Abstract
The strainer (cālanī) tests the strength of a definition of a particular kind. Suppose the definition D is stated in terms of an absence, and x is a definiendum of D. The strainer collects each x-token or x-individual that dissatisfies D in a specific case. Then, all the x-individuals put together would be equivalent to the type x. Hence—one would be forced to conclude that—in a sense, x dissatisfies D. This is a case of under-application of D, since, despite being a definiendum of D, x dissatisfies D. Therefore, D would be too narrow. Similarly, the strainer may detect over-application too. By using the strainer, Raghunātha Śiromaṇi demonstrated that Gaṅgeśa’s conclusive definition of pervasion (vyāpti) had a defect, and redefined pervasion. The strainer test is based on intuitive principles. It may disqualify a definition that has an absence in its definiens. Therefore, strainer-proofing becomes an important consideration that must be borne in mind every time we formulate such a definition.
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Notes
It was: sādhyâbhāva-vad-avṛttitvam, the first in the set of five famous definitions (vyāpti-pañcaka) Gaṅgeśa refuted. This roughly means: Y pervades X if and only if X never coexists with the absence of Y in any locus. For a detailed discussion, see Ingalls (1988, pp. 90–126).
I shall use the words, ‘definiendum’ and ‘non-definiendum’ in the following sense. A definiendum of the definition D is a case D is supposed to apply to, and a non-definiendum of D is a case D is supposed not to apply to. Consider the following definition:
O: x is oviparous if and only if x produces young by means of eggs.
A sparrow and a man is a definiendum and a non-definiendum of O respectively.
Let us assume that this is true in our Nyāya model.
Mukherjea (1976, p. 8).
Ibid, p. 15.
The word ‘having’ is used in the following sense: ‘an entity has/possesses A’.
Mukherjea (1976, p. 18).
This property makes a set by collecting each and every fire-individual, and then assigns it a membership of that set.
It is because kitchen-fire etc. cannot be there in a hill.
Let us assume that the unordered set of x1 through xn is {x1,…, xn}.
Jagadīśa writes:
na ca parvate mahānasīyo vahnir nâstītyâdi-pratīti-siddhasya hetu-man-niṣṭhâbhāvasya pratiyogitâvacchedakam eva vahnitvam iti avyāpti-tādavasthyaṃ, sādhyatâvacchedaka-tad-itarôbhayâvacchedya-bhinnāyā eva pratiyogitāyā anavacchedakatvasya vivakṣitatvāt. Mukherjea (1976, p. 22)
For a translation of this passage, see Mukherjea (1976, p. 22). Jagadīśa replaces A and P by ‘hetu’ and ‘sādhya’ respectively. I do not want to do that since the original definitions did not do that.
Once again I have deliberately ignored ‘vyāpyavṛtti’ since it is not really relevant to this paper. For a full discussion, see Wada (1994).
In the language of Nyāya, this could be written as: yan-niṣṭhâdheyatā-nirūpitâdhāratā-nirūpitâdheyatā-vad yad bhavati tena samaṃ tasya sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ vyāptiḥ.
Goekoop (1967, p.111) defines: ‘There is pervasion of A by B if, and only if, A has a common locus with B in such a way that B is none of the things that qua class are completely absent from some locus of A.’
On replacing X and Y by smoke and fire respectively, the definition becomes, ‘Fire pervades smoke if and only if fire-ness does not limit the counterpositive-ness of an absence that coexists with smoke in any locus.’
tat-samānâdhikaraṇâbhāva-pratiyogi tad-virodhi.
Compare this to the case of G1.
yad-rūpa-viśiṣṭa-samānâdhikaraṇâtyantâbhāva-pratiyogitâvacchedako yo dharmo tad-dharmâvacchinnaṃ sarvaṃ tad-rūpa-viśiṣṭasya virodhi.
References
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Acknowledgement
I acknowledge my indebtedness to Shruti K. Bhat and Nikhil Ravishankar for their valuable comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I also thank Dr. Andrey Klebanov, Lecturer, Graduate School of Letters, Kyoto University, Japan, for pointing me to important secondary literature on the sift method.
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Guha, N. Through the Logician’s Strainer: A Nyāya Technique. J Indian Philos 48, 385–400 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-020-09424-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-020-09424-3