Abstract
While there has been considerable interest in the writings of Søren Kierkegaard and Fyodor Dostoevsky, both of whom are considered seminal existential thinkers, relatively little has been said about similarities in their thought. In this paper, I propose to read their philosophical and literary works together as texts that offer an elaborate model of an existential religious transformation. Both Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky sketch a path leading from the inauthentic, internally fragmented and egotistic self to the authentically Christian, humble and loving individual. By examining the underlying structure of this transformative process, I try to show that its portrayal is in many ways similar in the account of both writers. Furthermore, I maintain that they set out not only to describe the inner workings of the existential religious transformation, but that their effort constitutes a direct appeal to the reader to initiate the transformative process herself or himself.
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Notes
Attempts to relate Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky have been made by several commentators, most notably by Shestov (1969), Pattison (2001), Dreyfus (2006), Fryszman (1996), Gajdenko (1970) and Wilson (1982). Although deeply informative, none of them directly engages with the transformative potential of the God-encounter, which stands at the core of this paper. Nevertheless, my argument will bear some resemblance with Pattison’s claim (2001, p. 252) that both Dostoevsky and Kierkegaard appeal to the reader to join in the dialogue constituted by their texts and decide which alternative is best for him/her to choose, hopefully choosing faith and thus initiating a process of inner transformation. Additionally, I will elaborate on the connection between the protagonists of Brothers Karamazov and Kierkegaard´s double-aspect self; a link which was at first established by Dreyfus (2006). If I were to briefly summarise the remaining approaches, then: (i) Shestov finds commonalities in Kierkegaard´s and Dostoevsky´s shared rejection of abstract speculative reason, while (ii) Fryszman, along with (iii) Gajdenko, draw from Bakhtin and argue that both Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky work within a polyphonic literary framework, Fryszman emphasising the dialogical nature of interaction between the various characters. And finally, (iv) Wilson focuses on the marginal perspectives of the ‘outsiders’, seeing the Notes from the Underground and Kierkegaard’s Unscientific Postscript as offering a critique of rational humanism.
Kierkegaard (1962, p. 153/SKS13:23).
Ibid, p. 154/SKS13:23.
Kierkegaard (2009a, p. 209/SKS7:226).
Ibid, p. 290/SKS7:316.
Ibid, p. 291/SKS7:317.
Ibid, p. 297/SKS7:323.
Ibid, p. 297/SKS7:323.
Ibid, p. 465/SKS7:505.
Harrison (2013, p. 390).
Dostoevsky´s letter to Nikolai Ozmidov, PSS30.1:10–11.
Ibid, PSS30.1:10–11.
According to Lossky (1953, p. 144), faith in God and in the immortality of one’s soul stand as two pillars of Dostoevsky’s religious worldview.
See Paris (2008, pp. 82–86), for a detailed analysis of Raskolnikov’s inner conflicts.
Dostoevsky (1912, PSS14:101).
A term that Kierkegaard takes from James 4:8.
Kierkegaard, SKS8:140.
Kierkegaard (2013b, p. 13/SKS11:129).
Ibid, p. 14/SKS11:130.
Dostoevsky´s diary entry from the 16th of April 1865, PSS20:172.
Ibid, p. 586/PSS10:450.
As Garff notes (Garff 2005, p. 267), Kierkegaard spent only 4 months on the manuscript of the Concept of Anxiety, which is, even by his standards, exceedingly short time. Additionally, as McArthy (1978, p. 36) pertinently remarks, the subject matter of the book is extremely dense, and Kierkegaard is attempting once again to do much at one time. All these factors combined make the notion of the Øjeblikket difficult to interpret.
Kierkegaard (2013a, p. 87/SKS4:390).
Nizet (1973, p. 239).
Dolinin (1961, p. 347).
Dostoevsky´s letter to Sofja Kovalevskaja, as cited by Voskuil (2013, p. 213).
Dostoevsky (1912, p. 343/PSS14:292).
