Abstract
The widespread implementation of anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) has been an important public administration trend of the past decades. Considering the multifaceted challenges they face, much attention has been afforded to the legal structures which condition their bureaucratic autonomy. Little is known, however, about the reputational dimension of the autonomy of ACAs. This paper contributes a theoretical bridge between bureaucratic reputation theory and the anti-corruption literature, by studying how these agencies construct and manage their reputations over time. Using a mixed-methods research design, this paper employs a narrative analysis of commission hearings and semi-structured interviews, paired with quantitative content analysis of media articles and agency web-communications. The case of Quebec’s (Canada) ACA shows the inherent challenges, strategies and non-linearity of reputation building, which enriches our understanding of the difficulty of crafting an agency’s de facto bureaucratic autonomy.
Similar content being viewed by others
Change history
27 March 2021
A Correction to this paper has been published: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-021-09948-z
Notes
Translates to ‘Permanent Anti-Corruption Unit’
Translates to ‘Anti-Corruption Commissioner’
Later, the ruling party lost the elections, and the newly formed government modified the nomination process of the Commissioner to be nominated by a 2/3rd majority of parliament.
References
Bautista-Beauchesne, N. (2020). Corruption and anti-corruption: A folklore problem? Crime. Law and Social Change, 73(2), 159–180.
Bautista-Beauchesne, N., & Garzon, C. (2019). Conceptualizing corruption prevention: A systematic literature review. Journal of Financial Crime, 26(3), 719–745.
Bélair-Cirino, M. (2017). Le numéro 2 de l'UPAC démissionne. Le Devoir. Montréal, Q.C: A1.
Busuioc, M. E., & Lodge, M. (2016). The reputational basis of public accountability. Governance, 29(2), 247–263.
Busuioc, M. E., & Lodge, M. (2017). Reputation and accountability relationships: Managing accountability expectations through reputation. Public Administration Review, 77(1), 91–100.
Carpenter, D. P. (2001). The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy. Reputations, Networks and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862-1928. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press.
Carpenter, D. P. (2010). Reputation and power. Organizational image and pharmaceutical regulation at the FDA. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press.
Carpenter, D. P., & Krause, G. A. (2012). Reputation and public administration. Public Administration Review, 72(1), 26–32.
Commission d'Enquête sur l'Octroi et la Gestion des Contrats Publics dans l'Industrie de la Construction (CEIC). (2014). Audience volume 232. Montréal, QC.
CEIC. (2015). Rapport final de la Commission d'enquête sur l'octroi et la gestion des contrats publics dans l'industrie de la construction. Québec: Retrieved from Montréal.
Christensen, T., & Gornitzka, A. (2019). Reputation Management in Public Agencies: The relevance of time, sector, audience, and tasks. Administration & Society, 51(6), 885–914.
Commissaire à la Lutte Contre la Corruption (CLCC). (2014). Mémoire présenté à la CEIC. Québec: Unité permanente Anticorruption (UPAC).
Corriveau, J. (2013). Applebaum arrêté par l'UPAC: 14 chefs d'accusation. Le Devoir. Montréal, QC.
Corriveau, J., & Caillou, A. (2018). Le commissaire de l'UPAC, Robert Lafrenière, quittera ses fonctions le 2 novembre prochain. Le Devoir. Montréal, QC.
De Sousa, L. (2009). Anti-corruption agencies: Between empowerment and irrelevance. Crime, Law & Social Change, 53(1), 5–22.
Di Mascio, F., et al. (2018). Exploring the dynamics of delegation over time: Insights from Italian anti-corruption agencies. Policy Studies Journal, 48(2), 367–400.
Dodge, J., Sonia, M. O., & Foldy, E. G. (2005). Integrating rigor and relevance in public administration scholarship: The contribution of narrative inquiry. Public Administration Review, 65(3), 286–300.
Gans-Morse, J., Borges, M., Makarin, A., Mannah-Blankson, T., Nickow, A., & Zhang, D. (2018). Reducing bureaucratic corruption: Interdisciplinary perspectives on what works. World Development, 105, 171–188.
