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Committing Crimes with BCIs: How Brain-Computer Interface Users can Satisfy Actus Reus and be Criminally Responsible

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Abstract

Brain-computer interfaces allow agents to control computers without moving their bodies. The agents imagine certain things and the brain-computer interfaces read the concomitant neural activity and operate the computer accordingly. But the use of brain-computer interfaces is problematic for criminal law, which requires that someone can only be found criminally responsible if they have satisfied the actus reus requirement: that the agent has performed some (suitably specified) conduct. Agents who affect the world using brain-computer interfaces do not obviously perform any conduct, so when they commit crimes using brain-computer interfaces it is unclear how they have satisfied actus reus. Drawing on a forthcoming paper by Allan McCay, I suggest three potential accounts of the conduct that satisfies actus reus: the agent’s neural firings, his mental states, and the electronic activity in his brain-computer interface. I then present two accounts which determine how actus reus may be satisfied – one a counterfactual and the other a minimal sufficiency account. These accounts are lent plausibility because they are analogous to the but-for and NESS (Necessary Element in a Sufficient Set) tests for causation which are generally accepted tests for causation in legal theory. I argue that due to the determinations of these accounts and considerations regarding the relationship between the mind and brain, actus reus is satisfied by either the agent’s neural activity or brain-computer interface electrical activity. Which of these satisfies actus reus is determined by how well the brain-computer interface is functionally integrated with the agent.

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Notes

  1. Although for a cautionary note about speculating too far ahead see [15].

  2. There may be an analogous problem in civil law criminal systems, but I will not engage directly with these systems here. For a discussion of the similarities of criminal law in common law and civil law jurisdictions see [17].

  3. “Intentionally” may be substitutable for “purposely”, although the former term is laden with theoretical baggage, so I discuss only purposeful action.

  4. For more on mental actions see [32].

  5. It is at least not one of the agent’s direct actions, which seem to be the ones relevant for actus reus. For discussion of direct and indirect actions see [33].

  6. For some recent examinations of BCIs and agency, albeit in a different form of BCIs, see [34,35,36,37]. For an assessment of actions performed through the use of BCIs see Steinert et al. [2].

  7. Strictly this may be a state of affairs, not an event, but these sorts of conditions must plausibly be included within minimally sufficient sets.

  8. For various problems for the NESS test see [41].

  9. Although given these stipulations, this event may not be a crime because White would lack mens rea.

  10. This may be considered analogous to the search for a proximal cause when determining causation in legal theory. See [41].

  11. For a study which supports Libet’s finding see [49] Although for one criticism (of many) of Libet’s experiments see [50].

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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Frederic Gilbert, Marianne McAllister, Allan McCay, Neil Levy, Lewis Phaceas, Oliver Rawle, Amanda Thompson, and Nicole Vincent.

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  1. Macquarie University, North Ryde, Australia

    Kramer Thompson

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Correspondence to Kramer Thompson.

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I have received assistance on this work from two individuals associated with Neuroethics: Neil Levy and Nicole Vincent. This work was produced without financial assistance.

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Thompson, K. Committing Crimes with BCIs: How Brain-Computer Interface Users can Satisfy Actus Reus and be Criminally Responsible. Neuroethics 14 (Suppl 3), 311–322 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-019-09416-5

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