Skip to main content
Log in

Should Animalists Be “Transplanimalists”?

  • Original Paper
  • Published:
Axiomathes Aims and scope Submit manuscript

A Correction to this article was published on 15 June 2020

This article has been updated

Abstract

Animalism, the view that human persons are human animals in the most straightforward, non-derivative sense, is typically taken to conflict with the intuition that a human person would follow her functioning cerebrum were it to be transplanted into another living human body. Some animalists, however, have recently called into question the incompatibility between animalism and this “Transplant Intuition,” arguing that a human animal would be relocated with her transplanted cerebrum. In this paper, we consider the prospects for this cerebrum transplant-compatible variant of animalism, which we call “Transplanimalism.” After presenting its account of three related thought experiments, and outlining its key advantages over Standard Animalism, we raise two concerns for Transplanimalism. First, we argue that Transplanimalism, like other closest-continuer accounts of the human person, encounters difficulties with symmetrical fission cases. Second, we introduce a new thought experiment that pushes Transplanimalism into surprisingly counterintuitive results. As a result of these concerns, we conclude that, despite its attractiveness, animalists should not endorse Transplanimalism.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Change history

Notes

  1. Proponents of Standard Animalism include van Inwagen (1990) and Olson (1997, 2003, 2007), though Olson has since distanced himself from the view, which he now calls “Strong Animalism”, in favor of a more modest version of animalism that he calls “Weak Animalism” (see Olson (2015b)). It should be noted that the third tenet of Standard Animalism is usually spelled out in terms of psychological continuity more generally: psychological continuity is neither necessary nor sufficient for the persistence of a human animal. But since we focus on cerebrum transplant cases in this essay, we have taken the liberty of further specifying the typical third tenet of Standard Animalism.

  2. See, for example, Snowdon (1991, 2014: 201–216), Olson (1997: 42–44, 2003: 324–325, 2016b: 145–146), Noonan (2003: 196–205), Shoemaker (2008), Parfit (2012: 9–11).

  3. The main proponent of the view that we are calling Contingent Animalism is Sauchelli (2017, 2018: 135–137). Other proponents of this sort of view include Joungbin Lim (2018), David Hershenov (2008, 2011), and Mark Spencer (2010). Lim defends an anti-criterialist version of Contingent Animalism, whereas Hershenov and Spencer defend a hylomorphic version of Contingent Animalism. Contingent Animalism is also considered favorably, though not explicitly endorsed, in Bailey (2015) and Thornton (2016), and considered disfavorably, if not outright rejected, in Olson (2016b: 102–106 and 2016b: 151–152), though Olson is not particularly careful in distinguishing between Contingent Animalism and the view that we are calling Transplanimalism.

  4. The main proponent of the view that we are calling Transplanimalism is Madden (2016), but an earlier version of this sort of view was also defended by Shewmon (1997), and perhaps even earlier by Wiggins (1967) [see Madden (2016: fn 2) for a brief history of Wiggins’s shifting views on this issue]. Transplanimalism is also considered favorably, though not explicitly endorsed, in Bailey (2015) and Thornton (2016), and considered disfavorably, if not outright rejected, in Olson (2007: 173–174; 2015b: 102–106; 2016b: 151–152), though in the two latter works Olson seems to run together Contingent Animalism and the view that we are calling Transplanimalism. Parfit (2012) suggests that if animalists were to accept the transplant intuition, then the view would collapse into a version of Neo-Lockeanism, but Transplanimalism’s account of the third case below will show that to be false.

  5. The earliest instance of this type of thought experiment of which we are aware is Shewmon (1985). For a more recent formulation see Madden (2016).

  6. See, for example, van Inwagen (1990: 169–181), Olson (1997: 44–46, 131–135). More recently, however, Olson has distanced himself from the brain–stem criterion [see, for example, Olson (2016a)].

  7. Precisely why transplanimalists hold that a human animal could survive such an operation are considered in Sect. 4 below. At this point we are simply presenting its account of what happens to the human animal in each of these cases.

  8. The earliest instance of this type of thought experiment of which are aware is Shoemaker (1963), though in its earliest formulation the thought experiment involves the transplantation of the person’s entire brain. Van Inwagen (1990: 172–181) and Olson (1997: 44–46) hold that transplanting the person’s whole brain (cerebrum, cerebellum, and brain–stem) would indeed relocate the human animal from one body to another, and so in order to get the proper conflict between Standard Animalism and the Transplant Intuition, the transplant has to be spelled out in terms of the relocation of just the person’s cerebrum.

  9. Once again, the reasons why the human animal follows its transplanted cerebrum, according to Transplanimalism are considered in Sect. 4 below.

  10. Whether we speak of the human animal in such a state as being composed solely of its cerebrum or solely of atoms arranged cerebrum-wise will depend on whether the transplanimalist chooses to recognize the existence of things like cerebra. Several contemporary animalists, due to their commitment to a theory of material composition known as biological minimalism, according to which the only composite material objects that exist are living organisms, famously deny the existence of such parts (see, for example, van Inwagen (1990), Olson (1995, 2007, 2015a, 2016b). In such case, all references to cerebra here and throughout the rest of our discussion can be replaced with “atoms arranged cerebrum-wise”.

