Skip to content
Licensed Unlicensed Requires Authentication Published by De Gruyter Mouton August 16, 2019

Reduction: The Solution to Mind Representation?

  • Yanying Cui

    Yanying Cui (b. 1977) is a PhD candidate at the School of Philosophy & Sociology, Shanxi University, and also a faculty member at the School of Foreign Languages, Taiyuan University of Science & Technology. Her research interests include theoretical linguistics, applied linguistics, language teaching methodology, and the philosophy of language. Her publications include “Can mind representation be reduced to physics?” (2018), “Speech accommodation theory and code switching” (2013), “Gender differences in complementing topics” (2012), and “Double spelling of stressed closed syllable and its etymology” (2012).

    EMAIL logo
    and Yidong Wei

    Yidong Wei (b. 1958) is a professor at the School of Philosophy & Sociology, Shanxi University. His research interests include the history of science, the philosophy of science, the philosophy of cognition, and the philosophy of mind. His publications include “How can the unification of consciousness be possible?” (2019a), “The adaptive knowledge representation and inference of artificial intelligence” (2019b), “Does phenomenological intentionality surpass naturalistic intentionality?” (2018), and “Adaptive representation of artificial intelligence” (2018).

From the journal Chinese Semiotic Studies

Abstract

Chomsky is an evolutionary figure in linguistics. His greatest contribution lies in transformational generative grammar, which put an end to the leading position structuralism had held in language for more than 30 years. His naturalistic methodology has greatly influenced the research of both linguistics and psychology, and he is also considered to be the first to study language from the cognitive perspective. He insists on a naturalistic methodology; therefore, he was even considered by some to be a physicalist. However, this is not the case. On the contrary, TGG, as a critique of the behaviorist view of language, is intertwined with a critique of physicalism. On the one hand, he thinks the mind, like chemical elements and electrons, can be approached from a third-person perspective; on the other hand, he again admits there exists consciousness, which can be merely approached in terms of a first-person authority, which, therefore, is a fatal challenge to his core theory. Now there remains a new solution to this dilemma, that is, to admit that the mind is a special natural phenomenon with two means of existence: one is involved in physical aspects with the brain, and the other is concerned with something mental, with the former approached by a third-person perspective and the latter better researched via a first-person authority.

About the authors

Yanying Cui

Yanying Cui (b. 1977) is a PhD candidate at the School of Philosophy & Sociology, Shanxi University, and also a faculty member at the School of Foreign Languages, Taiyuan University of Science & Technology. Her research interests include theoretical linguistics, applied linguistics, language teaching methodology, and the philosophy of language. Her publications include “Can mind representation be reduced to physics?” (2018), “Speech accommodation theory and code switching” (2013), “Gender differences in complementing topics” (2012), and “Double spelling of stressed closed syllable and its etymology” (2012).

Yidong Wei

Yidong Wei (b. 1958) is a professor at the School of Philosophy & Sociology, Shanxi University. His research interests include the history of science, the philosophy of science, the philosophy of cognition, and the philosophy of mind. His publications include “How can the unification of consciousness be possible?” (2019a), “The adaptive knowledge representation and inference of artificial intelligence” (2019b), “Does phenomenological intentionality surpass naturalistic intentionality?” (2018), and “Adaptive representation of artificial intelligence” (2018).

Acknowledgements

This research is funded by the National Planning Office of Philosophy and Social Science Foundation, with the project number 16AZX006. It is also part of the project funded by Foreign Language Teaching and Research Press with the project number 2018121201.

References

Chomsky, Noam. 1951. Morphophonemics of modern Hebrew Dissertation, PA: Philadelphia University of Pennsylvania.Search in Google Scholar

Chomsky, Noam. 1955. The logical structure of linguistic theory Cambridge, MA: Harvard University.Search in Google Scholar

Chomsky, Noam. 1957a. Syntactic structures The Hague: Mouton.10.1515/9783112316009Search in Google Scholar

Chomsky, Noam. 1957b. Review of R. Jakobson and M. Halle, Fundamentals of language. International Journal of American Linguistics 23(3). 234–242.10.1086/464414Search in Google Scholar

Chomsky, Noam. 1959. A review of B. F. Skinner, Verbal behavior. Language 35(1). 26–58.10.2307/411334Search in Google Scholar

Chomsky, Noam. 1964. Current issues in linguistic theory The Hague: Mouton.Search in Google Scholar

Chomsky, Noam. 1965. Aspects of the theory of syntax Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.10.21236/AD0616323Search in Google Scholar

Chomsky, Noam. 1966. Cartesian linguistics New York: Harper and Row.Search in Google Scholar

Chomsky, Noam. 1988. Language and problems of knowledge Cambridge: The MIT press.Search in Google Scholar

