Abstract
Max Scheler (1874–1928) and Mencius (孟子, 372–289 BC) both take feeling to be the origin of value and could therefore be considered to be proponents of axiological sentimentalism. Despite the great spatial and temporal distance between them, there are striking similarities between the theories of value they developed. It should be noted, however, that there are also some differences between them that are mainly derived from some difficulties with their theories of value. These difficulties should be removed so that a better theory of value could be developed. It is accordingly the aim of this paper to promote a phenomenological dialogue between Scheler and Mencius that could lead to such a better theory. In Sects. 1, 2, I will first delineate Scheler’s theory of value and feeling, then that of Mencius. In Sect. 3, I will point out some difficulties with the two theories and promote a dialogue between them that would improve each theory. In Sect. 4, I will conclude with some remarks concerning the future task of the phenomenological dialogue between Scheler and Mencius.
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Notes
In this paper, “the origin of value” means “the form of consciousness in which the experience of value or the disclosure of value takes place”. Axiological rationalism, axiological sentimentalism, and axiological conativism claim, respectively, that reason, feeling, or desire is the form of consciousness in which the experience of value takes place. In this respect, Scheler as a proponent of axiological sentimentalism claims that “Values are given first of all in feeling” (FM, 56/35). Here “given” means “experienced” or “disclosed.”
Scheler (1973a, b, 1980 ). Hereafter cited as “FM” followed by the pagination of the German and the English editions, respectively (e.g., “FM, 49/26”). In this paper, due to the constraint of space, I will confine my discussion to this work. Scheler discusses the issue of value and feeling extensively in the following works as well: Scheler (1972, 1973a, 1976, 1986, 1987).
Kant (1959).
Hume (1978, p. 457).
Scheler speaks of “vital values” (die vitalen Werte) (FM, 124/107).
Scheler speaks of “spiritual values” (die geistigen Werte) (FM, 124/107).
Scheler speaks of “the values of the holy and the unholy” (die Werte des Heiligen und Unheiligen) (FM, 125/108).
Scheler enumerates seven essential traits of sensual feeling in FM, 335–339/333–337.
Scheler speaks of “purely psychic feelings” (die rein seelischen Gefühle) (FM, 344/342).
Scheler speaks of “spiritual feelings” (die geistigen Gefühle) (FM, 344/342).
FM, 47/25.
See Chan (1963, pp. 49–51).
Mencius (2003). Hereafter this work will be cited as “Mencius” followed by pagination.
See the dialogue in Mencius (2003, p. 15ff.).
See Mencius, 241ff.
See Aristotle (1980, p. 356ff).
A typical example is Bergson (1961).
I have rendered “良能” as the “good ability”.
Here instinct does not mean instinctive behavior (Instinkthandlung), but a kind of innate intentionality that is directed to a certain group of objects. The concept of instinct as a kind of innate intentionality was discussed in Lee (1993, 2017). The issue of the moral instinct was discussed in Ni (2009), Lee (2014).
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Acknowledgements
This paper was presented at the 14th Conference of the International Max Scheler Society that took place on November 25–27, 2017 at Sun Yat-Sen University, Guangzhou, China. I thank Professor Liangkang Ni, Professor Wei Zhang and Professor Guido Cusinato for their kind invitation to the conference. A Chinese version of this paper was published in Phenomenological and Philosophical Research in China 23(2018), pp. 347–371 and a German version of this paper was published in C. Guthland/X. Yang/W. Zhang(eds.), Scheler und das asiatische Denken im Weltalter des Ausgleichs, Scheleriana volume 6, Nordhausen: Verlag Traugott Bautz GmbH, 2019, pp. 117–134. I would like to express my thanks to an anonymous reviewer who carefully read an earlier version of this paper and made two invaluable comments, one on the concept of the origin of value and the other on the issue of lessons from Mencius to Scheler. This work was supported by Global Research Network program through the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF-2017S1A2A2039388).
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Lee, NI. Feeling as the origin of value in Scheler and Mencius. Cont Philos Rev 53, 141–155 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-020-09496-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-020-09496-8