Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

When Texts Clash: Mīmāṃsā Thinkers on Conflicting Prescriptions and Prohibitions

  • Published:
Journal of Indian Philosophy Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

The Mīmāṃsā mission of disambiguating Vedic texts led the thinkers of the tradition to confront several instances of apparently conflicting Vedic commands. Consider the two cases: ‘give alms daily’ vs ‘do not give alms during ritual X’, and ‘never harm another’ vs ‘sacrifice an animal during ritual Y’. Each command in these two cases is derived from the Vedas and Mīmāṃsā authors thus attempted to resolve such cases of deontic conflict by putting forth hermeneutic solutions, without taking recourse to any other epistemic source. In this paper, I present several instances of conflicting Vedic commands and indicate three distinct types of deontic conflicts as well as their corresponding solutions as identified by Mīmāṃsā thinkers. This study is based on discussions put forth in four important Mīmāṃsā texts: the Pūrvamīmāṃsāsūtra, the Śābarabhāṣya, Kumārila’s Ṭupṭīkā and Āpadeva’s Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa. I explain the foundational difference between prescriptions (vidhi) and prohibitions (pratiṣedha / niṣedha) for Mīmāṃsā thinkers, and thereby also discuss several technical conceptions such as paryudāsa, vikalpa, prāpti and bādha among others. In doing so, I attempt to highlight certain fundamental tenets of the vast and intricate hermeneutic framework developed within the Mīmāṃsā tradition.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. See, for instance, Kataoka (2011b) and Taber (2005) for studies on Kumārila’s Ślokavārttika (ŚV), and Yoshimizu (1997) on Prabhākara’s Bṛhatī. Two recent studies dealing with various technical aspects of Mīmāṃsā are Benson (2010) and Freschi (2012).

  2. There is an ongoing collaborative attempt to draw out and mathematically formalize the deontic principles demonstrated in Mīmāṃsā texts as part of the project ‘Reasoning Tools for Deontic Logic and Applications to Indian Sacred Texts’ (https://mimamsa.logic.at). Publications of the project dealing especially with hermeneutic and deontic concerns of Mīmāṃsā include Freschi et al. (2017) and Freschi et al. (2019). This paper is a further outcome of the project.

  3. The PMS and the ŚBh are foundational texts for Mīmāṃsā thinkers and their inclusion in a study is imperative for an understanding of the deontic concepts accepted widely across the tradition. The passages of the ṬṬ included here are explanatory of the foundational principle regarding prohibitions succinctly presented in the ŚBh. The comparatively later MNP is also referred to as it helps one understand this complex doctrine regarding prohibitions further with the aid of examples already encountered in the ŚBh and ṬṬ.

  4. Several of these terms (vidhi, pratiṣedha, paryudāsa, prāpti, etc.) are also used technically within the Vyākaraṇa tradition, and it would be particularly rewarding to understand their specific points of similarity and difference with regard to their use in Mīmāṃsā, as this may be yet another illustration of the close development of these two traditions (see Freschi and Pontillo (2013) as well as Cardona (2013) for a further discussion). Nevertheless, in this paper, I focus only on Mīmāṃsā discussions and leave aside any comparison of these terms with their counterparts in Vyākaraṇa.

  5. mahāpitṛyajñena* yajeta prakṛtivad iti (*text emended from mahāpitṛvajñena) (Abhyaṃkara and Jośī 1974, p. 524).

  6. mahāpitṛyajñe na hotāraṃ vṛṇīte nārṣeyam iti (Abhyaṃkara and Jośī 1974, p. 524).

  7. See Freschi (2012, pp. 73–78) for a further discussion on archetypes and ectypes.

  8. nānuyājeṣu yeyajāmahaṃ karotīti (Abhyaṃkara and Jośī 1974, p. 524). See Kane (1941, pp. 1070–72) for an explanation of the three anuyājas in the Darśapūrṇamāsa sacrifice.

  9. See also Benson (2010, p. 49) who explains anārabhyādhīta as: ‘Certain items are “independently taught”, that is, without reference to any rite.’

  10. ā śrāvayeti caturakṣaram astu, śrauṣaḍ iti caturakṣaraṃ, yajeti dvyakṣaraṃ, yeyajāmaha iti pañcākṣaram, dvyakṣaro vaṣaṭkāraḥ, eṣa vai prajāpatiḥ saptadaśo yajñeṣv anvāyatta iti (Abhyaṃkara and Jośī 1974, p. 524). Keith (1914, p. 94) explains this Vedic statement as follows: ‘The rendering of these phrases is made to suit the number of syllables: yaja means ‘utter the Yājyā’, and is addressed to the Hotṛ by the Adhvaryu, just as ā śrāvaya is addressed by him to the Āgnīdhra ; ye yajāmahe is said by the Hotṛ and his attendant priests : it is uncertain if ye is the relative or a mere particle. çrauṣaṭ …is a bad translation of an Indo-Iranian equivalent (sraoṣo astu), and should rather have been astu çroṣaḥ; but neither this nor any other theory of çrauṣat or vaṣaṭ is satisfactory…’.

  11. The verbal base śru- is commonly used in the ŚBh to refer to something found directly in the Vedas, and the verb thus invokes śruti as the means of knowledge. I am hence translating it as ‘learnt [in the Vedas]’.

  12. The term prāpta (as well as its nominal form prāpti) is of crucial importance with regard to prohibitions and is discussed in the second section of the paper. It is often used in other contexts in Mīmāṃsā texts as well (see footnote 15) and briefly put, what this refers to here is something which has been preliminarily established so as to only be prohibited subsequently. I translate this simply as ‘established’.

  13. pratiṣedhaḥ śrūyate, codakena pradiṣṭe dharme, kvacid anārabhyavādena prāpte (Abhyaṃkara and Jośī 1974, p. 524).

