, 103).

  27. For an advanced study: Rao (1985, 25–30).

  28. In the ultimate realisation one cannot make distinction between primary illusion and secondary illusion, as in the strict sense there cannot be distinction between ordinary intuition and world intuition. Brahman-intuition is supposed to negate the world predicates in triple time, in such a way that there remains no trace of the things that are disvalued. The sublation of the world can take place only by primary sublation, and the presupposition of secondary illusion would only mean an analogical value for the primary sublation (Kumar 2004, 116).

  29. For Sureśvara this indirect intuition consists in ‘the understanding of the meaning of the śruti on the basis of vācya-vācaka relation underlying the sentence, thanks to the removal of any hindrance to the knowledge of the Brahman consequent to śravaṇa, manana, and the practice of śama, etc. (Hino 1991, 23).

  30. Śaṅkara’s bhāṣya on BG XIII. 13, in Bhagavadgītā: With the Commentary of Śaṅkarācārya, Swāmī Gambhīrānanda (tr.) (Kolkata: Advaita Ashrama 2010, 532).

  31. Comparable with: Ᾱpt’oktim khananaṁ tath’opariśilād’utkarṣaṇaṁ svīkṛtiṁ nikṣepaḥ samapekṣate na hi bahiḥ śabdais tu nirgacchati; tatvad brahma-vidaḥ upadeśa-manana-dhyānādibhir labhyate māyā-kārya-tirohitaṁ svamamalaṁ tattvaṁ na duryuktibhi.VC: 65.

  32. The New Theory of Reference in the philosophy of language became wide spread in the 1970s and implies that many locutions (e.g. proper names) refer directly to items, which contrasts with the traditional or old theory of reference, which implies that names and relevantly similar locutions express descriptive senses or are disguised descriptions (Smith 1999, 4).

  33. Study of the scriptures is fruitless as long as Brahman has not been experienced. And when Brahman has been experienced, it is useless to read the scriptures,—VC: 59.

  34. In order to understand the specific sense of intuition in the present paper, one requires to study the concept elaborately. The term ‘intuition’ can be explained by means of three different implications. The primary import of intuition (anubhava) is an empirical enterprise, like an artist having an intuition of his future paintings. The secondary import of anubhava can be seen as an insight into the nature of the trans-empirical reality. This is explained in VC: 212 where it is mentioned of the glimpse or the vision of the ultimate reality, which is dualistic in its nature. In the present study the main concern is the secondary import, i.e. trans-empirical insight sans experience. The highest level of intuition, according to VC, has two divisions, namely ānubhūti, which is the experience of the subject-objectless turīya; and aparokṣāanubhūti, which is the final realisation of the subject-objectless Real complimenting the dictum: jīvo brahmaiva nāparaḥ. In this sense aparokṣānubhūti is the non-dual realisation per se. The secondary import of anubhava (Intuition), so to say, is a faculty of a comprehensive vision of reality that reason, logic, and language alone cannot provide with. Reason presents a fragmentary view of reality by making unlimited divisions in it. Thus, it misses the main structure of the reality which cannot be put into any particular frame work. If the reality is infinite, then it can be viewed as an infinite whole only by means of anubhava. Anubhava is supra-rational in nature, for according to VC systematic reasoning culminates into anubhava as the final proof (VC: 474). Anubhava goes beyond logic because in the logical reasoning there is only a formal relationship among all the concepts, and logic cannot grasp the whole truth by these formal relationships. The secondary intuition can be further elaborated with the help of certain contemporary authors: The faculty of intuition is the total awareness of reality that makes no division or dissection of the things presented to it (Pradhan 2009, 91). According to Radhakrishnan, “Intuition is the basis of all thinking. Though inarticulate in itself, it gives rise to all discourse. In the very logical proof there is a grasping of the intellectual togetherness as a whole, an intuition of the whole as sustained by different steps”. (Radhakrishnan 1964, 143). Intuition goes beyond reason, yet it is not against reason. The faculty of intellect is included in the higher faculty of intuition, and so intuition can never be irrational. “Intuition is not a-logical but supra-logical. It is the wisdom gained by the whole spirit, which is above any mere fragment thereof, be it feeling or intellect” (Radhakrishnan 1964, 116).

  35. Viṣayāśā mahāpāśād yo vimuktaḥ su-dustyajāt; sa eva kalpate muktyai nānyaḥ ṣaṭśāstra-vedī api, VC: 78.

  36. Prajñavān api paṇḍito api caturo’apy-atyanta-sūksm’ārtha-dṛgvyāliḍhas tamasā na vetti bahudhā saṁbodhito’api sphuṭam; bhrānty’āropitam eva sādhu kalayaty’ālambate tadguṇān hant’āsau prabalā duranta-tamasaḥ śaktir mahaty’āvṛtiḥ, VC: 114- translated version of Swami Turīyānanda.

  37. BṛUB II. 1. 20, BSB III. 3. 1.

  38. Vedāntasāra of Sadānanda, Swāmī Nikhilānanda (tr.), (Kolkata: Advaita Ashrama 2006): vijātīyadehādi pratyayarahitādvitīya vastusajātīya pratyayapravāho nididhyāsanaṁ,—VS: 192.

  39. Speculative philosophy is defined as a philosophy professing to be founded upon intuitive or a priori insight and especially insight into the nature of the absolute or divine; broadly: a philosophy of the transcendent or one lacking empirical bases or theoretical as opposed to demonstrative philosophy. In this article the term ‘speculation’ is employed from the view point of speculative philosophy.

  40. Here, it should be noted that there is no equivalent word for the term philosophy in Indian traditions. The most accurate word that is used is darśana, which means an insight into the nature of the reality. Though in Advaita epistemology the analytic-deductive and speculative models are used, their ultimate purpose is the self-realisation.

Abbreviations

BG :

The Bhagavadgītā

BṛU :

The Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad

BṛUB :

The Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad Bhāṣya

BSB :

The Brahmasūtrabhāṣya

PD :

The Pañcadaśī

VC :

The Vivekacūḍāmaṇi

VS :

The Vedānta-sāra

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Acknowledgements

I am indebted to the Indian Council of Philosophical Research for the Post Doctoral Award, of which this article is the outcome (Grant No. F. No. 1-15/2014/ P & R/ICPR; GF).

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Menezes, W. The Fading Boundaries of Analysis and Speculation in the Vivekacūḍāmaṇi: An Argument Recognising Advaita as a Philosophy in Praxis. J. Indian Counc. Philos. Res. 36, 447–467 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40961-019-00182-6

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