Chomsky, Noam. 1993a. A minimalist program for linguistic theory. In Kenneth Hale & Samuel J Keyser (eds.), The view from building 20: Essays in linguistics in honor of Sylvain Bromberger, 1–52. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Search in Google Scholar

Chomsky, Noam. 1993b Language and thought Wakefield, RI: Moyer Bell.Search in Google Scholar

Chomsky, Noam. 1993c. The prosperous few and the restless many. Berkeley: Odonian.Search in Google Scholar

Chomsky, Noam. 1993d. Year 501: The conquest continues Boston: South End.Search in Google Scholar

Chomsky, Noam. 1994. Naturalism and dualism in the study of language and mind. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 2(2). 181–209.10.1080/09672559408570790Search in Google Scholar

Chomsky, Noam. 1995a. Categories and transformations. In Noam Chomsky, The minimalist program (Current Studies in Linguistics 28), 219–394. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Search in Google Scholar

Chomsky, Noam. 1995b. Language and Nature. Mind 104. 1–6.10.1093/mind/104.413.1Search in Google Scholar

Chomsky, Noam. 1995c. The minimalist program Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.10.7551/mitpress/9780262527347.001.0001Search in Google Scholar

Chomsky, Noam. 1999a. Derivation by phase. In M. Kenstowicz (ed. ), Ken Hale: A life in language, 1–52. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Search in Google Scholar

Chomsky, Noam. 1999b. Language and the brain. Address at the European Conference on Cognitive Science, on October 30 at Santa Maria della Scala, Siena.Search in Google Scholar

Chomsky, Noam. 1999c The new military humanism Monroe, ME: Common Courage.Search in Google Scholar

Chomsky, Noam. 2000. New horizons in the study of language and mind Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/CBO9780511811937Search in Google Scholar

Chomsky, Noam. 2009. Mysteries of nature: How deeply hidden? Journal of Philosophy 106(4), April. 167–200.10.5840/jphil2009106416Search in Google Scholar

Chomsky, Noam. 2015. What kind of creatures are we? New York: Columbia University Press.10.7312/chom17596Search in Google Scholar

Dennett, Daniel. 1991 Darwin’s dangerous idea London: Penguin.Search in Google Scholar

Descartes, René, Elizabeth Sanderson Haldane & G. R. T. (George Robert Thomson) Ross. 1931 [1637]. Discourse on the method of rightly conducting research. In René Descartes, Elizabeth Sanderson Haldane & George Robert Thomson Ross. The philosophical works of Descartes, rendered into English by Elizabeth S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross Reprinted with corrections, 81–130. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Search in Google Scholar

Dewey, John. 1910. How we think. Boston: D.C. Heath & Co.10.1037/10903-000Search in Google Scholar

Fodor, Jerry. 1981). Representations: Foundations of cognitive science Cambridge: MIT Press.Search in Google Scholar

Hu, Shi. 2000. Research methods Shenyang: Liaoning People’s Publishing House.Search in Google Scholar

Hume, David. 1975 [1777]. Enquiries concerning human understanding and concerning the principles of morals Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.10.1093/actrade/9780198245353.book.1Search in Google Scholar

Hume, David. 1983 [1778]. History of England: From the invasion of Julius Caesar to the revolution in 1688, Vol. 6 of 6 vols. Originally published: London: T. Cadell. Reprint with new Foreword by William B. Todd. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund 1983. Retrieved from http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/793 (accessed 20 March 2019).Search in Google Scholar

Kim, Jaegwon. 1992. Multiple realization and the metaphysics of reduction. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52(1). 1–26.10.2307/2107741Search in Google Scholar

McGinn, Colin. 1989. Can we solve the mind–body problem? Mind New Series 98(391). 49– 366.10.1093/mind/XCVIII.391.349Search in Google Scholar

McGinn, Colin. 1993. Problems in philosophy Oxford: Blackwell.Search in Google Scholar

McGilvray, James (ed.). 2007. The Cambridge companion to Chomsky Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Search in Google Scholar

Papineau, David. 2001. The rise of physicalism. In Carl Gillett & Barry Loewer (eds). Physicalism and its discontents, 1–36. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/CBO9780511570797.002Search in Google Scholar

Poland, Jeffrey. 2003. Chomsky’s challenge to physicalism. In Louise M. Antony & Norbert Hornstein (eds.), Chomsky and his critics 29–48. Oxford: Blackwell.10.1002/9780470690024.ch2Search in Google Scholar

Popper, Karl. 1972. Objective knowledge Oxford: Clarendon Press.Search in Google Scholar

Searle, John. 2000. The rediscovery of the mind Cambridge: The MIT press.Search in Google Scholar

Published Online: 2019-08-16
Published in Print: 2019-08-27

© 2019 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

Downloaded on 24.4.2024 from https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/css-2019-0019/html
Scroll to top button