Abstract
The main purpose of this paper is to uphold the very fact that there are many ways of understanding the concept Universal and also the several issues revolving round it but then the fundamental aim must be to free the ontology of any extra pressure. Thus, the prime aim of the paper is to exhibit the different ways in which discussions relating to Universals were usually dealt with. The thrust nevertheless lies on the reference of Tropes which is found to be more apt in providing a less cumbersome ontology. The aim thus is not to provide a comparative study on whether Universals are more fundamental than Particulars but to show that the usual ways of discussing Universals could be looked differently and secondarily; both Universals and Particulars are ways of explaining an object as a whole. The point thus is to concentrate on our understanding of the given object. The purpose of bringing in the reference of Tropes thus proves that there can be discussions that arise from the discussions of Universals undoubtedly but nevertheless can provide better opportunities. The methods applied are the revisiting of concepts like non-relational tie, relation of attachment, the explanation on Supervenience and finally the concept of Tropes (the ontological glue and what is it for a substance to have properties, etc.). There is also a special effort made of introducing the concept “generality” and “peculiarity.” Tropes stand true to a great extent to expectations especially as independent entities. Though it is true that they form clusters to help in the emergence of substances as a whole, their explanatory powers are a sure welcome. In philosophy, we always try to reach the simplest element or an explanation that would serve as a unit or as the fundamental, and Universals and Tropes serve this purpose in their own way.
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Notes
Transcendence as we understand to overwhelm the given is perhaps the main task of metaphysics. Universal being a metaphysical issue entertains the concept of transcendence every now and then. The present paper aims at revisiting rather the tendency of Universals as a metaphysical issue to transcendent. The prime aim though is to prove that universals do not lay any pressure on the ontology. This has partly been exhibited by the help of Supervenience theory and primarily by way of Trope theory.
Universals are exemplified by their instances for multiple cases. Hence, they can be present in their different instances with an aim to provide an explanation of their being.
The part–whole relation holds between Universals and Particulars where the binding principle is that of partial identity.
Non-relational tie binds Particular and Universal, Universal to Universal and Particular to Particular. Non-relational tie which binds Particular and Universal is sortal or instantial tie and characterizing tie, respectively. This is dealt in detail by Strawson in his book Individuals, p. 167, Methuen 1959.
Strawson, P.F, Individuals, Methuen 1959.
Armstrong, D.M., Universals and Scientific Realism, vol. I, p. 113, Cambridge University Press, 1978.
Pearce Glenn and Maynard Patrick Ed, Conceptual Change, pp. 31–41. D. Reidel Publishing Company 1973.
Pearce Glenn and Maynard Patrick Ed, Conceptual Change, p. 55. D. Reidel Publishing Company 1973.
Pearce Glenn and Maynard Patrick Ed, Conceptual Change, pp. 77–93. D. Reidel Publishing Company 1973.
I mean by “attachment” the thought that core concept only can undergo revitalization and to make this possible there are actually eccentric circles circling the core concept in an infinite fashion. These eccentric circles invite all revitalizing of the core concept and hence I intended to rescue concepts from the whole issue of change in a concept or conceptual change. Here, concepts are taken as meaning the same as Universals.
Quinton, Anthony, “Properties and Classes”, in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 1957, vol. 58.
The structure would have parts, and that which has parts is thought of as prone to destruction so the traditional concept would be reluctant in accepting this. But structural universal could overcome this conventional prejudice by a slight modification in a few basic understandings.
Simons, Peter, Particulars in Particular Clothing: Three Trope Theories of Substance, in Laurence Stephen and Macdonald Cynthia, edited Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics, Blackwell, 1988.
The nominalism that I would stick to is “moderate nominalism” which is in contrast to Armstrong’s view of “predicate nominalism.” In the case of “moderate nominalism,” one is prepared to say that there is an objective basis for the application of the same predicate such as “is red” to a number of particular things, namely particular resemblances that hold between the red objects. On the other hand, Armstrong’s view of “predicate nominalism” is an extreme view which holds that things that are called by the same name have nothing more in common than the same predicate being used in all the different cases.
We might call those theories “Particularists” to cover all of the theories that are not realist. Nominalism and Trope theory then stand in contrast to realism in being Particularists.
Laurence Stephen and Macdonald Cynthia edited Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics, Blackwell, 1988.
The question whether Trope theory has explanatory advantage over substratum and bundle theories depends in part on how the Trope theorist is to account for the unity of substances. Trope theory uses relations of compresence to bundle together the Tropes which are constitutive of substance. But compresence is typically taken to be an external, rather than an internal relation. It is given that Trope theory has as much difficulty in accounting for the unity of substances as does the bundle theory, which suffers from the objection that according to it, substances are mere collections of properties; either Trope theory along with bundle theory can appeal to extrinsic relations (which for Trope theory are further Tropes and for bundle theorist are further properties), in which case a kind of infinite regress problem threatens. The other problem which might arise is that either the extrinsic relation then needs to “glue” the original relations to one another, and so on ad infinitum or the relations that are taken to bind the properties or Tropes together may be taken to be primitive.
As I have already pointed out, this paper would help us to develop a new perception over the fundamental job of metaphysics itself, namely transcendence. It is perhaps here that my commitment gets fulfilled. Trope theory by giving us the epistemic concept of being abstract has proved that there are other dimensions of the concept of transcendence as well.
If tropes are to be made primitive in the sense that they can provide an explanation of the unity of substance, then it might be a good option to forget about substance and talk in terms of tropes and bundles. If we refrain from using the term “substance,” then that would prove the primitivity of tropes as well as prove tropes as independent entities. Our understanding of tropes then would be such that the cluster which Tropes form would enact the same function as substance used to do and the tropes which form the bundle will complement each other, hence giving a new dimension to the concept of dependency as such.
Laurence Stephen and Macdonald Cynthia edited Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics, pp. 336 Blackwell, 1988.
One important thing that needs attention and which came to me as a possible perception is Tropes are not contingently abstract; it seems to be a necessary derivative from the central commitment of Trope theory that Tropes are essentially or by their very nature, abstract. The meaning of abstract, namely its being epistemic, is made plain by way of detail analysis already made in the last few sections.
References
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Campbell, K. (1988). The metaphysics of abstract particulars. In L. Stephen & M. Cynthia (Eds.), Contemporary readings in the foundations of metaphysics. Oxford: Blackwell.
John, B., & Robert, P. (1998). A theory of structural universal. In L. Stephen & M. Cynthia (Eds.), Contemporary readings in the foundations of metaphysics. Oxford: Blackwell.
Macdonald, C. (1988). Tropes and other things. In L. Stephen & M. Cynthia (Eds.), Contemporary readings in the foundations of metaphysics. Oxford: Blackwell.
Simons, P. (1988). Particulars in particular clothing: three trope theories of substance. In L. Stephen & M. Cynthia (Eds.), Contemporary readings in the foundations of metaphysics. Oxford: Blackwell.
Strawson, P. F. (1959). Individuals. London: Methuen.
Wilfrid, S. (1973). In P. Glenn & M. Patrick (Eds.), Conceptual change. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company.
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My doctoral dissertation was on “Issues Relating to Universals: Revisited”. This paper is a modified presentation of thoughts and ideas that I nurtured in my dissertation. Thoughts behind this paper are an extension of some of the rudimentary ideas of my dissertation.
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Kanjilal, B. Revisiting Universals with Special Reference to Tropes. J. Indian Counc. Philos. Res. 37, 97–114 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40961-020-00192-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40961-020-00192-9