See Morgan (1990) for a closer analysis of Dostoevsky’s epilepsy.
Dostoevsky (1913, p. 225/PSS8:188).
Ibid, p. 225/PSS8:189.
For example, Dimkov (2019) equates Dostoevsky’s ecstatic auras with profound religious mystical experiences, which, as he claims, might have long lasting positive psychological and behavioural effects on the individual.
Dostoevsky (1912, PSS14:101).
Ibid, 382/PSS14:325.
Ibid, 383/PSS14:274.
Dostoevsky (1972, p. 611/PSS10:469).
Ibid, p. 586/PSS10:450.
Kirillov is an intriguing character and it could be easily argued that his self-deification demonstrates the pitfalls of these epiphanic ecstasies. He shows us that they might, if interpreted incorrectly, lead away from God, towards self-destructive solipsism. It is clear that Kirillov’s extensively planned suicide, apart from facilitating the goals of the revolutionary group, is simply a result of this self-deification. His reasoning is that of subjective idealism, tinted with solipsistic tendencies—arguing, that if God is non-existent, then in the absence of his divine will, all will belongs to the single individual, that is to Kirillov himself (Dostoevsky 1972, p. 614/PSS10:471). He then feels obliged to assert his own self-will and express it on the most vital point—that of his own existence. To commit suicide—to shoot himself—is then the highest possible manifestation of his own will.
Ibid, p. 88/SKS5:392.
Kierkegaard (1971, p. 349/SKS11:43).
Kierkegaard (2009b, p. 36/SKS5:415).
Ibid, p. 7/SKS5:395.
Kierkegaard (2009a, p. 387/SKS7:419).
It is also worth mentioning that in reading Dostoevsky’s and Kierkegaard’s descriptions of the God-encounter, we get the sense that they are in fact occurring somewhat ‘naturally’. Almost as if a mere concurrence of inner fragmentation and reflection upon that fragmentation is enough to steer the individual towards God.
Dreyfus (2006, p. 151).
Law (2013, p. 85).
It might be argued that Kierkegaard´s treatment of the sinful woman from Luke 7:37–50 in Three Discourses at the Communion on Fridays (1849) and then in An Upbuilding Discourse (1850) is his attempt to present a humble individual. However, I would instead maintain that the woman who was a sinner represents for Kierkegaard a prototype of a perfectly loving individual, as he repeatedly emphasises her devotion to Christ, calling her the woman who ´loved much´.
Kierkegaard (1985, p. 32/SKS4:239).
This is a crucial point, albeit the hardest one to understand. Even though it seems counter-intuitive, Kierkegaard believes that the ability to reverse one’s decision is not a sign of omnipotence, but rather a sign of weakness or indecisiveness. This idea is also picked up by Roos (1957, p. 56), who claims that Kierkegaard sees Christ as effectively trapped in his new form, as a result of his incarnation. This comes to light in Kierkegaard’s example of the relationship of a king towards a low-born girl and his subsequent descent to her level (which is required so that he can truly love her), which mirrors Christ’s descent into flesh at the time of his incarnation. Where these two accounts start to differ is at a moment when we come to the realization that the king’s servant form is just a disguise or a mask, while in case of Christ, his servant form is his truest essence; it is an innermost core of his own being, which he cannot voluntarily cast aside. Humility thus needs to be an essential, and not merely accidental, attribute of the individual.
Barrett (2013, p. 322).
Sandoz (2000).
Ziolkowski (2001).
Dostoevsky’s letter to Mikhail Katkov 8th October 1870, PSS29.1:142.
Dostoevsky, PSS20:173.
The motive of rebirth could be traced back to Dostoevsky’s experience of the mock execution, after which he proclaims in a letter to his brother that this near-death experience constitutes a turning point in his life—claiming to be reborn in a new—spiritual—form; more can be found in Dostoevsky´s letter to his brother from December 1849; in Dostoevsky (1987, p. 53/PSS28:161).
