Abstract
Despite being a well-studied decision rule, the Slater rule has not been analyzed axiomatically. In this paper, we show that it is the only rule which is unbiased, monotone, tournamental, tie-breaking, and gradual. Thereby we provide a characterization of it for the first time. We also show these axioms to be logically independent.
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Notes
Copeland (1951).
The rule introduced in Miller (1980) takes all linear extensions of the cover relation. Here at a profile p an alternative a covers alternative b, if for all alternatives x we have that b beats x in pairwise comparison at p implies that a beats x in pairwise comparison.
Muller and Satterthwaite (1977) show the equivalence of strategy proofness and strong positive association hence making the connection to the impossibility results of Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975). Brandt et al. (2016) also introduces a monotonicity condition for tournaments only. We provide a detailed comparison between this condition and our framework in the Appendix.
We take linear orders to be irreflexive without theoretical consequences in our approach. It has however notational advantage here as now linear orders are partial tournaments.
For every two distinct alternatives a and b we can partition \({\mathbb {T}}\) in \({\mathbb {T}}_{ab}\), \({\mathbb {T}}_{ba}\) and \({\mathbb {T}}_{\{a,b\}}=\) \(\mathbb { \ T\backslash (T}_{ab}\cup \) \({\mathbb {T}}_{ba}).\) Note that complete tournaments are in \({\mathbb {T}}_{ab}\cup \) \({\mathbb {T}}_{ba}\) and that \( {\mathbb {T}}_{\{a,b\}}\) consists of the incomplete tournaments at which a and b are incomparable. Every elementary change from ab to ba or from ba to ab is now a connecting relation (edge) between an element in \( {\mathbb {T}}_{ab}\cup \) \({\mathbb {T}}_{ba}\) and one in \({\mathbb {T}}_{\{a,b\}}.\) Further, an elementary change from xy to yx does not effect the preference between a and b in case \(\{x,y\}\ne \{a,b\}.\) Call an elementary change between a and b if it is either from ab to ba or from ba to ab. So, a path of elementary changes with an odd number of changes between a and b starting in \({\mathbb {T}}_{ab}\cup \) \( {\mathbb {T}}_{ba}\) ends in \({\mathbb {T}}_{\{a,b\}}.\) As \({\mathbb {T}}_{\{a,b\}}\) consists of incomplete tournaments and both R an \(R^{\prime }\) are complete it follows that on every path of elementary changes from R to \( R^{\prime }\) there is an even number of elementary changes between a and b. As this holds for every two distinct alternatives it follows that such a path is of even length.
For instance, it is possible to deduce the same results as presented here with only marginal changes based on a condition like \(\varphi \) is gradual if for all pairs of profiles (p, q) forming an elementary change from ab to ba in \({\mathbb {L}}^{N}\) there are non-negative integers k such that
$$\begin{aligned} \varphi (k\cdot p+q)\cap \varphi (p)\ne \emptyset . \end{aligned}$$Meaning that if at such an elementary change the sets of outcomes \(\varphi (p)\) and \(\varphi (q)\) are disjoint then graduality imposes that for some (large) replica \(k\cdot p\) of p the influence of q is limited. Meaning that the outcome at \(k\cdot p+q\) has something in common with the outcome at p. This condition is related to Young’s continuity condition for scoring rules. See Young (1975).
This resembles the Fishburn’s C2 condition for choice correspondences.
See footnote 5 in Baigent and Klamler (2003), which attributes the clarification of the issue to Hannu Nurmi.
Instead of representing \(\succ \) by an additive weight function \(\omega \) as above one may choose \(\succ \) such that
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(a)
\(R^{1}\succ R^{2}\) for all \(R^{1},R^{2}\in {\mathbb {A}}\), with \( R^{2}\varsubsetneq R^{1}.\)
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(b)
\(R^{1}\succ R^{2}\) for all \(R^{1},R^{2}\in {\mathbb {A}}\), with \( R^{1}\backslash \{xy\}\succ R^{2}\backslash \{xy\}\) for some \(xy\in R^{1}\cap R^{2}.\)
Here \({\widehat{T}}_{p}\) being the best means that \({\widehat{T}}_{p}\) is that tournament in \({\mathbb {A}}\) contained in \(T_{p}\) such that \({\widehat{T}} _{p}\succ \) T, for all \(T\in {\mathbb {A}}\backslash \{{\widehat{T}}_{p}\}\) and \(T\subseteq T_{p}\).
-
(a)
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Funding
B. Can: This work is mostly financed by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) under the grant with Project No. 451-13-017 (VENI, 2014) and partially by Fonds National de la Recherche Luxembourg. The support of both institutes, therefore, is gratefully acknowledged. M. Pourpouneh: This work is supported by the Center for Blockchains and Electronic Markets (BCM) funded by the Carlsberg Foundation under Grant No. CF18-1112.
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Appendices
Appendix
Monotonicity
This appendix is on remarks related to update monotonicity.