  14. The conception of vikalpa is discussed further later in this section.

  15. This is another instance of the use of the term prāpta, but in a context different from the topic of prohibitions (as mentioned in footnote 12). The phrase kiṃ prāptam is commonly and characteristically used in the ŚBh, and here, the term prāpta once again refers to something that is preliminarily established—which, in this case, is the pūrvapakṣa.

  16. The pūrvapakṣin in this adhikaraṇa of the ŚBh (i.e. on PMS 10.8.1 and 10.8.3) seems to employ the nominal term prāpti to refer to the prescription (and hence as a synonym of vidhi) as contrasted with the prohibition (pratiṣedha). Hence, prāpti here refers to something distinct from the referent of the participle prāpta, which continues to express ‘something which is preliminarily established’ (as explained in footnote 12). This is especially clear from sentences such as ubhau hi prāptipratiṣedhau pramāṇavantau (ŚBh 10.8.1, see footnote 19), pratiṣedho 'pi prāptau prāptāyām (ŚBh 10.8.3, see footnote 28), etc. Perhaps the pūrvapakṣin uses the term prāpti in this manner since the action prescribed by the Vedic prescription (vidhi) becomes applicable (prāp-). Nevertheless, it is evident that this term refers to the prescription and I hence translate it as such. The siddhāntin however does not use the term prāpti in this manner and in fact, as explained later, uses the term prāpti in the same sense as that of prāpta.

  17. The term pramāṇavat appears repeatedly in this passage and literally means ‘having a means of knowledge’ or ‘being based on a means of knowledge’. I prefer to render it simply as ‘authoritative’ as it seems to me that this most succinctly and lucidly conveys the term’s import in this already abstruse passage.

  18. This final sentence is a quote from the sūtra 10.8.1. This is another instance of the use of the term prāpta (‘something established’), this time as found in the sūtra itself.

  19. kiṃ prāptam. vikalpa iti. prāptipratiṣedhayoḥ pramāṇavattvāt. ubhau hi prāptipratiṣedhau pramāṇavantau. prāptis tāvat pramāṇavatī. mahāpitr̥yajñena yajeta prakr̥tivad iti. tathā, eṣa vai prajāpatiḥ saptadaśo yajñeṣv anvāyatta iti bhavati vākyaṃ prāpteḥ pratiṣedham anapekṣamāṇaṃ* pramāṇabhūtam. tathā pratiṣedhaḥ pramāṇavān, na hotāraṃ vr̥ṇīte, nārṣeyaṃ, mr̥tyor evainān utsr̥jatīti. tathā, nānuyājeṣu yeyajāmahaṃ karotīti. sarveṣu yajiṣu yeyajāmahakriyā prāptā, na karoty anuyājeṣv iti pratiṣidhyate. yeyajāmahaḥ kartavya iti vacanāt sa yeyajāmahakaḥ prayogaḥ phalavān iti gamyate. na kartavyo yeyajāmaha iti vacanād ayeyajāmahakaḥ prayogaḥ phalavān iti gamyate. ubhayoḥ prāmāṇyād ubhayathāpi phalam iti gamyate. tasmād vikalpaḥ. evaṃ hotrārṣeyavaraṇe 'pi. tasmāt prāptapratiṣiddhatvād vikalpaḥ syāt (*text emended from anapekṣyamāṇaṃ—since this is the most economical solution as the passive verb does not make sense in this sentence) (Abhyaṃkara and Jośī 1974, pp. 524–26).

  20. I understand the term pradeśa in the sūtra as per its gloss in the ŚBh: codakena pradiṣṭe dharme. See also footnote 13, as well as the passage from Edgerton (1929, p. 16) cited earlier in this section for an explanation of the ritual-related term dharma.

  21. pratiṣedhaḥ pradeśe ’nārabhyavidhāne ca prāptapratiṣiddhatvād vikalpaḥ syāt (Abhyaṃkara and Jośī 1974, p. 524).

  22. The term arthaprāpta is often used in Mīmāṃsā discussions to refer to something established on account of one’s natural inclination i.e. based on how entities (as existing in an ontologically realistic worldview) really are and their intrinsic nature—as contrasted with something that would instead need to be established through an explicit Vedic statement (śabda). This contrast is depicted in the ŚBh on PMS 2.4.2: arthaprāptaṃ hi tan na vidhātavyaṃ śabdena.

  23. tad yathā loke ’rthaprāpte yatra pratiṣedho bhavati, na viṣaṃ bhakṣayitavyaṃ, na sarpāyāṅgulir deyā, na kaṇṭakaḥ pādenādhiṣṭheya iti, akriyaiva tasyārthasya bhavati, na vikalpaḥ (Abhyaṃkara and Jośī 1974, p. 526).

  24. tena manyāmahe, vidhipratiṣedhayoḥ pratiṣedho balīyān iti. prāpte hi vidhau pratiṣedho bhavati. yena ca nāma prāpte yad ucyate tat tasya bādhakaṃ bhavati. tasmād akriyaivānuyājeṣu yeyajāmahasya, mahāpitr̥yajñe ca hotrārṣeyavaraṇasyeti (Abhyaṃkara and Jośī 1974, p. 526).

  25. The term śabda here clearly refers to the Vedas, with śabdalakṣaṇa having the same sense as codanālakṣaṇa in PMS 1.1.2 (codanālakṣaṇo ’rtho dharmaḥ). I understand the term lakṣaṇa here as explained in the ŚBh on PMS 1.1.2 as: lakṣyate yena, tal lakṣaṇam. dhūmo lakṣaṇam agner iti hi vadanti (Āpaṭe 1929, p. 12).

  26. Here the pūrvapakṣin is responding to the former argument by saying that in fact there need not be any sequence for prohibitions and prescriptions—either one can follow.

