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Aham, Subjectivity, and the Ego: Engaging the Philosophy of Abhinavagupta

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Abstract

This paper engages Abhinavagupta’s (11th C.) philosophy of “aham,” “I” or “I-am,” in a global philosophical platform. Abhinavagupta reads aham to ground speech in experiencing and expressing subjectivity. The aham, in this background, has three distinctive topographies: aham as the ego of the empirical subject, aham as the subject of experience that objectifies the ego, and aham as the ego that embodies the totality (It is generally problematic to assign any specific concept to a particular philosopher. For example, the all-embracing nature of aham is already found in Utpala’s writings (Dyczkowski 1990, p. 11). Nemec (2011, p. 42) reiterates the fact that the concept of pūrṇāhantā or the vocabulary to support this concept is absent in Somānanda. Besides Abhinava, I am incorporating later Śākta commentarial texts in this analysis. My justification for giving Abhinava main credit is that he formally established this concept and later commentators primarily expand upon his insights. See also Bäumer (2011, pp. 101–124). While aham in its most exalted sense relates to the absolute I-consciousness that embraces the totality, it immanently encloses all individualities within its embrace, enveloping all to find a singular identity through its transcendental gaze. Aham in this sense is the “I-am” in which all those within the parameters discover their individuality while also finding collectivity. It is the I-sense that determines or delimits the parameters of the body, and in this sense aham also stands for the embodied self-experience.

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Notes

  1. Dyczkowski in Self-awareness, own awareness, and egoity, © Author, 1990, p. 11). Nemec (The ubiquitous Śiva: Somānanda’s Śivadṛṣṭi and his tantric interlocutors, Oxford University Press, New York, 2011, p. 42) reiterates the fact that the concept of pūrṇāhantā or the vocabulary to support this concept is absent in Somānanda. Besides Abhinava, I am incorporating later Śākta commentarial texts in this analysis. My justification for giving Abhinava main credit is that he formally established this concept and later commentators primarily expand upon his insights. See also Bäumer (Abhinavagupta’s Hermeneutics of the Absolute: Anuttaraprakriyā: An Interpretation of his Parātrīśikā Vivaraṇa, D. K. Printworld, Delhi, 2011, pp. 101–124.

  2. If explored historically, this concept of affirmative “aham” is not just an evolution of ideas within Śaiva/Śākta monism but this is also a result of a sustained dialogue with the Buddhist philosophers. For the conversation of these ideas, see Eltschinger and Ratié (2007) and Ratié (2007). For a comparative approach, see Ganeri (2011) and MacKenzie (2011).

  3. For this identification, see for example Parātrīśikāvivaraṇa (PTV), pp. 4–5: sā ca śaktiḥ lokānugrahavimarśamayī prathamataḥ parāmarśamayyā paśyantyā āsūtrayiṣyamāṇānantaśaktiśatāvibhinnā prathamataraṃ paramahāmantramayyām adeśakālakalitāyāṃ saṃvidi nirūḍhā, tāvat paśyantyudbhaviṣyaduktipratyuktyavibhāgenaiva vartate |. Read also Padoux in Vāc: The concept of the word in selected Hindu Tantras, Sri Satguru Publications, Delhi, 1990, pp. 190, 380, and 386. For the analysis of phonetic expression in light of triadic mysticism that becomes central to the analysis of aham, also see Tantrāloka (TĀ), Chapter 3, verses 66–234. For the expression of speech in accordance with the manifestation of aham, see TĀ, Chapter 3, verses 236–240.

  4. I am deriving this on the basis of a gradual evolution of the ego in the Trika system. Starting from an individual ego (sakala) to the absolute, Parama Śiva, this system provides seven stages for the surge of subjectivity.

  5. Wenta (2016, pp. 364–367) interprets pūrṇa in Utpala’s writings in three distinctive senses of the fullness of sensory experience, the fullness of I-ness, and the composite of the transmental (unmanā) with the mind (samanā).

