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Reading bedtime stories to compatriots: Reconciling global equality of opportunity and self-determination

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 February 2019

Ayelet Banai  and
Eszter Kollar
Ayelet Banai*
Affiliation:
School of Political Sciences, the University of Haifa
Eszter Kollar
Affiliation:
Institute of Philosophy, KU Leuven
*
*Corresponding author. Email: abanai@poli.haifa.ac.il
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Abstract

In this article, we propose a reconciliation between global equality of opportunity and self-determination, two central and seemingly conflicting principles in the contemporary theory of global justice. Our conception of reconciliation draws on the family-people analogy, following the account of familial relationship goods, developed by Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift, on permissible parental partiality and domestic equality of opportunity. We argue, first, that a plausible conception of global equality of opportunity must be able to distinguish morally arbitrary aspects of nationality that require mitigation from morally permissible ones. Second, we argue that a plausible criterion for the distinction integrates a person’s normative interests over a lifetime: (i) the interests of a child born into societal circumstances that impact her life prospects; and (ii) the interests of an adult citizen in collective self-determination. Third, we outline an account of ‘people relationship goods’, as a principled way to circumscribe the permissible scope of self-determination. Fair global equality of opportunity requires mitigating nationality-tracking inequalities, except those that fall within the permissible scope of collective self-determination.

Keywords

Global Equality of OpportunitySelf-DeterminationFamily-people AnalogyRelationship GoodsReconciliationFamily ValuesLegitimate Partiality
Type
Research Article
Information
Review of International Studies , Volume 45 , Issue 3 , July 2019 , pp. 367 - 386
Copyright
© British International Studies Association 2019 

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References

1 Blake, Michael, ‘Distributive justice, state coercion, and autonomy’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 30:3 (2001), pp. 257–296 CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; Miller, David, National Responsibility and Global Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; Altman, Andrew and Wellman, Christopher, A Liberal Theory of International Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 123–124 CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

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9 Caney, Justice Beyond Borders, ch. 5; Thomas Pogge, ‘The bounds of nationalism’.

10 Brighouse and Swift, Family Values, pp. 27–41 (p. 86).

11 Ibid., pp. 44–5.

12 Ibid., p. 36.

13 Ibid.

14 Dworkin, Ronald, ‘What is equality? Part 3: the place of liberty’, Iowa Lew Review, 73:1 (1987), pp. 1–54 Google Scholar .

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16 Ibid., pp. 94–7; Brighouse and Swift, ‘Legitimate parental partiality’, pp. 55–6.

17 Brighouse and Swift, ‘Legitimate parental partiality’, pp. 58–61 (p. 70); Brighouse and Swift, Family Values, pp. 70–4, 88–93.

18 Brighouse and Swift, Family Values, pp. 4, 71–3, 93–4.

19 We shall not specify a standard of how good is good enough or an account of competent parenting, see discussion in Brighouse and Swift, Family Values, ch. 4.

20 Brighouse and Swift, ‘Legitimate parental partiality’, pp. 52–5; Brighouse and Swift, Family Values, pp. 87–93.

21 For current purpose, we take no stand on whether well-being is objective or not. We presuppose that a conception of human needs or interests is available, which is sufficiently broadly acceptable to serve as a notion of the well-being interest that self-determining peoples and families ought to fulfil respectively.

22 Brighouse and Swift, Family Values, p. 52.

23 Ibid., pp. 93–4.

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28 See, for example, Armstrong, ‘National self-determination’, pp. 327–8.

29 Carens, ‘Aliens and citizens’; Caney, ‘Cosmopolitan justice and equalizing opportunities’.

30 Moellendorf, Global Inequality Matters, p. 75.

31 Ibid.

32 Blake, ‘Distributive justice’.

33 See, for example, Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice.

34 Brighouse and Swift, Family Values, ch. 3.

35 Thomas Scanlon, ‘Equality of Opportunity: A Normative Anatomy’, in Annual Uheiro Lectures, Oxford (December 2013).

36 Rawls, John, Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 61 Google Scholar , emphasis added.

37 Moellendorf may argue this way, but takes a different stance.

38 Brock, Global Justice, p. 62; Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice.

39 Both Brock and Miller are likely to accept this characterisation of their position as not, strictly speaking, equality of opportunity views. However, since they use the language of equal vs sufficient opportunity, we thought it is important to clarify the differences in the normative structure.