Dostoevsky´s diary entry from the 16th of April 1865, PSS20:172.
Dostoevsky (1912, p. 52/PSS14:51).
Ibid, PSS:14:289.
Ibid., 363/PSS14:262.
See Ziolkowski (2014, p. 152) for further notes on Makar´s kenoticism.
See Tucker (2000, p. 260) for further notes on Sonia´s kenoticism.
Webster (2000).
Dostoevsky (1913, p. 556/PSS8:458).
Dostoevsky, PSS5:79.
Ibid, 25/SKS9:33.
Ibid, 25/SKS9:33.
Ibid, 58/SKS9:64.
Ibid, 19/SKS9:27.
Hannay (1991, p. 247).
Walsh (1988, p. 248).
Ferreira (2013, p. 337).
Kierkegaard (1998, p. 45/SKS9:52).
Ibid, p. 146/SKS9:147–148.
Krishek (2008, p. 616).
This claim is also supported by Pattison (2013, p. 211) who argues that love, being the defining theme of the upbuilding discourses, constitutes a universally upbuilding sentiment, which does not require even any particular Christian dogmatic presuppositions. This he clarifies by alluding to a passage where Kierkegaard emphasises the ordinariness and humanness of love on an example of a large family sharing a cramped apartment yet living together in an altogether loving way.
Dostoevsky, PSS5:79.
Dostoevsky (1912, PSS14:289).
Dostoevsky (1912, p. 242/PSS14:210).
Dostoevsky (1913, p. 219/PSS8:184).
This he claims in the very last issue of his journal The Moment; Kierkegaard (1968, p. 287/SKS13:410).
Dostoevsky (1912, p. 343/PSS14:292).
Steinberg (1991, p. 66).
Dostoevsky (1912, PSS14:289).
Frank (2003, p. 597).
Scanlan (2002, p. 83).
Letter to Pobedonostsev, May, 1879; in Dostoevsky (1987, p. 467/PSS30.1:66).
Dostoevsky (1912, p. 304/PSS14:262).
Miller (2008, p. 76).
This idea is voiced by the mysterious visitor Mikhail, whom Zosima calls his ‘teacher’; Dostoevsky (1912, p. 321/PSS14:275).
See Blake (2014) for a comprehensive study of Dostoevsky’s views on Catholicism.
Dostoevsky (1912, p. 340/PSS14:289).
A good example of this is the fact that Dostoevsky sees contemporary European violence as occasioned by resurgence in Catholic devotion; see Blake (2014, p. 201).
Ibid, 202/PSS14:149.
Khan (1975, p. 63).
Especially an edifying discourse titled On the Occasion of a Wedding, where Kierkegaard writes about Kjerlighed (not of Elskov) being a duty, see Kierkegaard (2009b, p. 43/SKS5:419).
Kierkegaard (1998, p. 17/SKS9:24).
Ibid, 91/SKS9:96.
Ibid, 188/SKS9:188.
Kierkegaard (1962, p. 118/SKS16:91).
Kierkegaard (1998, p. 69,74/SKS9:76,80).
Ibid, 375/SKS9:368.
References
Original language editions
Works of Dostoevsky cited by volume and pages refer to Dostoevsky’s collected works; Polnoe sobrlanie sochinenli v tridtsati tomnakh, Leningrad, 1972–1990 (Cited as PSSvolume:page).
Works of Kierkegaard cited by volume and pages refer to Kierkegaard’s collected works; Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter, Copenhagen, 1997—Continuing. (Cited as SKSvolume:page).
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Acknowledgments
This paper was created within the project Rationality Crisis and Modern Thought, subproject Dostoevsky and Kierkegaard on subjectivity, realized at the Faculty of Arts of the Charles University in Prague, with financial support of the Specific University research in 2018.
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Vaškovic, P. A path to authenticity: Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky on existential transformation. Int J Philos Relig 87, 81–108 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-019-09732-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-019-09732-z