  11. Alternatively, the transplanimalist could say that rather than ceasing to exist, the second human animal remains alive, comes to have its cranium occupied by another, cerebrum-sized animal, and now serves as sort of life support for that animal. (Thanks to [reference redacted Jason Eberl for purposes of blind review] for bringing this suggestion to our attention.) Transplanimalists typically understand such cases to involve the lives of the two human animals becoming so fully integrated as to compose one single life, however, thus resulting in one single human animal. And so, in what follows, we take the latter account to be characteristic of Transplanimalism.

  12. Those who are familiar with such cases will recognize that what transplanimalists are suggesting here is that the removal of the cerebrum of the original human animal produces a new human animal by means of fission and the placement of that cerebrum into the second body destroys a human animal by means of fusion. See Sect. 4 below for more on this.

  13. Olson (1997: 7–9).

  14. A human animal in a PVS, due to its damaged condition, might not qualify as a “person” in the Lockean sense, but importantly it would still be a living human animal, and the same living human animal that was there before the injury. According to animalism, I am the human animal, and so after falling into a PVS, the damaged or debilitated human animal that remains would still be me.

  15. See citations in fn 2 above.

  16. Johnston (2007, 2016), Toner (2014), Olson (2015a, 2016a, b) and Sauchelli (2017).

  17. See, for example, Olson (1997, 2003, 2016a, b) and Snowdon (1991, 2014).

  18. “…we must consider what person stands for; which, I think, is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places…” (Locke (1996: 138).

  19. Olson (2016b).

  20. The litany of objections that follows is drawn from Olson (2007: 173–175, 2015b: 102–106). See also Madden (2016).

  21. Madden (2016).

  22. Ibid., p. 4.

  23. Ibid., p. 6.

  24. Ibid., p. 7.

  25. Ibid., p. 10.

  26. For a disjunctive account of our persistence conditions very similar to the “uniqueness strategy” suggested here, see Hershenov (2008, 2011) and Spencer (2010). Madden dismisses this alternative strategy as a “metaphysical fetishization of the ‘personal’ capacities for moral responsibility, self-reflection, and so on, which distinguish us from other animals” (2016: 6).

  27. Madden (2016: 15).

  28. Ibid.

  29. Rupert et al. (2004: 886–887).

  30. Madden (2016: 16).

  31. Ibid.

  32. Jones (2015).

  33. Madden (2016: 6).

  34. This seems to be confirmed by actual commissurotomy cases, in which patients have lost functionality in one cerebral hemisphere, but have retained a large portion of their psychological profile (see, for example, Choi (2007)).

  35. Or, if one hemisphere turns out to have a greater number of the human animal’s human–animal-characteristic capacities, then assume that there is at least some operation that could split the cerebral cortex in such a way that the two resulting halves contain the same number of the relevant capacities.

  36. Compare to the “My Division” case described in Parfit (1984: 153–154).

  37. Madden (2016: 5).

  38. We have drawn these options from Parfit (1984: 255–256), though they are familiar from other places in the literature as well. There is at least one more possible option: there could have been two human animals there before the operation, only after which this becomes apparent, but we won’t pursue this option here.

  39. Notice that in the second case, the uniqueness strategy allows for the Transplanimalist to discern the fate of the original animal. For, according to the uniqueness strategy, the identity of the human animal follows its psychological capacities, whether or not those capacities outnumber the other capacities that are preserved elsewhere.

  40. Perhaps it is best to describe the scenario as one in which the original human animal comes to be multi-located rather than spatially-scattered, but we won’t pursue this option here.

  41. Parfit (1984: 256).

  42. Noonan (2003: 127–139). See also Hawley (2005).

  43. See, for example, Olson (1997: 42–52).

  44. Monozygotic twinning, for example, appears to be a symmetrical fission of the early embryo, though not all animalists would be willing to grant that we have a human animal at that stage of development. Olson (2016a) also considers the possibility that if a human animal could survive without its brain–stem, then relocating the human animal’s whole brain may actually give rise to two paths along which the original human animal’s biological life appears to be preserved. Here too, though, not all animalists would be willing to grant that a human animal can survive without a functioning brain–stem. For a discussion of how Standard Animalists might address potential symmetrical fission cases like these see Snowdon (2014).

  45. What is the transplanted right cerebral hemisphere, then? Well, it isn’t Luke, since Luke was left behind, even though it possesses approximately half of Luke’s psychology. And it isn’t Matthew until later in the thought experiment (it isn’t even a part of Matthew until it is successfully transplanted into his cranium). Is it a human animal? If it is, then it turns out that there is a third, short-lived human animal in this thought experiment (one that comes into existence upon the removal of the right cerebral hemisphere from Luke’s cranium and perishes upon the successful transplantation of that cerebral hemisphere into Matthew’s cranium). If it isn’t a human animal, but is nevertheless a thinking, self-conscious being (or could be with the right external assistance), then this thought experiment also introduces a unique Remnant-Person Problem for Transplanimalism. Either way, the thought experiment seems to raise additional problems for the view.

