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Arms and Diplomacy

  • Special Issue of the Journal Herald of the Russian Academy of Sciences on International Relations
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Abstract

The withdrawal of the United States from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) in 2019 threatens the collapse of the entire nuclear weapons control system created over the past 50 years. This may lead to an uncontrolled multilateral arms race. This dangerous turn of events is assessed differently by politicians and experts. One of the growing trends of thought postulates that the bipolar world of the Cold War times has given way to multipolarity, and therefore bilateral limitation of nuclear weapons is no longer possible. This premise is complemented by the hypothesis that the latest weapons and military technologies cannot be limited by the old methods of negotiations and agreements, which therefore should also be abolished. It is proposed to focus on the organization of various multilateral forums to create an enabling environment for strengthening nuclear deterrence, transparency, and predictability. However, scientific analysis shows that both of these premises are unfounded. First, despite deep reductions in nuclear weapons over the past 30 years, the share of the two leading powers in the global arsenal of such weapons has barely decreased, and the nuclear landscape remains largely bilateral. Second, the revolutionizing impact of advances in military technology is not new but a common occurrence that has recurred regularly throughout history. The experience of the past five decades has convincingly demonstrated that arms control can be successfully implemented if there is political will at the highest state level to reach agreements on the limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons.

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Notes

  1. SNF means strategic nuclear forces.

  2. That is, schematically, one missile with 10 warheads can hit 10 enemy missiles with 100 warheads.

  3. It was allowed to have a total of no more than 1320 MIRVed missiles and heavy bombers with ALCMs, including no more than 1200 sea and land MIRVed missiles and no more than 820 multiply charged ground ICBMs [19].

  4. The ceilings of the Treaty were 1600 carriers, 6000 warheads, including 4900 ICBM and SLBM warheads, including 1100 units for ICBM warheads on mobile launchers and 1540 warheads on heavy ICBMs.

  5. We are talking about a nuclear aerial bomb with a variable B-61-12 power.

  6. This refers to the new W-76-2 nuclear warhead for the Trident-2 SLBM with a capacity of 5 kt.

  7. For example, these are US Tomahawk type (BGM-109) sea-based and airborne (AGM-158B, JASSM-ER) CMs. Russia is also building up its arsenal of nonnuclear cruise missiles: Caliber 3M-14 naval missiles, Kh-555 and Kh-101 aircraft missiles, and 9M728 Iskander and 9M729 Novator land-based cruise missiles.

  8. According to Russian data, out of 59 Tomahawk SLCMs fired, 36 were downed by the Syrian air defense or failed the flight. See INTERFAX.RU, 04/07/2017.

  9. This applies to the Russian SLCM Caliber and US Tomahawk and aviation cruise missiles of the US Kh-101/102 RF and AGM-158 types, as well as to new medium-range missiles after the INF Treaty denunciation.

  10. For example, the United States is deploying Trident II SLBMs with low-yield warheads (W-76-2), long-range air-launched cruise missiles (LRSO type), guided bombs with variable charge power (B-61-12), and new nuclear SLCMs [30].

  11. These include projects of a fractionally orbital bombardment system, a space-based gliding vehicle, and a space maneuvering vehicle.

  12. Otherwise, in the first case, it is impossible to intercept missiles on the acceleration section of the trajectory, and in the second, the flight time of the strike weapons to the targets will be too long.

  13. CFE means the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty.

  14. We are speaking about regular sessions of Russia, the United States, China, Britain, and France on disarmament issues, which have been held since 2007.

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Funding

This research was supported by the Russian Science Foundation, project no. 18-18-00463.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Primakov National Research Institute of the World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia

    A. G. Arbatov

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  1. A. G. Arbatov
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Correspondence to A. G. Arbatov.

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Translated by B. Alekseev

RAS Academician Aleksei Georgievich Arbatov is Head of the Center for International Security, Primakov National Research Institute of the World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), RAS.

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Arbatov, A.G. Arms and Diplomacy. Her. Russ. Acad. Sci. 90, 633–644 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1134/S1019331620060039

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