  27. It may be possible to consider ubhaya as referring also to the previously mentioned guṇas and doṣas. However, I translate it as above since the term ubhaya as found in this discussion (ŚBh on PMS 10.8.1 and 10.8.3) is used throughout in reference to prescriptions and prohibitions (e.g. ubhau hi prāptipratiṣedhau pramāṇavantau (10.8.1), ubhau ca prāptipratiṣedhau prāpnutaḥ (10.8.3)). Moreover, PMS 10.8.3 also contains this term (ubhayaṃ śabdalakṣaṇam) which is unambiguously explained in the ŚBh as referring to the prescription and prohibition (ubhayaṃ śabdalakṣaṇaṃ prāptir api pratiṣedho 'pi).

  28. naitad evam. tulyo hi hetur iha prāpteḥ pratiṣedhasya ca. ubhayaṃ śabdalakṣaṇaṃ, prāptir api pratiṣedho 'pi. prāptir api pratiṣedhe prāpte, pratiṣedho 'pi prāptau prāptāyām. loke punar ubhayam arthalakṣaṇaṃ pratyakṣato gamyamānaṃ guṇadoṣakaram. tatra vidhipratiṣedhayor yataro guṇavān so 'nuṣṭhīyate. na tu śabdalakṣaṇe guṇadoṣau śakyete avagantum. tasmād yad yad vākyena prāptaṃ, tat tad ubhayam avadhāryeta. ubhau ca prāptipratiṣedhau prāpnutaḥ. tasmād vikalpas tatra tatreti. (Abhyaṃkara and Jośī 1974, pp. 526–27).

  29. This is a reference to the argument in PMS 1.1.4-5, where it is claimed that only the Veda can reveal truths inaccessible through ordinary senses.

  30. Such an argument of the pūrvapakṣin (about having no further recourse outside of the statements of the Vedas themselves) resonates with any hermeneutic endeavour to make sense of textual commands without external intervention.

  31. ucyate. anyāyyatvād vikalpasya. anyāyyo hi vikalpaḥ. katham. iha yajatiṣu yeyajāmahaṃ karotīty ucyate. yady evam avagamyate, na śakyaḥ sa vinā yeyajāmahena yajātir abhinirvartayitum. tatra pratiṣedhavacanam anarthakam. pratiṣedhe 'pi vijñāte vidhivacanam anarthakam. tasmād anyāyyo vikalpaḥ. nanv anyatarasya vidher ānarthakyaprasaṅgād vikalpa āśrayaṇīyo bhavati. ucyate. yatrānyatarad ānarthakyam āpadyate, kalpetāpi tatra vikalpaḥ, yatra na kenacid api prakāreṇārthavattā saṃbhavati (Abhyaṃkara and Jośī 1974, p. 528).

  32. The concept of vikalpa is discussed in more detail subsequently in this section.

  33. The translation of vākyaśeṣa as ‘sentence-remainder’ is quite literal and hence somewhat awkward. As I explain immediately below, the sense is that such prohibitions are to be considered as appendages to their respective prescriptions. Nevertheless, since vākyaśeṣa is an important technical term, I continue to render it as ‘sentence-remainder’ in all directly translated passages in this paper.

  34. api tu vākyaśeṣaḥ syād anyāyyatvād vikalpasya vidhīnām ekadeśaḥ syāt (Abhyaṃkara and Jośī 1974, p. 527).

  35. A literal translation would be ‘there is no connection in the following manner’ (naivam abhisaṃbandhaḥ), but I am translating as above so as to render it easier to read.

  36. vākyaśeṣaḥ syāt pratiṣedhaḥ, pradeśānārabhyavidhānayoḥ. naivam abhisaṃbandhaḥ, anuyājeṣu yeyajāmaho na kartavya* iti. kathaṃ tarhi. nānuyājeṣv iti naśabdo 'nuyājaśabdena saha saṃbadhyate, na karotinā. kim ato yady evam. nānuyājeṣv ity etāvad aparipūrṇaṃ vākyaṃ, tat sākāṅkṣaṃ pūrvavākyaikadeśena saṃbhantsyate. yad etat, yeyajāmahaṃ karotīty uktaṃ, tan nānuyājeṣu. yāvad uktaṃ syāt. anuyājavarjiteṣu yajatiṣu yeyajāmahaṃ karotīti. tasmād vidhir eva paryudastānuyājakaḥ, nāsti pratiṣedha iti na vikalpo bhaviṣyati. mahāpitr̥yajñe 'pi prakr̥tivad iti vacanād dhotrārṣeyavaraṇam iha kartavyaṃ prāptam. tad ucyate prakr̥tivat kartavyaṃ varaṇaṃ varjayitveti. naśabdo 'tra vr̥ṇīter arthena saṃbadhyate. pratyayārthas tv anuvādaḥ. yad atra prakṛtivat kartavyaṃ tad varaṇaṃ varjayitveti (*text emended from kartavyaṃ) (Abhyaṃkara and Jośī 1974, p. 527).

  37. It is interesting to note that the sūtra 10.8.4 only mentions the solution of vākyaśeṣa and not the term paryudāsa, something introduced here by Śabara in his commentary. However, PMS 10.8.15 specifically uses the term paryudāsa and unambiguously states that something is a paryudāsa if it is a vākyaśeṣa (see footnote 40).

  38. aharahar dadyād iti (Abhyaṃkara and Jośī 1974, p. 538).

  39. dīkṣito na dadāti, na juhoti, na pacatīti (Abhyaṃkara and Jośī 1974, p. 537).

  40. api tu vākyaśeṣatvād itaraparyudāsaḥ syāt pratiṣedhe vikalpaḥ syāt (Abhyaṃkara and Jośī 1974, p. 538).

