Construction of Information Platform for Shareholder Agency Governance under Group Control based on Artificial Intelligence

Abstract

The wide application of artificial intelligence has greatly improved our work efficiency and quality of life. This paper selected tourism companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges as the samples, and adopted the mixed panel analysis based on the relationship between shareholders' agency and corporate performance under the control of the business group with artificial intelligence. The conclusions are as follows: the higher the concentration of group equity, the lower the agency cost of shareholders. Furthermore, state-owned group control has lower shareholder agency cost than private group control. The higher the degree of equity balance, the lower the agency cost of shareholders. The higher the proportion of independent directors, the lower the agency cost. The higher the debt ratio, the lower agency cost of group controlling shareholders. The higher the ownership concentration, the better the company performance. Then, in order to reflect the information data of the group governance mechanism timely, the governance information platform is constructed, which is a unified structured information collection, sorting and disclosure mechanism system. On this basis, the process oriented internal control system is integrated to overcome the efficiency block caused by supervision.

Introduction

Group control is a common corporate institutional arrangement in China [1], [2], [3], more than 60% of listed companies are affiliated to enterprise groups [4], On the one hand, the pursuit of private interests by the controlling shareholders of the group has the natural predatory nature of hollowing out their controlled subsidiaries [5]. On the other hand, taking into account the sustainable development, profit maximization and business cycle changes, the controlling shareholders of the group have support and interest transfer behaviour for their controlled subsidiaries by using the whole group network. At the same time, according to the nature of the ultimate controller, it can be divided into state-owned group control and private group control. State-owned group control can be further divided into central state-owned group control and local state-owned group control. Due to the different nature of controllers, controlling shareholders have different strategic orientation, resource endowment and organizational character [6].

Under the traditional group governance mode, there is a lack of real-time intelligent governance information system, and the group does not have the ability to discover and judge problems in real time. Corporate governance rules put forward more and more strict requirements for the frequency, content and timeliness of information disclosure. Based on this, it is necessary for enterprise groups to construct real-time business intelligence governance information system, form the ability to capture and judge problems in real time, reveal the conflicts between rules, and check the trend of governance indicators in real time, so as to analyse the impact of rapidly changing internal and external factors on themselves. In order to improve the efficiency of decision-making and win the overall interests, the group should timely disclose relevant information, control potential risks and adjust relevant governance mechanisms.

Almost all of China's listed tourism companies belong to those group controlled, which are mainly controlled by state-owned groups. In the epidemic normalization era, it is important to explore the relationship among group control, shareholder agency and corporate performance of tourism groups from the perspective of corporate governance. This paper focuses on the following issues: (1) whether do the major shareholders of the group tunnel or support their subsidiaries? and whether the constraint effect of the governance mechanism on the shareholder agency problem controlled by the group is effective? (2) Does group control of major shareholders damage (or improve) the company's performance? (3) How is it to construct the information response platform of shareholder agency governance under group control?

Based on these purposes, this paper empirically tests the effectiveness of the internal governance mechanism of group control tourism listed companies on shareholder agency cost constraints, and the impact of group control on corporate performance, taking China's Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchange tourism listed companies from 2011 to 2019 as research samples. According to the empirical results, the group's governance mechanism information platform is constructed.

The contributions of this paper are as follows: (1) as a happy industry in China, the tourism group large shareholder does not increase the agency cost, on the contrary, which supports its’ controlling companies. This conclusion enriches the research literature on shareholder agency. (2) Under the control of tourism group, ownership concentration is positively correlated with corporate performance. (3) From the perspective of information system, the construction scheme broadens the response method of agent governance of group controlling shareholders. Furthermore, the governance information system based on artificial intelligence, will be efficient combined with IT theory and group governance theory.