Gilad, S., Maor, M., & Bloom, P. B.-N. (2013). Organizational reputation, the content of public allegations, and regulatory communication. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 25(2), 451–478.
Gilardi, G. (2008). Delegation in the regulatory state: Independant regulatory agencies in Western Europe. Northampton, USA: Edgar Elwar.
Hood, C. (2011). The blame game: Spin, bureaucracy, and self preservation in government. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Hudon, P. A., & Garzón, C. (2016). Corruption in public procurement: entrepreneurial coalition building. Crime, Law and Social Change, 66, 291–311.
Kuris, G. (2015). Watchdogs or guard dogs: Do anti-corruption agencies need strong teeth? Policy & Society, 34, 125–135.
Leech, N. L., & Onwuegbuzie, A. J. (2009). A typology of mixed methods research designs. Quality & Quantity, 43, 265–275.
Macnamara, J. (2005). Media content analysis: Its uses, benefits and best practice methodology. Asia Pacific Public Relations Journal, 6(1), 1–34.
Maor, M. (2007). A scientific standard and an Agency's legal Independence: Which of these reputation protection mechanisms is less susceptible to political moves? Public Administration, 85(4), 961–978.
Maor, M., Gilad, S., & Bloom, P. B.-N. (2012). Organizational reputation, regulatory talk, and strategic silence. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 23(3), 581–608.
Maor, M., & Sulitzeanu-Kenan, R. (2016). Responsive change: An agency output response to reputational threats. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 26(1), 31–44.
Marvel, J. D., & McGrath, R. J. (2015). Congress as manager: oversight hearings and agency morale. Journal of Public Policy, 36(3), 489–520.
Meagher, P. (2005). Anti-corruption agencies: Rhetoric versus reality. The Journal of Policy Reform, 8(1), 69–103.
Persson, A., Rothstein, B., & Teorell, J. (2013). Why anticorruption reforms fail- systemic corruption as a collective action problem. Governance, 26(3), 449–471.
Porter, I. (2018). Procès Côté-Normandeau: la chasse aux fuites se poursuit. Le Devoir. A2. Montréal, QC.
Porter, I., et al. (2017). Arrestation de Guy Ouellette - L'UPAC nie avoir intimidé Ouellette et défend ses techniques d'enquête. Le Devoir. A1-A10. Montréal, QC.
Quah, J. S. T. (2007). Anti-corruption agencies in four Asian countries: A comparative analysis. International Public Management Review, 8(2), 73–96.
Quah, J. S. T. (2010). Defying institutional failure: Learning from the experiences of anti-corruption agencies in four Asian countries. Crime, Law and Social Change, 53(1), 23–54.
Québec (2011). Loi Concernant la Lutte Contre la Corruption. L-6.1. Québec, Q.C.
Québec. (2012). Étude des crédits budgétaires 2012–2013 du MSP. Québec, QC: Gouvernement du Québec, Commission des Institutions.
Québec. (2015a). Étude des crédits budgétaires 2015–2016 du MSP. Québec, QC: Gouvernement du Québec, Commission des Institutions.
Québec. (2015b). Examen des orientations, des activités et de la gestion administrative du CLCC. Québec, QC: Gouvernement du Québec, Commission des Institutions.
Québec. (2017). Étude de crédits budgétaires 2017–2018 du MSP. Québec, QC: Gouvernement du Québec, Commission des Institutions.
Québec. (2018a). Étude de crédits budgétaires 2018–2019 du MSP. Québec, QC: Gouvernement du Québec, Commission des Institutions.
Québec. (2018b). Loi visant à accroître la compétence et l’indépendance du CLCC et du BEI ainsi que le pouvoir du DPCP d’accorder certains avantages à des témoins collaborateurs. Québec, QC: Government of Quebec.
Reeves-Latour, M., & Morselli, C. (2017). Bid-rigging networks and state-corporate crime in the construction industry. Social Networks, 51, 158–170.