  41. It may seem that the term aviśeṣeṇa in this passage could mean ‘in general’, i.e. without restrictions to a specific ritual context. However, this argument of the ŚBh on PMS 10.8.15 is in response to the pūrvapakṣa presented in PMS 10.8.12-14, and the term aviśeṣa is first mentioned in PMS 10.8.12 (dīkṣitasya dānahomapākapratiṣedho ’viśeṣāt sarvadānahomapākapratiṣedhaḥ syāt) as well as in the ŚBh thereon (kiṃ prāptam. sarvadānahomapākānāṃ pratiṣedhaḥ. kutaḥ. aviśeṣāt. nāsti viśeṣavacanaḥ śabdaḥ). The pūrvapakṣin is arguing here that the command prohibiting the initiated (dīkṣita) from giving alms, etc. should be considered as a prohibition of all giving, etc. since there is no speech unit (śabda) expressing any difference (viśeṣa) between this giving, etc. and the daily almsgiving, etc. I hence consider the term aviśeṣena, which is being used here now by the siddhāntin, as having the same sense. Moreover, if the term aviśeṣeṇa is considered to mean ‘in general’ in this passage, the sentence would then be about the prohibition of almsgiving, etc. which is uttered in general (uktānām aviśeṣeṇa dānādīnāṃ … pratiṣedho…)—but such giving, etc. is not prohibited, rather it is prescribed. The prohibition which becomes a vākyaśeṣa is that which is about the giving, etc. specific to the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice, and I have hence translated above accordingly.

  42. vākyaśeṣaḥ syāt pratiṣedhaḥ. uktānām aviśeṣeṇa dānādīnāṃ jyautiṣṭomikaparyudāsena pratiṣedho vākyaśeṣaḥ syāt. aharahar dadyād ity asya śeṣo, na dīkṣita iti. evaṃ homapākavākyayor api. asati paryudāse, pratiṣedhe vikalpaḥ syāt. sa cānyāyya ity uktam. tasmāt paryudāsa iti (Abhyaṃkara and Jośī 1974, p. 538).

  43. This verse seems to me as being a nice mnemonic regarding the distinction between prohibitions and exclusions, only reinforcing Śabara’s long discussion. The MNP also uses the ye-yajāmahe example from the ŚBh while discussing this topic, and I hence think it pertinent to mention this verse here. I am aware of the chronological interval between the two texts and am not attempting here to understand the ŚBh through the much later MNP.

    More importantly, Edgerton (1929, p. 167 (n. 219)) points out that this verse was identified by a traditional Sanskrit commentary on the MNP (referred to by Edgerton as edition C) as being ‘quoted from the Harikārikā, that is Bhartṛhari’s Vākyapadīya … where however (says comm.) they appear as parts of two distinct verses …: aprādhānyaṃ vidher yatra pratiṣedhe pradhānatā, prasajyapratiṣedho ’yaṃ kriyayā saha yatra nañ. And: pradhānatvaṃ vidher yatra pratiṣedhe ’pradhānatā, paryudāsaḥ sa vijñeyo yatrottarapadena nañ.’ Interestingly, Cardona (1967, p. 42 (n.23)) also quotes these two verses when discussing the grammatical concepts of paryudāsa and prasajyapratiṣedha and notes that this verse is cited by the commentary Prasāda of Viṭṭhala to the grammatical work Prakriyākaumudi of Rāmacandra. Perhaps then, the valid applicability of this same verse about paryudāsa and pratiṣedha in the distinct contexts of Mīmāṃsā and Vyākaraṇa is once again evidence of the close development of these two traditions.

  44. This is in accordance with the five-fold classification of all Vedic sentences by the Mīmāṃsaka thinkers as vidhi, mantra, nāmadheya, niṣedha and arthavāda. For instance, the MNP states: sa ca vedo vidhimantranāmadheyaniṣedhārthavādātmakaḥ (Edgerton 1929, p. 195). On the topic of arthavāda, see also Benson (2010, p. 48).

  45. For an explanation of anuvāda as ‘subsequent reference’, see Benson (2010, p. 47)

  46. jartilayavāgvā vā juhuyāt, gavīdhukayavāgvā vā juhuyāt, na grāmyān paśūn hinasti, nāraṇyān. atho khalv āhur anāhutir vai jārtilāś ca gavīdhukāś ca, payasāgnihotraṃ juhuyād iti (Abhyaṃkara and Jośī 1974, pp. 532–33).

  47. bhaved ayaṃ pratiṣedhena vikalpaḥ* na ced anyaṃ vidhiṃ prakalpayet. payasāgnihotraṃ juhotīty asya vidheḥ prakḷptau jartilagavīdhukahomavacanam anāhutivacanam apy arthavādārthaṃ syāt (*removing sentence break) (Abhyaṃkara and Jośī 1974, p. 533). Another instance of classifying a sentence as arthavāda is presented in the ŚBh on PMS 10.8.5.

  48. darśapūrṇamāsābhyāṃ svargakāmo yajeteti (Abhyaṃkara and Jośī 1974, p. 553).

  49. puroḍāśābhyām evāsomayājinaṃ yājayet yāv etāv āgneyaś caindrāgnaś ceti*. (*text emended from caindrāgnayeti—this same phrase puroḍāśābhyām … caindrāgnaś ca is found also in the ŚBh on PMS 10.8.45, see footnote 54). (Abhyaṃkara and Jośī 1974, p. 553).

  50. kim adhikāraśrutivākyaśeṣo 'yam - darśapūrṇamāsābhyāṃ svargakāmo yajetety ābhyāṃ puroḍāśābhyām asomayājīti … kiṃ tāvat prāptam. adhikāraśeṣa iti. yad etat svargakāmo yajeteti tasya śeṣaḥ, ābhyāṃ puroḍāśābhyām asomayājī svargakāmo yajeteti (Abhyaṃkara and Jośī 1974, p. 553).

