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Dynamics of female labor force participation and welfare with multiple social reference groups

  • Mihaela Pintea EMAIL logo

Abstract

I develop a model with status concerns to analyze how different economic factors affect female labor participation and welfare, as well as average household incomes and wages. Reductions in the price of domestic goods and increases in female wages have positive effects on female participation. Increases in male wages have different effects on female participation depending on whether they affect female wages or not. Events that lead to increases in female participation are usually associated with decreases in the welfare of stay-at-home wives but are not necessarily associated with increases in welfare of working wives. Allowing for part-time work can lead to an increase in overall female labor force participation, but some women that would have worked full-time end up working part-time. If female wages are endogenous, an increase in male wages leads to an increase in the female participation rate even if it is not associated with a decrease in the gender wage gap. The positive feedback of increased female participation on their wages can lead to hysteresis of dual equilibria of high and low female labor force participation and a discontinuous transition between these equilibria.

JEL Classification: D62; E24; J16

Appendix

Stability condition forμ~

From (8) I define the function f(μi) as the difference between the utility when staying home and the utility when working of the woman with taste μi.

Thus, if there exists a stable interior solution such that f(μ~)=0, then f(μ~ϵ)<0 and f(μ~+ϵ)>0. The stability condition in this case is (f(μ)>0|μ=μ~), thus

(15)α1Chα4wmwf(wm+μ~wf)(1+μ~)>0.

Let g(μ~)=α1Chα4wmwf(wm+μ~wf)(1+μ~). Given that g(μ~)=α4(wmwf)wm+wf+2μ~wf((wm+μ~wf)(1+μ~))2>0, Since μ~[01], g(μ~)>0 iff g(0) > 0 and therefore α1Ch>α4wmwfwm. Intuitively, this stability condition tells us that there exist a stable unique equilibrium for female labor force participation if gender wage difference, and the importance that women put on their relative position in the working force are not prohibitively high relative to the quantity and the importance of home good in the utility function.

Proof of Proposition 1

Applying the implicit equation theory for (9), using (5) and (6), and imposing the stability condition (16):

(16)dμ~dp=Ch(α2wmwm+wfpCh+α31wm+pCh)α1Chα4wm,twf,t(wm+μ~wf)(1+μ~)<0
(17)dμ~dwm=α2wfpChwm(wm+wfpCh)+α3wfpCh(wm+wf)(wm+pCh)+α41(wm+μ~wf)α1Chα4wmwf(wm+μ~wf)(1+μ~)<0
(18)dμ~dwf=α2wm+wfpCh+α3(wm+wf)+α4wmwf1(wm+μ~wf)α1Chα4wmwf(wm+μ~wf)(1+μ~)>0
Proof of Corollary 1

Direct consequence of (5), (6) applied to (18) and (19)

Proof of Lemma 1

Applying the implicit equation theory for (9), using (5) and (6), and imposing the stability condition (16):

(19)μ~α3=ln(wm+wfwm+pCh)α1Chα4wmwf(wm+μ~wf)(1+μ~)>0
(20)μ~α4=ln(wf(1+μ~)wm+μ~wf)α1Chα4wmwf(wm+μ~wf)(1+μ~)<0
Proof of Proposition 2

Using (3) and (17):

(21)Yhh¯p=dμ~dp(wfpCh)+(1μ~)Ch<>0

Using (4) and (17):

(22)Yind¯p=μ~p(wfwm)(1+μ~)2>0

Using (3) and (17):

(23)Yhh¯wm=μ~wm(wfpCh)+1<>0

Using (4) and (18):

(24)Yind¯wm=μ~wm(wfwm)+1+μ~(1+μ~)2>0

Using (3) and (19):

(25)Yhh¯wf=μ~wf(wfpCh)+μ~>0

Using (4) and (19):

(26)Yind¯wf=μ~wf(wfwm)+μ~(1+μ~)2<>0
Proof of Lemma 2

As stay-at-home wives produce their own “home goods” using (7) it is inferred that their welfare is equal such that:

AverageWelfares¯=Welfares¯

As working wives buy their “home” good and have heterogeneous preferences for producing it themselves, using (7) and (6) their average welfare can be written as:

AverageWelfarew¯=α1Ch(1μ~2)+α2ln(wm+wfpCh)+α3ln(wm+wfwm+μ~wf+(1μ~)pCh)+α4ln(wf(1+μ~)wm+μ~wf)
Proof of Lemma 3

dAverageWelfarew¯dx=dα1Chdx+dα2ln(wm+wfpCh)dx+dα3ln(wm+wfwm+μ~wf+(1μ~)pCh)dx+dα4ln(wf(1+μ~)wm+μ~wf)dxα1Ch12dμ~dx=dWelfarew¯(μi)dx

for any μi if μ~=1and\;thus dμ~dx=0

Given that Ch is exogenous, dChdx=0.

