Abstract
This paper assesses the interaction between the housing and credit markets and shadow banks, with the possibility of bank runs. The findings illustrate how a negative TFP shock is amplified by macro-financial and macro-housing channels through household balance sheets, bank balance sheets, and liquidity channels. If the shock renders the shadow banking system insolvent, two equilibria coexist: the no-run equilibrium and the run equilibrium. In this instance, run is a sunspot coordination failure; if households receive a negative signal from fundamentals and stop rolling over deposits to the financial sector, banks are not able to fund their losses with new deposits. So they are forced to liquidate their assets at an endogenous fire sale price. The main finding of this paper is that the model with housing provides a comprehensive account of the consequences of economic crises, namely the house price double-dip, the output downward spiral, and the lengthy recovery period. To eliminate the bank-run equilibrium, this paper proposes macroprudential policy tools in the form of capital adequacy buffers and loan-to-value ratios. Then a welfare analysis is applied to determine the optimal policy mix.
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