  51. See Freschi (2017) for an explanation of the term nitya in Mīmāṃsā.

  52. naitad evam, adhikāravākyaśeṣa iti. nityau hi darśapūrṇamāsau, yāvajjīvaṃ darśapūrṇamāsābhyāṃ yajeteti. nityau ca tatremau* puroḍāśau phalaṃ prati sahakāriṇau. tāv anityam asomayājinaṃ prati vidhīyete ity anupapannam. katham. nityau hi darśapūrṇamāsayor bhaviṣyataḥ, yaś cāsomayājī tasyopakariṣyata iti nopapadyeta. puroḍāśavidher nityena darśapūrṇamāsasamudāyena saṃbandhaḥ. tasmān nāsomayājyadhikāraśrutivākyaśeṣaḥ (*text emended from tatraimau) (Abhyaṃkara and Jośī 1974, p. 554).

  53. Smith (1987, p. 250) explains that sāṃnāyya is ‘a mixture of freshly boiled milk from the previous morning milking and curds (yoghurt) made from milk of the previous evening’s milking. It is offered in the new moon sacrifice to Indra or Mahendra. It should be offered by one who has performed a Soma sacrifice and replaces the puroḍāśa offered to the same deity by a non-Soma sacrificer’.

  54. evam abhisaṃbandhaḥ kriyate. asomayājinaḥ puroḍāśāv etau, yau prāptau. somayājinaḥ sāṃnāyyam aparam apīti. puroḍāśābhyām evāsomayājinaṃ yājayet, yāv etāv āgneyaś caindrāgnaś ca, sāṃnāyyena somayājinam iti, evam ekena vākyena somayājinaḥ sāṃnāyyaṃ vidhīyate, apareṇāpi vākyenāsomayājinaḥ. tasmād ubhayor apy anuvāda iti. (Abhyaṃkara and Jośī 1974, p. 558).

  55. yathā, nātirātre gṛhṇāti ṣoḍaśinam iti (Abhyaṃkara and Jośī 1974, p. 531). The atirātra is one of the seven forms (saṃsthā) of Soma sacrifices and there is mention here of the ṣoḍaśin-vessel. See Kane (1941, p. 1205) for a description of this.

  56. This sentence is not mentioned in the ŚBh here but instead later in the discussion on PMS 10.8.9 (see footnote 61). The two commands however are clearly contrasted in the discussion on this example in the MNP: yathā nātirātre ṣoḍaśinaṃ gṛhṇātīty atra. atra hy atirātre ṣoḍaśinaṃ gṛhṇātīti … (Edgerton 1929, p. 267). Edgerton (1929, p. 176) also states that he was unable to locate these two sentences in their quoted forms, but explains that the fact ‘that different authorities prescribed the atirātra with and without the ṣoḍaśin is clear’.

  57. The term vacanavyakti has an important technical sense in Mīmāṃsā, as was first pointed out by McCrea (2000, p. 457). The term however seems to be differently understood by the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas and the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas (Saxena 2019). Nevertheless, it may be sufficient to note here that this refers to the various interpretations that a given sentence can have, and I am hence translating it accordingly.

  58. nanu parasparaṃ viruddhau vidhipratiṣedhau na saṃbhavataḥ. ucyate. vacanaprāmāṇyāt pratiṣedho vidhiṃ bādhitvā bhaviṣyati. vidhir api pratiṣedham. nānyā gatir astīti pakṣe mithyāpratyayaḥ kalpayiṣyate. tadā vidhir yadā na pratiṣedhaḥ. tadā pratiṣedho yadā na vidhir iti. nanu sarvadā vidhiḥ pratiṣedhaś ca prāpnoti. ucyate. uktam etad vacanaprāmāṇyād virodhāc ca mithyāpratyayaḥ. prayogavacana ekaṃ kalpaṃ gr̥hītvā na dvitīyam api gṛhṇātīti. tasmād anyatareṇa kalpena sidhyatīti. nanu kalpāntarabhāve vaiguṇyam. atrocyate. satyaṃ vaiguṇyam. vaiguṇye 'pi tatsiddhir eva vākyāt pramāṇād avagamyate. tasmād adoṣaḥ. yatra punar anyā vacanavyāktir asti vākyasya, tatra na vikalpo bhavati. yathā nānuyājeṣu yeyajāmahaṃ karotīti (Abhyaṃkara and Jośī 1974, pp. 531–32).

  59. Translation as per notes below in text: upavītāḥ—acirān naṣṭā ity arthaḥ (Abhyaṃkara and Jośī 1974, p. 536).

  60. asty ādhānam. tatredam āmananti. ya evaṃ vidvān vāravantīyaṃ gāyati, ya evaṃ vidvān yajñāyajñīyaṃ gāyati, ya evaṃ vidvān vāmadevyaṃ gāyatīti. tatredam āmnāyate, upavītā vā etasyāgnayo bhavanti, yasyāgnyādheye brahmā sāmāni gāyatīti (Abhyaṃkara and Jośī 1974, p. 536).

  61. PMS 10.8.9: upavādaś ca tadvat, ŚBh: tasmād upavādas tadvat. kiṃvat. yathā, atirātre gṛhṇāti ṣoḍaśinam iti vidhāya pratiṣedhārthaṃ syāt (Abhyaṃkara and Jośī 1974, p. 536).

  62. yathaiva hi nindayā na kartavyam iti gamyate, evam upadeśāt kartavyam iti gamyate … tasmād anuṣṭhātuṃ vidhiḥ, varjayitum upavāda iti (Abhyaṃkara and Jośī 1974, p. 537).

  63. na pṛthivyām agniś cetavyo nāntarikṣe na divīty apratiṣedhabhāginam arthaṃ pratiṣedhanti. vijñāyata evaitad antarikṣe divi cāgnir na cīyata iti (Āpaṭe 1929, p. 111). (I have not included the pṛthivyām part of the Vedic sentence in my translation above, since that is a different point and not related to the argument here.)

  64. abhāgipratiṣedhāc ca (Āpaṭe 1929, p. 111).

  65. The siddhāntin’s solution in this case is that this sentence is in praise of the following Vedic prescription: hiraṇyaṃ nidhāya cetavyam iti (Having deposited gold, one should kindle [the fire]). Thus, one should not kindle the fire on the ground without depositing gold, just as one does not build it in the skies.