  6. This is one of the central themes of the Yāmala Tantras. I have addressed the dialogical aspect of consciousness elsewhere (Timalsina 2014). For example: rudrasya rudrāyāś ca yad yāmalaṃ saṅghaṭṭaḥ nirvibhāgapraśnottara-rūpasvarūpāmarśanaprasarād ārabhya yāvad bahir anantāparigaṇanīyasṛṣṭisaṃhārabhāsanaṃ yatrāntaḥ . . . PTV, p. 103, lines 2–4.

  7. For basic Lacanian concepts, consult the entry by Adrian Jonston (2018), Jacques Lacan: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/lacan/

    Also read Bruce 1995. Lawrence (2008, pp. 47–48, 143, 152) made first attempt to read cosmic I-sense of pūrṇāhantā in light of Lacan.

  8. For Abhinava’s application of the term śītkāra, see TĀ 3.167, 5.112. For saṅghaṭṭa, see Tantrāloka 28.47, 29.49,29.53, 29.49,29.53, 29.116, 29.136, 29.140, 29.144, 29.152, 32.56.

  9. The word icchā has a wide range of applications. For instance, volition, will, and desire. While I have read icchā in this paper as ‘desire,’ this is just to engage psychoanalytical theories.

  10. See Laplanche and Pontalis (1988) and Iversen (2007) for discussion on jouissance.

  11. idam ity asya vicchinnavimarśasya kṛtārthatā | yā svasvarūpe viśrāntir vimarśaḥ so ’ham ity ayayam || APS, verse 15.

  12. If compared closely, Abhinavagupta’s treatment of three persons clearly follows the way Bhartṛhari analyzes the grammatical persons in the chapter Puruṣasamuddeśa of the Vākyapadīya.

  13. As Utpala adds further: caitanyaprakāśatādātmyād ahaṃpratyavamarśātmā jīvitasthānīyo yadāśrayāj jaḍam api vastu vimraṣṭṛsvabhāvapramātraikyād ahaṃbhāvaviśrānter ajaḍatvam āyāti | Vṛtti of Utpala upon APS, 15. (I have read vimarṣṭṛ here instead of vimarśṣṭṭ as it appears in the print).

  14. dvidhā sa eṣa evātmā mito’parimitas tathā | prāṇādinā niruddho ’ṇuḥ paramātmā tv akhaṇḍitaḥ || APS 16.

    ubhayo ’py eṣa paryantabhūmiḥ sarvārthasaṃvidām | eka evānusandhānād ato ’nyo nopapaddyate || APS 17.

  15. tatra yat kevalaṃ svātmany avasthitaṃ tat kevalaṃ jaḍarūpayogi mukhyatayā narātmakaṃ ghaṭas tiṣṭhati itivad eṣa eva prathamapuruṣaviṣayaḥ śeṣaḥ | yat punar idam ityapi bhāsamānaṃ yad āmantryamāṇatayā āmantrakāhaṃbhāvasamācchāditatadbhinnedaṃbhāvaṃ yuṣmacchabdavyapadeśyaṃ tacchāktaṃ rūpam, tvaṃ tiṣṭhasi it yatra hi eṣa eva yuṣmacchabdārthaḥ, āmantraṇatattvaṃ ca | tathā hi yathā ahaṃ tiṣṭhāmi tathaivāyam api iti | tasyāpi asmadrūpāvacchinnāhaṃbhāvacamatkārasvātantryam avicchinnāhaṃcamatkāreṇaiva abhimanvāna āmantrayate, yathārthena madhyamapuruṣeṇa vyapadiśati, seyaṃ hi bhagavatī parāparā | sarvathā punar avicchinnacamatkāranirapekṣasvātantryāhaṃvimarśe’haṃ tiṣṭhāmīti parābhaṭṭārikodayaḥ, yatra uttamatvaṃ puruṣasya | . . . śivasvarūpam api cojjhitacidrūpam iva naraśaktyātmakaṃ vapur āviśaty eva | ko ’haṃ, eṣo ’haṃ, aho ahaṃ, dhiṅ mām, aho mahyaṃ ityādau hi aham iti guṇīkṛtyāvicchinnaṃ svātantryaṃ, mukhyatayā tu vicchinnaiva idantā pratīyate yatra bhagavatyā aparāyā udayaḥ | PTV of Abhinavagupta, pp. 25–27 (Commentary upon verses 3–4).

