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NATO enlargement and US foreign policy: the origins, durability, and impact of an idea

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Abstract

Since the Cold War, NATO enlargement has moved from a contentious issue in US foreign policy debates to an accepted plank in US strategy. What explains this development—why has support for enlargement become a focal point in US foreign policy? After first reviewing US policy toward NATO enlargement, this article evaluates a range of hypotheses from international relations theory and policy deliberations that might explain the trend. It finds that no one factor explains the United States’ enlargement consensus. Instead, pervasive US support for enlargement reflects the confluence of several international and domestic trends that, collectively, transformed NATO expansion into a lodestone of US foreign relations. Regardless, the development carries a range of consequences for US national security; although enlargement afforded the United States significant oversight of European security and political developments, it came at the cost of increased tensions and diminished flexibility with Russia, allied cheap-riding, and US overextension.

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Notes

  1. For similar efforts to examine the sources of post–Cold War unipolarity, see Layne (2002), Brooks and Wohlforth (2008), Walt (2009), Posen (2006), and Mastanduno (1997).

  2. As Secretary of State Madeline Albright testified in 1997, the United States could not ‘dismiss the possibility that Russia could return to the patterns of the past’. Hence, enlarging NATO assisted in ‘closing the avenue to more destructive alternatives’ in Russia’s future. See US Senate 1998, 8. See also Talbott (2019, 412).

  3. For example, the 2003 Senate Foreign Relations Committee enlargement discussion coincided with the 2003 invasion of Iraq, leading senators to simultaneously discuss both NATO enlargement and plans for Iraqi reconstruction. See US Senate 2003. On the limited evaluation, compare the range of witnesses and length of testimony in 1998 to the 2008 discussion (US Senate 2008).

  4. In this, I use a range of established IR theories to develop potential specific explanations for the enlargement consensus; on this approach, see Van Evera (1997, 40–43).

  5. Many opponents of NATO expansion expected that (1) new great powers might soon emerge—suggesting that expansion was strategically risky—just as (2) enlargement might encourage states to counterbalance. See Waltz (1993).

  6. NATO’s Partnership for Peace—developed early in the Clinton administration as a way of engaging Eastern European states without formally enlarging NATO—might have offered a mechanism for such commitments. See Art (1998, 400n32) and Walker (2019).

  7. This dynamic may have created a related problem. Having decided to suppress alternatives, the United States exposed itself to a form of entrapment whereby hints that states were considering security structures besides NATO could spur enlargement; in effect, the United States reduced its control over events.

  8. For a related argument, see Porter (2018).

  9. Though the importance of the issue is often overstated, it might also allow them to court ethnic voters in key political districts. See Goldgeier (1999, 100–101).

  10. On miscalculation of the distribution of power as a source of conflict, see Blainey (1988). For nuanced discussion of the situation in Europe, see Glaser (2010, 213–216).

  11. This comes on top of ideational, normative, and institutional factors that many scholars argue independently reduce the risk of European competition and conflict. See Mueller (1989) and Risse-Kappen (1996).

  12. To be sure, the United States is free not to utilize nuclear weapons on behalf of a NATO ally amid a crisis. Still, given the questions this could raise over the United States’ future credibility and the concern US leaders have historically shown over the United States’ willingness to reassure its partners, expansion increases the likelihood US leaders may feel obliged to escalate up to and including nuclear use for NATO’s new members.

  13. Of course, it remains unclear if the US and/or other NATO members would expand to Ukraine, Georgia, or additional countries bordering Russia if conflict were ongoing. Still, the United States has stressed it is willing to consider continued expansion and, in any case, leaders in Russia, Ukraine, and beyond may believe we are serious about further enlargement. Thanks go to Robert Jervis for help on this point.

  14. The canonical statement of the first point is Olson and Zeckhauser 1966. The second point needs elaboration. Alliances tend to wax and wane as states pool resources in response to threats. This is costly and risky domestically—requiring resource mobilization—and internationally—as states rely on one another for their security. For alliances facing limited threats, it is reasonable to expect states to buckpass and underinvest in military forces as much as possible, hoping that their allies will instead bear the burdens of confronting what threats there are.

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Acknowledgements

The author gratefully acknowledges the Charles Koch Foundation’s support in sponsoring Boston University’s ‘Evaluating the Legacy of NATO Enlargement’ workshop in May 2019, for which this article was composed. For comments on prior drafts, the author wishes to thank workshop participants, the anonymous reviewers, Barry Posen, and Robert Jervis.

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Correspondence to Joshua R. Shifrinson.

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Shifrinson, J.R. NATO enlargement and US foreign policy: the origins, durability, and impact of an idea. Int Polit 57, 342–370 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-020-00224-w

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