  66. asati prasaṅge pratiṣedho nityānuvādaḥ (Āpaṭe 1929, p. 130).

  67. See especially footnotes 12 and 18.

  68. See footnote 22 for an explanation of the term arthaprāpta as found in the ŚBh.

  69. The verb used here is karoti, but it must mean pravartate—i.e. if one becomes inclined to undertake the action of killing (and not if one has completed the act of killing). The verb pravartate is explicitly used in the MNP, as explained in the immediately next subsection.

  70. nakāro ’yaṃ nivṛttiṃ bravīti. sā ca pravṛttim antareṇa na saṃbhavati … yady anuyājeṣu yeyajāmaho na syāt tathā sati pravṛttir eva na syāt. evaṃ ca pratiṣedhānarthakyam eva syāt. yathā tarhi ‘brāhmaṇo na hantavyaḥ’ iti, evaṃ bhaviṣyati. na hi. tatra hy arthād hananaṃ prāptaṃ kuryām vā na veti. yadā karoti tadā pratiṣidhyate*, na hantavya iti. tatrārthaprāptasya śāstreṇa nityabādhaḥ. iha tu dve śāstre. tena dve ’pi grahītavye. tayor virodhād vikalpaḥ syāt. (*text emended from matiṣidhyate) (Abhyaṃkara and Jośī 1974, pp. 525–26).

  71. na ca tatra tasya pratiṣedhaḥ prāptiṃ vinā saṃbhavati, prāptisāpekṣatvāt pratiṣedhasya (Edgerton 1929, p. 263) (A similar discussion is also found in the Arthasaṃgraha (AS) of Laugākṣibhāskara).

  72. ata eva nāntarikṣe na divīty asya na pratiṣedhatvam antarikṣe cayanāprāpteḥ (Edgerton 1929, p. 264).

  73. This is discussed in Edgerton (1929, p. 264).

  74. The term rāga is used here as a broad category to refer to any passion or emotion which, upon arising naturally in an individual, may cause him/her to perform certain acts—possibly even leading to the harm of another. This term rāga (generally used in the sense of the specific emotion of love, affection, etc.) does not seem to be distinguished from dveṣa (hatred), bhaya (fear), etc. in the present discussion.

  75. sarvo hi puruṣaḥ kadācid dhananādau pravartate, kadācic ca rāgādyabhāve na pravartate. tatra yadi niṣedhasya prāptisāpekṣatvaṃ na syāt, tadā rāgādi tirodhāya hananādāv apravṛttaṃ praty eva śāstraprāmāṇyopapattau rāgādinā hananādau pravṛttena puṃsā na tato nivartitavyam. (Edgerton 1929, p. 264)

  76. kiṃ tu hanane pravṛttaṃ puruṣaṃ prati kartavyatvena prasaktasya pratiṣedhāt, yat kartavyaṃ tan neti (Edgerton 1929, p. 264).

  77. Such a precondition in the case of prohibitions seems to be closely related to the concept of adhikāra in the case of prescriptions. As Freschi et al (2019, p. 7) explain: “every sacrifice is characterized by an eligibility (adhikāra). The eligibility identifies the person who will possess the result of the sacrifice … Being eligible further implies having enough material to organize the performance of a sacrifice: eligibility thus always includes ability, and so it incorporates a version of the “ought entails can” thesis…” Perhaps it may be reasonable then to argue that in case of prohibitions regarding impossible actions (say, building an altar in the sky), there is no adhikārin and hence this is not a genuine deontic statement.

  78. The term śāstraprāpta is explicitly found used in the MNP as contrasted with rāgaprāpta: dīkṣito na dadāti na juhotītyādiṣu tu dānahomādināṃ śāstraprāptāv api puruṣārthena prāptatvāt… rāgaprāptyabhāvāt. (Edgerton 1929, p. 267). The MNP is here discussing the example of ‘one who is initiated [into the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice] does not give, nor does he sacrifice’ (discussed in the first section of the paper ). The MNP explains that the prescription to give alms daily is established by an explicit Vedic prescription (śāstraprāpta) and is not in fact based on natural passions (rāgaprāptyabhāva). Moreover, the further idea indicated here by the MNP of this Vedic prescription of daily almsgiving as being puruṣārtha is discussed immediately hereafter.

  79. See Edgerton (1929, p. 164 (n. 213)) for the different possible explanations of the term kalañja: meat killed with a poisoned arrow, tobacco or red garlic. The last of the three is considered to be the most probable one.

  80. The two kinds of prohibitions mentioned here are not those based on something established through Vedic prescription or natural passions (as I am demonstrating here). The two types indicated by the MNP in this passage are those which lead to vikalpa (as in, nātirātre gṛhṇāti ṣoḍaśinam) and those which do not (as in, na kalañjaṃ bhakṣayet). Nevertheless, these two examples exactly fit the sense that I am indicating, since the former leads to vikalpa because of the very presence of a Vedic prescription (i.e. śāstraprāpti) whereas the latter prohibition comes into force only when one becomes inclined (i.e. rāgaprāpti) towards eating the kalañja.

  81. etāvāṃs tu viśeṣaḥ: yatra vikalpāpādakaḥ pratiṣedhaḥ tatra pratiṣidhyamānasya nānarthahetutvam, ubhayor api vidhipratiṣedhayoḥ kratvarthatvāt. yatra tu na vikalpaḥ prasajyate prāptiś ca rāgataḥ pratiṣedhaś ca puruṣārthas tatra niṣidhyamānasyānarthahetutvam, yathā kalañjabhakṣaṇasya. (Edgerton 1929, p. 267).

  82. The MNP gives the instance of the prohibition ‘one must not be intimate with one’s wife during the course of a particular ritual’. The MNP explains that the transgression of such prohibitions leads only to the destruction of the purpose of the ritual (krator vaiguṇyam) and not to any harm to the agent (anartha): rāgataḥ prāptasyāpi kratvārthatvena pratiṣedhe tadanuṣṭhānāt krator vaiguṇyaṃ nānarthotpattiḥ, yathā svastryupagamanādi-pratiṣedhe (Edgerton 1929, p. 268).