Reeves-Latour, M., & Morselli, C. (2018). Fighting corruption in a time of crisis: Lessons from a radical regulatory shift experience Crime. Law & Social Change, 69(3), 349–370.
Richer, J. (2017a). Affaire Ouellette: L'UPAC résiste aux pressions politiques et poursuit l'enquête. La Presse Canadienne. Montréal, Q.C.
Richer, J. (2017b). Arrêté mercredi, le député Guy Ouellette affirme que l'UPAC tente de le museler. La Presse Canadienne. Montréal, Q.C.
Schnell, S. (2018). Cheap talk or incredible commitment? (Mis)calculating transparency and anti-corruption. Governance, 31, 415–430.
Scott, I., & Gong, T. (2015). Evidence-based policy-making for corruption prevention in Hong Kong: A bottom-up approach. Asia Pacific Journal of Public Administration, 37(2), 87–101.
Stake, R. (2000). Case Studies. In N. K. Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), Handbook of qualitative research (2nd ed., pp. 435–454). Thousand Oaks: CA: Sage.
Thomas, D. R. (2006). A general inductive approach for Analyzing qualitative evaluation data. American Journal of Evaluation, 27(2), 237–246.
Tomic, S. (2019). Leadership, institutions & enforcement: Anti-corruption agencies in Serbia, Croatia and Macedonia. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan.
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2004). United Nations convention against corruption. New York: NY.
UPAC. (2015a). Rapport annuel de gestion 2014–2015. Québec, QC.: Commissaire à la Lutte Contre la Corruption.
UPAC. (2015b). Recommandations du CLCC concernant l'octroi et la gestion des contrats publics en informatique. Québec: Unité Permanente Anticorruption.
Vérificateur Général du Québec. (2018). Rapport du vérificateur général du Québec à l'Assemblée Nationale pour l'année 2018-2019. Québec, QC.
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Dr. César Garzon and Dr. Étienne Charbonneau for their helpful comments on the paper, as well as the Fonds de Recherche du Québec sur la Société et la Culture (FRQSC) for financial support. All shortcomings belong to the author.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
Publisher’s note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
The original online version of this article was revised: Full information regarding the corrections made can be found in the correction for this article.
Annex
Annex
(source: UPAC reports 2012 to 2018)
Qualitative coding scheme
Several coding schemes were developed to engage the different types of data that were used in this article. For the qualitative data, a mainly inductive coding approach was used to generate narrative stories and analyse the qualitative interviews. This process enabled to generate themes, categories and labels centered around the agency’s bureaucratic reputation and autonomy. A line-by-line coding strategy was employed using the software Nvivo ®. The coding excerpts and exemplars formed the basis of the narrative analysis. A shortened sample of the codebook which shows several examples of coding nodes with their description.
Name of node | Description |
---|---|
Bureaucratic Autonomy | General statements which refer to the ability of the ACA to pursue its mandates without exogenous interference |
(A) Capacities-unique-niche | Specific statements which pertain to the powers, capacities, programs which define the autonomy of the agency |
(A) Legitimacy-Network | Specific statements which pertain to the building of institutional inter-agency networks and legitimacy that define the ACA’s autonomy |
(A) Preferences-independence | Specific statements which pertain to the political independence and organisational preferences of the agency. |
Bureaucratic Reputation | General statements which refer to the organisational reputation and credibility of the agency. |
(R) Moral | Specific statements which pertain to the values and normative dimension of the ACA’s reputation |
(R) Performance | Specific statements which pertain to performance indicators, outputs, and goals of the ACA. |
(R) Procedural | Specific statements which pertain to the following of protocol, appropriate procedures, legal and judicial guidelines, and jurisdictions. |
(R) Technical and Professional | Specific statements pertaining to the competence of the ACA’s staff, their professionalism, the development of a unique technical expertise in fighting corruption. |
Change and evolution of policies | General statements pertaining to the modifying of the policy environment surrounding the ACA, changes in anticorruption laws, or the addition of new institutions over time. |
Citizens | General statements pertaining to the relationship with citizens as an accountability forum, fostering trust, and cooperation (i.e. witness testimonies). |
Coordination and Cooperation | General statements pertaining to inter-agency relations with other bureaucratic agencies, coordination with other public agencies |
Prevention | General statements pertaining to the different mandates of corruption prevention such as education, training, raising awareness, risk-management etc. |
To give an example of the qualitative coding process, a coded excerpt for each bureaucratic reputation dimension has been sampled and translated from the Commissioner’s parliamentary hearings:
Performative: “I think the UPAC has proved itself. We have, statistically speaking, 155 completed arrests, as you said, 86 cases committed for trial, 18 or 20 convictions solely at the criminal level, excluding the penal, 18 million recovered. I think that we’re doing the work, no one is questioning that.” [39].
