Abstract
According to Gamper (Sci Ontol Axiomathes 29:99–102, 2019), one function of science is to determine how the world is. Science, Gamper continues, rests on a set of basic assumptions, and the gap between basic assumptions and science should be filled by ontological frameworks that accommodates the modal properties of such assumptions. Different frameworks may surely suggest different modal properties. Thus, in so far as we use different basic assumptions, we can have different ontologies with different modal properties. Ontologies affect, in turn, science, which, however, has the power to falsify the ontological frameworks. The aim of this article is to show a possible trouble of Gamper's proposal, here considered as applied to the geographical debate.
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Tambassi, T. On Scientific Ontology: A Reply to Gamper. Axiomathes 31, 549–552 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-020-09498-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-020-09498-4