40 Armstrong, ‘National self-determination’, p. 328.

41 Goodin, Robert, ‘What is so special about our fellow countrymen?’, Ethics, 98:4 (1988), pp. 663–686 CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

42 Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice; Altman and Wellman, A Liberal Theory of International Justice, ch. 4; Blake, ‘Distributive justice’.

43 Moellendorf, Global Inequality Matters, p. 85.

44 Tan, ‘Liberal nationalism and cosmopolitan justice’.

45 Armstrong, ‘National self-determination’, p. 334.

46 Brighouse and Swift, Family Values, pp. 61–4.

47 We thank an anonymous reviewer for pushing us to clarify our view, and its departure from the family.

48 Armstrong, Chris, ‘Against “permanent sovereignty” over natural resources’, Politics, Philosophy & Economics, 14:2 (2015), pp. 129–151 (pp. 139–41)CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; Moore, Margaret, A Political Theory of Territory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 90–110 CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

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50 Stilz, Anna, ‘Nations, states and territory’, Ethics, 121:3 (2011), pp. 572–601 (pp. 580–4)CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; Stilz, Anna, ‘Why do states have territorial rights?’, International Theory, 1:2 (2009), pp. 198–206 CrossRefGoogle Scholar . We are aware that the view that territorial autonomy is preferable requires more discussion than outlined here.

51 In their criticism of Miller’s national self-determination, Brighouse and Swift suggest a notion of political goods similar to ours: ‘Legitimate partiality, parents, and patriots’, p. 120.

52 Brighouse and Swift, Family Values, p. 67.

53 We do not discuss the question of which interests are indeed agency interests although this is relevant for specifying the scope of permissible partiality. Agency interest arguably opens the door to a broader scope of self-determination than can be reconciled with global egalitarianism. The framework outlined here proposes ways to resist this, as illustrated below.

54 Miller, David, On Nationality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), ch. 4 Google Scholar .

55 Kymlicka, Will, Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996)CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

56 David Miller, ‘National self-determination and global justice’, in Citizenship and National Identity (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2000), pp. 161–79.

57 For critiques of liberal-nationalism on this point and ‘people’-based account of self-determination, as alternative to nation, see Moore, Margaret, ‘Which people and what land? Territorial right-holders and attachment to territory’, International Theory, 6:1 (2014), pp. 121–140 CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Stilz, ‘Nations, states and territory’.

58 Moore, Margaret, ‘Natural resources, territorial right, and global distributive justice’, Political Theory, 40 (2012), pp. 84–107 CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; Philpott, Daniel, ‘In defense of self-determination’, Ethics, 105:2 (1995), pp. 352–385 CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

59 Philpott, ‘In defense of self-determination’, p. 352.

60 Moore, ‘Which people and what land?’, p. 133.

61 Ibid.

62 Stilz, Anna, ‘The value of self-determination’, in David Sobel, Peter Vallentyne, and Steven Wall (eds), Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy, 2 (2016), pp. 115–120 Google Scholar .

63 Moore, ‘Which people and what land?’.

64 As often argued in the literature, individuals do not choose their identities in a vacuum, but are socialised into them. Nevertheless, identities are not immutable and they are subject to reflection and occasionally to revision. Their value and implications for theories of self-determination rest on their value to the individuals that hold them. See Banai, Ayelet, ‘Political self-determination and global egalitarianism: Towards an intermediate position’, Social Theory and Practice, 39:1 (2013), pp. 45–69 CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

65 On national identity and cultural distinctiveness, see, for example, Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, pp. 11, 79–80; Miller, On Nationality, pp. 25–31.

66 Consider, for example, Kurdish, German, and Italian nationalities and the interesting ways in which they do not overlap with political affiliations. As noted above, affiliation to a polity is not necessarily status quo-biased. Political identity may attach to a polity that a group aspires to, for example in the case of secessionist movements, those among the citizens of member states of the European Union consider themselves primarily Europeans.

67 Banai, ‘Political self-determinationp’, pp. 56–63.

68 As noted above, we understand both personal and collective autonomy to be valuable because they are valuable for individuals, but they are different. Collective autonomy does not assume a collective metaphysical entity that is valuable independently from value to the members, but it differs in its content from personal autonomy.

69 It is not assumed that the ‘people’ are internally harmonious and conflict-free. In a fairly functional people, there is a sense of a common good that prevents political and social rivalries from becoming violent conflicts.

70 These goods are promising candidates for distinctive ‘people relationship goods’. A full analysis of which are indeed distinctive and why remains for future inquiry.

71 Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice; Altman and Wellman, A Liberal Theory of International Justice.