  83. A summary of the discussion is found in Kataoka (2011b, pp. 166–68). The critical edition of the text is presented in Kataoka (2011a, pp. 55–58) and its translation in Kataoka (2011b, pp. 497–513).

  84. See Jha (1942, pp. 342ff) for a brief overview of the several types of bādha indicated by later Mīmāṃsakas.

  85. ataś ca prāptisāpekṣatvāt pratiṣedhānām anuyājeṣu yeyajāmahapratiṣedhe tasya tatra prāptir vaktavyā. (Edgerton 1929, p. 264).

  86. na ca padaśāstreṇāhavanīyaśāstrasyeva nānuyājeṣv iti viśeṣaśāstreṇa yajatiṣu yeyajāmahaṃ karotīti sāmānyaśāstrasya bādhaḥ syād iti vācyam. (Edgerton 1929, p. 264)

  87. śāstrayor hi tatra bādhyabādhakabhāvo yatra parasparanirapekṣatā. na hi padaśāstrasya svārthavidhānārtham āhavanīyaśāstrāpekṣāsti. niṣedhaśāstrasya tu prasaktyarthaṃ yajatiṣu yeyajāmahaṃ karotīti vidher asti apekṣā. (Edgerton 1929, pp. 264–265)

  88. Edgerton (1929, p. 265) reports a variant here: parasya nirapekṣatā instead of parasparanirapekṣatā. If this variant is accepted, then the sense would be that these commands are devoid of the need for anything additional (para) in order to convey their deontic sense rather than the need for each other (paraspara). Edgerton (1929, pp. 3–4 ) states that the text of the MNP accepted by him is based on three editions—B: Āpadevapraṇītaḥ Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśaḥ (ed. Mahādevaśarman, p. 1923); C: The Mīmāṃsā Nyāyaprakāśa of Āpadeva (ed. and original Sanskrit commentary by Pdt. A. Chinnaswami Sastri, p. 1925); and P: the text printed in The Pandit (ed. Ganganatha Jha, vol. 26 and 27, 1904–05). Edgerton explains that he primarily relies on B and C, as P has several typos. He also reports that the variant parasya nirapekṣatā is found in B and P and not in C (Edgerton 1929, p. 265 fn. 373). I am unable to independently check these three texts (B, C and P) or their sources. Nevertheless, I have checked two other editions of the MNP (Vidyāsāgara (1898, p. 73) and Sastri and Sastri (1921, p. 450)) as well as three manuscripts (M.T.B. College, Manuscripts Library Nos. 61 & 68; Chunilal Gandhi Vidyabhavan, Manuscripts Library Coll. No. 604) and all of these report the term paraspara and not parasya. Even the AS, which is identical to the MNP in several sentences and paragraphs and is to be considered “Āpadeva’s most important direct source” (Edgerton 1929, p. 23), reports paraspara and not parasya (for instance, Thibaut (1882, p. 23) and Upādhyāya (1990, p. 194)). It seems then that the reading parasya is perhaps a typo. I am grateful to the anonymous reviewer of this paper for having pointed out these additional editions and manuscripts of the MNP.

  89. Sentences classified as mantra, nāmadheya, arthavāda or śāstraprāpta-prohibitions depend upon prescriptions (vidhi). Only prohibitions classified as rāgaprāpta would not directly depend upon a prescription, but would instead require the relevant rāga in order to first establish (prāpti) the action to be prohibited.

  90. The PMS is generally dated to the 2nd century BCE and the MNP to around the 17th century CE (Verpoorten 1987, p. 47).

  91. In most cases, it is the ŚBh which mentions examples to demonstrate the rule enunciated in the sūtras—however, in the case of the conflict in ‘giving alms daily’ and ‘not giving alms when initiated into the Jyotiṣṭoma’, even this example is found mentioned in PMS 10.8.12—dīkṣitasya dānahomapākapratiṣedho 'viśeṣāt sarvadānahomapākapratiṣedhaḥ syāt.

Abbreviations

AS:

Arthasaṃgraha of Laugākṣibhāsakara

MNP:

Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa of Āpadeva

PMS:

Pūrvamīmāṃsāsūtra

ŚBh:

Śābarabhāṣya

ŚV:

Ślokavārttika of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa

ṬṬ:

Ṭupṭīkā of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa

References

  • Abhyaṃkara, Kāśīnātha Vāsudevaśāstrī, & Jośī, Gaṇeśaśāstrī (Eds.). (1974). Śrīmajjaiminipraṇīte Mīmāṃsādarśane. Second. Puṇya: Ānandāśramamudraṇālaya.

    Google Scholar 

  • Āpaṭe, Vināyaka Gaṇeśa (Ed.). (1929). 1 Śrīmajjaiminipraṇīte Mīmāṃsādarśane. Puṇya: Ānandāśramamudraṇālaya.

    Google Scholar 

  • Āpaṭe, Vināyaka Gaṇeśa (Ed.). (1932). 4 Śrīmajjaiminipraṇīte Mīmāṃsādarśane. Puṇya: Ānandāśramamudraṇālaya.

    Google Scholar 

  • Benson, James (Ed.). (2010). Mīmāṃsānyāyasaṃgraha (A compendium of the principles of Mīmāṃsā) by Mahādeva Vedāntin. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cardona, George. (1967). Negations in Pāṇinian rules. Language,43(1), 34–56.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cardona, George. (2013). Mīmāṁsā and the Pāṇinian System. Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute,94, 7–110.

    Google Scholar 

  • Edgerton, Franklin. (1929). The Mīmāṅsā Nyāya Prakāśa, or Āpadevī: A Treatise on the Mīmāṅsā System by Āpadeva. New Haven : Yale University Press/London: H. Milford, Oxford University Press.