Proof of Proposition 3

Using (7), (5), and (17):

dWelfares¯dp=α3(wm+μ~wf+(1μ~)pCh)[Chwm(1+μ~)+wfμ~+pCh(wm+pCh)dμ~dp(wfpCh)]>0

Using (7), (5), (6) and (17):

dWelfarew¯dp=α2Ch(wm+wfpCh)α3(1μ~)Chwm+μ~wf+(1μ~)pChdμ~dp[α3(wfpCh)wm+μ~wf+(1μ~)pChα4(wmwf)(wm+μ~wf)(1+μ~)]<>0

If dμ~dp=0thendWelfarew¯dp<0

Using Lemma 3, assumptions (5) and (6), and (17):

dAverageWelfarew¯dp=α2Chwm+wfpChα3(1μ~)Chwm+μ~wf+(1μ~)pChdμ~dp[12α1Ch+α3wfpChwm+μ~wf+(1μ~)pChα4wmwf(wm+μ~wf)(1+μ~)]<>0

If dμ~dp=0\;then\;dAverageWelfarew¯dp<0.

Proof of Proposition 4

Using (7), (5) and (18):

dWelfares¯dwm=α2wm+α3(wm+pCh)(wm+μ~wf+(1μ~)pCh)[(μ~dμ~dwm)(wfpCh)]>0

Using (7), (5), (6) and (18):

dWelfarew¯dwm=α2wm+wfpChα3(wfpCh)(1μ~)(wm+pCh)(wm+μ~wf+(1μ~)pCh)α4(1+μ~)(wm+μ~wf)(1+μ~)dμ~dwm[α3(wfpCh)(wm+wf)(wm+wf)(wm+μ~wf+(1μ~)pCh)α4(wmwf)(wm+μ~wf)(1+μ~)]<>0

Using Lemma 2, (5), (6) and (18):

dAverageWelfarew¯dwm=α2wm+wfpChα3(wfpCh)(1μ~)(wm+pCh)(wm+μ~wf+(1μ~)pCh)α4(1+μ~)(wm+μ~wf)(1+μ~)dμ~dwm[12α1Ch+α3(wfpCh)(wm+wf)(wm+wf)(wm+μ~wf+(1μ~)pCh)α4(wmwf)(wm+μ~wf)(1+μ~)]<>0
Proof of Proposition 5

Using (7), (5) and (19):

dWelfares¯dwf=α3[μ~+dμ~dwf(wfpCh)](wm+pCh)(wm+μ~wf+(1μ~)pCh)<0

Using (7), (5), (6) and (19):

dWelfarew¯dwf=α2wm+wfpCh+α3(wm+pCh)(1μ~)(wm+pCh)(wm+μ~wf+(1μ~)pCh)+α4(wmμ~wf)(wm+μ~wf)wf+dμ~dwf[α3(wfpCh)wm+μ~wf+(1μ~)pCh+α4(wmwf)(wm+μ~wf)(1+μ~)]<>0

If dμ~dwf=0 then dWelfarew¯dwf>0.

Using Lemma 2:

dAverageWelfarew¯dwf=α2wm+wfpCh+α3(wm+pCh)(1μ~)(wm+pCh)(wm+μ~wf+(1μ~)pCh)+α4(wmμ~wf)(wm,t+μ~wf)wf+dμ~dwf[12α1Chα3(wfpCh)wm+μ~wf+(1μ~)pCh+α4(wmwf)(wm+μ~wf)(1+μ~)]<>0

If dμ~dwf=0then dAverageWelfarew¯dwf>0.