  46. Note that if transplanimalists were to pursue the proposal considered in footnote 11 above, then this would allow them to avoid at least some of the counterintuitive implications of this thought experiment. Recall that according to that proposal, in a cerebrum transplant scenario, rather than ceasing to exist, the second human animal, that which receives the transplanted cerebrum, remains alive, comes to have its cranium occupied by another, cerebrum-sized animal, and now serves as sort of life support for that animal. On this proposal, Luke would indeed survive receiving Matthew’s cerebrum at the end of the experiment. He would do so by coming to have his cranium occupied by what is left of Matthew and serving as a sort of life support for his twin brother. Thanks again to [reference redacted Jason Eberl for purposes of blind review] for bringing this option to our attention.

References

  • Bailey A (2015) Animalism. Philos Compass 10:867–883

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Choi C (2007) Strange but true: when half a brain is better than a whole one. Scientific American. Available at: https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/strange-but-true-when-half-brain-better-than-whole/

  • Hawley K (2005) Fission, fusion, and intrinsic facts. Philos Phenomenol Res 71:602–621

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hershenov DB (2008) A hylomorphic account of thought experiments concerning personal identity. Am Cathol Philos Q 82:481–502

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hershenov DB (2011) Soulless organisms? Am Cathol Philos Q 85:465–482

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Johnston M (2007) Human beings revisited. Oxf Stud Metaphys 3:33–74

    Google Scholar 

  • Johnston M (2016) Remnant persons. In: Blatti S, Snowdon P (eds) Animalism. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 89–127

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Jones L (2015) Ten sinister parasites that control their hosts’ minds. BBC Earth. Available at: http://www.bbc.com/earth/story/20150316-ten-parasites-that-control-minds

  • Lim J (2018) Strategy for animalism. Axiomathes 28:419–433

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Locke J (1996) An essay concerning human understanding. Hackett, Indianapolis

    Google Scholar 

  • Madden R (2016) Human persistence. Philos Impr 16:1–18

    Google Scholar 

  • Noonan HW (2003) Personal identity. Routledge, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Olson ET (1995) Why I Have No Hands. Theoria 61:182–197

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Olson ET (1997) The human animal. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Olson ET (2003) An argument for animalism. In: Martin R, Barresi J (eds) Personal Ident. Blackwell, Malden, pp 318–334

    Google Scholar 

  • Olson ET (2007) What are we?. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Olson ET (2015a) Animalism and the Remnant-Person Problem. In: Fonseca J, Gonçalves J (eds) Philosophical perspectives on the self. Peter Lang, Bern, pp 21–40

    Google Scholar 

  • Olson ET (2015b) What does it mean to say that we are animals? J Conscious Stud 22:84–107

    Google Scholar 

  • Olson ET (2016a) The role of the brainstem in personal identity. In: Blank A (ed) Animals. Philosophia, Munich, pp 291–302

    Google Scholar 

  • Olson ET (2016b) The Remnant-Person Problem. In: Blatti S, Snowdon P (eds) Animalism. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 145–161

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Parfit D (1984) Reasons and persons. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Parfit D (2012) We are not human beings. Philosophy 87:5–28

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rupert EE, Fox RS, Barnes RD (2004) Invertebrate zoology, 7th edn. Cengage, Boston

    Google Scholar 

  • Sauchelli A (2017) The animal, the corpse, and the remnant-person. Philos Stud 174:205–218

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sauchelli A (2018) Personal identity and applied ethics. Routledge, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Shewmon DA (1985) The metaphysics of brain death, persistent vegetative state, and dementia. Thomist 49:24–80

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Shewmon DA (1997) Recovery from ‘brain death’. Linacre Q 64:30–96

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Shoemaker S (1963) Self-knowledge and self-identity. Cornell University Press, Ithaca

    Google Scholar 

  • Shoemaker S (2008) Persons, animals, identity. Synthese 162:113–332

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Snowdon PF (1991) Personal identity and brain transplants. In: Cockburn D (ed) Royal institute of philosophy supplement. Cambridge University Press, New York, pp 109–126

    Google Scholar 

  • Snowdon PF (2014) Persons, animals, ourselves. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Spencer MK (2010) A reexamination of the hylomorphic theory of death. Rev Metaphys 63:843–870

    Google Scholar 

  • Thornton AK (2016) Varieties of animalism. Philos Compass 11:515–526

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Toner P (2014) Hylemorphism, remnant persons and personhood. Can J Philos 44:76–96

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Van Inwagen P (1990) Material beings. Cornell University Press, Ithaca

    Google Scholar 

  • Wiggins D (1967) Identity and spatio-temporal continuity. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

We would like to extend our special thanks to Eric Yang, Evan T. Woods, Jason Eberl, and audiences at the 2018 Moscow Center for Consciousness Studies Summer School on Personal Identity in St. Julian’s, Malta, and the 2019 Canadian Philosophical Association at the University of British Columbia for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Jeremy W. Skrzypek.

Additional information

Publisher's Note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Skrzypek, J.W., Mangino, D. Should Animalists Be “Transplanimalists”?. Axiomathes 31, 105–124 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-020-09482-y

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-020-09482-y

Keywords

Navigation