Two Types of Argument from Position to Know

Authors

  • David Botting IFL, FCSH, Universidade Nova de Lisboa

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v38i4.5065

Abstract

In this paper I will argue that there is an inductive and a non-inductive argument from position to know, and will characterise the latter as an argument from (epistemic) authority because of providing content-independent reasons. I will also argue that both types of argument should be doubt-preserving: testimony cannot justify a stronger cognitive attitude in the arguer than the expert herself expresses when she testifies. Failure to appreciate this point undercuts Mizrahi’s (2013) claim that arguments from expert opinion are weak.

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Published

2018-12-18

Issue

Vol. 38 No. 4 (2018)

Section

Articles

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