Procedural: “People familiar with this area know this: every economic crime, is extremely long, extremely complicated. It’s, oftentimes, without witnesses, it’s testimonial proof and we need to take the time to do it; and myself, I won’t accept the submission of a half-baked casefile, because at that point, we would be blamed for cutting corners, intentionally or not, and that won’t be the case. Each casefile that will be submitted to the DPCP, you can rest assured that it’s going to be complete, and that it’s going to be to their satisfaction”. [41].
Moral: “Our joint actions are founded on the values of integrity, of loyalty, of respect and of competence” [39].
Technical and Professional: “I am truly proud to be able to count on a permanent and competent staff, which is currently developing a unique expertise. They are the grand artisans of the UPAC’s success”. [39].
Quantitative coding schemes
For the quantitative data, two different datasets with similar coding schemes were developed for the press articles and the web communications. This was necessary because the inductive thematic analysis was susceptible of varying between the media and the web communications; and because the coding dealt with different types of perceptions of the ACA’s reputation. Indeed, the web communications dealt with an internal perspective of reputation management, while the press articles reflected a broader external perspective of the ACA’s bureaucratic reputation. For both datasets, a single coding procedure was used for the bureaucratic reputation dimension, and an inductive thematic analysis progressively generated categories to filter the articles. Two samples are provided, to exemplify the coding process, one web article and one press article.
Web article excerpt (translated)
“The Commissioner (…) has disclosed this morning in a press briefing the details of an important operation that was carried out on the South-Bank of Montreal. Once the operation was completed, 14 individuals were arrested and 47 charges were submitted concerning cases of fraud, fraud on the government, breach of trust by a public servant, acts of municipal corruption, influencing a municipal public servant, conspiracy and use of counterfeit documents.” (C8, 2012, p.1).
ID | Date | Theme | Prevention | Repression | Performance | Moral | Technical – Professional | Procedural |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
C8 | 17/04/2012 | Investigation update or progression | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Press article excerpt (translated)
EPIM officers join the UPAC.
Sarah Bélisle, Journal de Montréal (11/12/2013, p.9).
ID | Date | Media | Theme | Prevention | Repression | Performance | Moral | Technical – Professional | Procedural |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
P12–462 | 11/12/2013 | Journal de Montréal | Evolution of the institutional, legal and organisational structure | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
“The police officers of the Escouade de Protection de l’Intégrité Municipale de la Ville de Montréal (EPIM) have passed under the purview of the Unité Permanente Anticorruption (UPAC). The city’s Mayor, Denis Coderre announced yesterday. M. Coderre considers the decision as a first step towards the creation of an Inspector General’s office, a cornerstone of his campaign. He has declined to address the question. “Today, we regroup the expertise and the Montreal perspective of the EPIM with the information and multi-disciplinary approach of the UPAC, and bingo”, exclaimed the mayor. The two entities will work closely together.”
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Bautista-Beauchesne, N. Crafting anti-corruption agencies’ bureaucratic reputation: an uphill battle. Crime Law Soc Change 75, 297–326 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-020-09928-9
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-020-09928-9