  16. In particular, this is not the Cartesian or Husserlian Ego. While Freud’s analysis of the unconscious subverts the Cartesian ego as it rejects the equation among subject, ego, and consciousness, this also is not the Abhinavaguptian aham.

  17. ātmā jīvitabhūtaḥ sārasvabhāvo vicchedaśūnyo ’ntarabhyupagamakalpo ’nanyamukhapre-ṣitatvasvātantryaviśrāntirūpo ’ham iti parāmarśaḥ | (Īśvarapratyabhijñā Vimarśinī, Vol. 1, pp. 302–303).

  18. tad uktaṃ śrīsomānandapādair nijavivṛttau - a-bījaṃ śuddhaśivarūpam | PTV, p. 20:1–2.

  19. anuttaravimarśātmaśivaśaktyadvayātmani| parāmarśo nirbharatvād aham ity ucyate tadā || TĀ III.203. tasya pratyavamarśo yaḥ paripūrṇo ’hamātmakaḥ | sa svātmani svatantratvād vibhāgam avabhāsayet || TĀ 3. 235.

  20. This text is not currently available and I am using the passages based on citations.

  21. akāraḥ sarvavarṇāgryaḥ prakāśaḥ paramaḥ śivaḥ | hakāro ’ntyaḥ kalārūpo vimarśākhyaḥ prakīrtitaḥ||. . . ādāv asya śiro raudrī vaktraṃ vāmā prakīrtitā | ambikā bāhur ity uktā jyeṣṭhā caiva nakhāgragā || icchā śiraḥpradeśasthā kriyā ca tadadhogatā | jñānā pādagatā hy asya śāntā hṛnmadhyagā bhavet || Saṅketapaddhati. Cited in the Artharatnāvalī commentary upon Nityāṣoḍaśikārṇava, p. 35.

  22. For the elevenfold analysis of aham, see Vidyānanda’s Artharatnāvalī, Nityāṣoḍaśikārṇava, p. 35.

  23. ātmanaḥ sphuraṇaṃ paśyed yadā sā paramā kalā | ambikārūpam āpannā parā vāk samudīritā || Yoginīhṛdaya (YH) I.36.

  24. vāmā viśvasya vamanād aṅkuśākāratāṃ gatā || YH I.37.

  25. jñānaśaktis tathā jyeṣṭhā madhyamā vāg udīritā ||YH I.38 . . . kriyāśaktis tu raudrīyaṃ vaikharī viśvavigrahā || YH I.40.

  26. bhāsanād viśvarūpasaya svarūpe bāhyato ’pi ca| etāś catasra śaktyas tu. . . . || YH I.41.

  27. Dīpikā on the YH I.40.

  28. Dīpikā upon YH I.40.

Abbreviations

APS:

Ajaḍapramātṛtāsiddhi

PTV:

Parātrīśikāvivaraṇa

TĀ:

Tantrāloka

YH:

Yoginīhṛdaya

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  1. San Diego State University, 11289 Silver Buckle Way, San Diego, CA, 92127, USA

    Sthaneshwar Timalsina

  2. Department of Religious Studies, San Diego State University, San Diego, CA, 92182, USA

    Sthaneshwar Timalsina

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Timalsina, S. Aham, Subjectivity, and the Ego: Engaging the Philosophy of Abhinavagupta. J Indian Philos 48, 767–789 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-020-09439-w

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