  • Freschi, Elisa. (2012). Duty, Language and Exegesis in Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā: Including an Edition and Translation of Rāmānujācārya’s Tantrarahasya. Brill: Śāstraprameyapariccheda.

    Google Scholar 

  • Freschi, Elisa. (2017). “What Does Nitya Mean in Mīmāṃsā?” ed. Madan Mohan Agrawal. Journal of UA Foundation For Indological Studies,3, 1–14.

    Google Scholar 

  • Freschi, Elisa, Ciabattoni, Agata, Genco, Francesco A., & Lellmann, Björn. (2017). Understanding Prescriptive Texts: Rules and Logic as Elaborated by the Mīmāṃsā School. Journal of World Philosophies. https://doi.org/10.2979/jourworlphil.2.1.05.

    Google Scholar 

  • Freschi, Elisa, Ollett, Andrew, & Pascucci, Matteo. (2019). Duty and Sacrifice: A Logical Analysis of the Mīmāṃsā Theory of Vedic Injunctions. History and Philosophy of Logic.,40(4), 323–354.

    Google Scholar 

  • Freschi, Elisa, & Pontillo, Tiziana. (2013). Rule-Extension Strategies in Ancient India: Ritual, Exegetical and Linguistic Considerations on the Tantra- and Prasaṅga- Principles. Bern: Peter Lang GmbH, Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ganeri, Jonardon. (2008). Contextualism in the Study of Indian Intellectual Cultures. Journal of Indian Philosophy,36(5–6), 551–562.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jha, Ganganatha. (1942). Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā in its sources. Varanasi: Benares Hindu University.

  • Kane, Pandurang Vaman. (1941). 2 (Part 2) History of Dharmaśāstra (Ancient and Medieval, Religious and Civil Law). Pune: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kataoka, Kei. (2011a). Kumārila on Truth, Omniscience and Killing—Part 1: A Critical Edition of Mīmāṃsā-Ślokavārttika Ad 1.1.2 (Codanāsūtra). Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kataoka, Kei. (2011b). Kumārila on Truth, Omniscience and Killing—Part 2: An Annotated Translation of Mīmāṃsā-Ślokavārttika Ad 1.1.2 (Codanāsūtra). Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.

    Google Scholar 

  • Keith, Arthur Berriedale. (1914). 1 The Veda of the Black Yajus School: Entitled Taittiriya Sanhita. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • McCrea, Lawrence. (2000). The hierarchical organization of language in Mīmāṃsā interpretive theory. Journal of Indian Philosophy,28(5), 429–459.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sastri, M. M., Lakshmana, Sri, & Sastri, Sita Rama (Eds.). (1921). Mimansā Nyāya Prakāsa By Apadeva, With a Commentary Called “Bhattalankar” by Pandit Ananta Deva. Benares: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office.

    Google Scholar 

  • Saxena, Shishir. (2019). Denotation as complex and chronologically extended: anvitābhidhāna in Śālikanātha’s Vākyārthamātṛkā-I. Journal of Indian Philosophy,47(3), 489–506.

    Google Scholar 

  • Smith, Frederick M. (1987). The Vedic Sacrifice in Transition: A Translation and Study of the Trikāṇḍamaṇḍana of Bhāskara Miśra. Pune: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute.

    Google Scholar 

  • Taber, John. (2005). A Hindu Critique of Buddhist Epistemology—Kumārila on Perception: The “Determination of Perception” Chapter of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa’s Ślokavārttika. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Thibaut, G. (Ed.). (1882). The Arthasaṃgraha: An elementary treatise on Mīmāṃsā by Laugākshi Bhāskara. Benares: Braj B. Das and Co.

    Google Scholar 

  • Upādhyāya, Vācaspati. (1990). Artha-Saṃgraha of Laugākṣi Bhāskara, With an Original Sanskrit Commentary “Arthāloka” by Paṇḍitarāja Paṭṭābhirāma Śātri and Hindi Commentary “Arthālokalocana” by Dr. Vācaspati Upādhyāya. Third. Varanasi: Chaukhamba Orientalia.

  • Verpoorten, Jean-Marie. (1987). Mīmāṃsā Literature. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz.

    Google Scholar 

  • Vidyāsāgara, Jīvānanda, ed. (1898). Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśaḥ. Kalikattā.

  • Yoshimizu, Kiyotaka. (1997). 25 Der “Organismus” Des Urheberlosen Veda: Eine Studie Der Niyoga-Lehre Prabhākaras Mit Ausgewählten Übersetzungen Der Bṛhatī. Wien: Institut für Indologie der Universität Wien.

Download references

Acknowledgements

The research for this paper has been generously supported by the Vienna Science and Technology Fund (WWTF) within the project ‘Reasoning Tools for Deontic Logic and Applications to Indian Sacred Texts’ (MA16_028). I worked on this paper during my time as a researcher at the Institute for the Cultural and Intellectual History of Asia (IKGA) of the Austrian Academy of Sciences (ÖAW). I am grateful to all members of the project team (from the IKGA as well as TU Wien) for our varied discussions and their several constructive suggestions and ideas. I am especially thankful to Dr. Elisa Freschi for her many valuable comments to earlier drafts of this paper. Many thanks also to the anonymous reviewers of this paper for their meticulous reading and helpful comments.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Arts and Sciences, Ahmedabad University, Navrangpura, Ahmedabad, 380009, Gujarat, India

    Shishir Saxena

Authors
  1. Shishir Saxena
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Shishir Saxena.

Ethics declarations

Conflict of interest

The author declares that there have no conflict of interest.

Additional information

Publisher's Note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Saxena, S. When Texts Clash: Mīmāṃsā Thinkers on Conflicting Prescriptions and Prohibitions. J Indian Philos 48, 467–501 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-020-09428-z

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-020-09428-z

Keywords

Search

Navigation