A tournament choice correspondence, say \(\Psi ,\) assigns to every tournament \(T \in {\mathbb {T}}\) a subset \(\Psi (T)\) of the set of alternatives A. For instance consider the Copeland tournament choice correspondence \(\Psi ^{C}\) defined for an arbitrary tournament T as follows
where \(Cscore(x,T)=|\{z\in A:xz\in T\}|.\)
In Brandt et al. (2016), the following monotonicity for such correspondences is introduced: a tournament choice correspondence is said to be monotone if for all \(a\in A\) and all T and \(T^{\prime }\) in \( {\mathbb {T}}\), with both (1) T \(\cap \) \((A\backslash \{a\})^{2}=T^{\prime }\cap \) \((A\backslash \{a\})^{2}\) and (2) \(ay\in T\) implies \(ay\in T^{\prime }\) for all \(y\in A\backslash \{a\}\)
As the ranges of tournament preference correspondences differ from those of tournament choice correspondences, a direct comparison between update monotonicity and the monotonicity defined above is not possible. For a special subclass of tournament choice correspondences it is possible to translate the monotonicity condition to the setting of tournament preference correspondences. This translated condition appears to be weaker than update monotonicity. By that, for this subclass, the difference between monotonicity and update monotonicity can partially be revealed. Let \(\Phi \) be a tournament preference correspondence. To \(\Phi \) we can associate a tournament choice correspondence \(\Psi ^{\Phi }\) in the following way
Here \(best(R)=\{y\in A:\) for all \(z\in A\) we have \(yz\in R\}.\) So, \(\Psi ^{\Phi }(T)\) chooses all best alternatives from the outcome of \(\Phi \) at tournament T. It is obvious that \(\Psi ^{C}=\Psi ^{\Phi ^{C}}\).
Translating the monotonicity condition for tournament choice correspondences to tournament preference correspondences via such a best choice association yields the following. Let \(\Phi \) be a tournament preference correspondence. We say that \(\Phi \) is weakly monotone if for all tournament pairs \( (T,T^{\prime })\) forming an elementary change from ab to ba, with \(b\in best(R)\) for some \(R\in \Phi (T),\) there are \(R^{\prime }\in \Phi (T^{\prime })\) with \(b\in best(R^{\prime }).\)
Proposition 1
Let \(\Phi \) be a tournament preference correspondence and \( \Psi ^{\Phi }\) its associated tournament choice correspondence. Then
Proof
(if part) Let \(\Psi ^{\Phi }\) be monotone. Let tournament pair \((T,T^{\prime })\) forms an elementary change from ab to ba, with \(b\in best(R)\) for some \(R\in \Phi (T).\) It is sufficient to prove that \(b\in best(R^{\prime })\) for some \(R^{\prime }\in \Phi (T^{\prime }).\) As \(b\in best(R)\) for some \( R\in \Phi (T),\) it follows that \(b\in \) \(\Psi ^{\Phi }(T).\) Monotonicity of \( \Psi ^{\Phi }\) implies that \(b\in \) \(\Psi ^{\Phi }(T').\) Meaning that for some \(R^{\prime }\in \Phi (T^{\prime })\) we have that \(b\in best(R^{\prime }).\)
(only if part) Let \(\Phi \) be weakly monotone. Let tournament pair \( (T,T^{\prime })\) forms an elementary change from ab to ba, with \(b\in \Psi ^{\Phi }(T).\) In order to prove that \(\Psi ^{\Phi }\) is monotone it is sufficient to show that \(b\in \Psi ^{\Phi }(T^{\prime }).\) As \(b\in \Psi ^{\Phi }(T),\) there are R \(\in \Phi (T)\) with \(b\in best(R).\) Weak monotonicity of \(\Phi \) guarantees the existence of \(R^{\prime }\in \Phi (T^{\prime })\) with \(b\in best(R^{\prime }).\) So, \(b\in \Psi ^{\Phi }(T^{\prime }).\) \(\square \)
To see that update monotonicity implies weak monotonicity take notations like in the definition of the latter notion. So, \(R\in \Phi (T)_{ba}.\) Update monotonicity implies that \(\Phi (T)_{ba}\subseteq \Phi (T^{\prime })\subseteq \Phi (T)\). In particular \(R\in \) \(\Phi (T^{\prime }).\) So, we may take \(R^{\prime }=R\) to conclude that \(b\in best(R^{\prime }).\) So, a consequence of Proposition 1 is that update monotonicity of \(\Phi \) implies that \(\Psi ^{\Phi }\) is monotone. The Copeland preference correspondence \(\varphi ^C\) is not update monotone. Therefore, the Copeland tournament correspondence \(\Phi ^C\) is not T-monotone. The Copeland tournament correspondence \(\Psi ^C\) is monotone. Therefore, by Proposition 1, \(\Phi ^C\) is weakly monotone, but not T-monotone.
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Can, B., Pourpouneh, M. & Storcken, T. An axiomatic characterization of the Slater rule. Soc Choice Welf 56, 835–853 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-020-01305-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-020-01305-8