Stability condition for μ^t

Using (14) I derive the slope of wf,t as a function of μ~t1 as:

(27)dwf,tdμ~t1=β(1θ)μ~t1β1wm0

And thus

(28)d2wf,tdμ~t12=β(β1)(1θ)μ~t1β2wm(>)0 iff β(>)1

In steady state μ~t1=μ~t

I rewrite (19) to derive the slope:

(29)dwfdμ~=α1Chα4wmwf(wm+μ~wf)(1+μ~)(α2wm+wfpCh+α3(wm+wf)+α4wmwf1(wm+μ~wf))0

and thus

(30)

If there exist an interior solution forμ^t the stability condition for it is that

(31)β(1θ)μ~tβ1wm<α1Chα4wmwf(wm+μ~wf)(1+μ~)(α2wm+wfpCh+α3(wm+wf)+α4wmwf1(wm+μ~wf))
Proof of Proposition 6

Plug (14) into (9) to determine (μ^,w^f\;)as well as the partial derivatives that reflect the effect that changes in the exogenous parameters wmandp have on female labor force participation and female wages

(32)Ddμ^=dwm[α2pChwm(1+θ+(1θ)μ^β)pCh+α3pChwm(wm+pCh)]dp[α2Chwm(1+θ+(1θ)μ^β)pCh+α3Chwm+pCh]

where

D=α1Chα2wmβ(1θ)μ^β1wm(1+θ+(1θ)μ^β)pChα3β(1θ)μ^β11+θ+(1θ)μ^βα4[1θ(1θ)μ^β(1+(μ^θ+(1θ)μ^β)(1+μ^)+β(1θ)μ^β1(θ+(1θ)μ^β)(1+μ^(θ+(1θ)μ^β)]0

Using (33) and (32) it is thus shown that if a stable interior solution exists

(33)dμ^tdwm0

and

(34)dμ^tdp0

Using (14), (35) and (36):

(35)dw^fdwm=θ+(1θ)μ^β+β(1θ)μ^β1dμ^tdwm>0
(36)dw^fdp=β(1θ)μ^β1dμ^dp0
(37)d(w^fwm)dwm=θ+(1θ)μ^β+β(1θ)μ^β1dμ^dwm1><0
Proof of Lemma 4
dμ^dα3=1Dln(wm(1+θ+(1θ)μ^β)wm+pCh)>0
dμ^dα4=1Dln((θ+(1θ)μ^β)(1+μ^)1+μ^(θ+(1θ)μ^β))<0
dw^fdα3=β(1θ)μ^β1dμ^dα3>0
dw^fdα4=β(1θ)μ^β1dμ^dα4<0
Proof of Proposition 7

Using (3), (36), (38) and assumptions (5) and (6):

(38)dYhh¯dp=dμ^dp(w^fpCh)+μ^dw^fdp+(1μ^)Ch<>0

Using (4), (36), (38) and assumptions (5) and (6):

(39)dYind¯dp=dμ^dp(w^fwm)+(1μ^)μ^dw^fdp(1+μ^)2<>0

Using (3), (35), (37) and assumptions (5) and (6):

(40)dYhh¯dwm=1+dμ^dwm(w^fpCh)+μ^dw^fdwm>0

Using (4), (35), (37) and assumptions (5) and (6):

(41)dYind¯dwm=dμ^dwm(w^fwm)+(dw^fdwm+1)(1+μ^)(1+μ^)2>0
Proof of Proposition 8

Using (7), (5), (36) and (38):

dWelfares¯dp=α3[μ^Chwm+w^fwm+pChdμ^dp(w^fpCh)dw^fdpμ^]wm+μ^w^f+(1μ^)pCh>0

Using (7), (5), (6), (36) and (38) it can be proven that:

dWelfarew¯dp=α2(dw^fdpCh)wm+w^fpCh+α3[(1μ^)Chdμ^dp(w^fpCh)+dw^fdp(1μ^)(wm+pCh)wm+w^f]wm+μ^w^f+(1μ^)pCh+α4dμ^dpw^f(wmw^f)+dw^fdpwm(1+μ^)w^f(wm+μ^w^f)(1+μ^)<>0;dAverageWelfarew¯dp=dμ^dp12α1Ch+α2(dw^fdpCh)wm+w^fpCh+α3[(1μ^)Chdμ^dp(w^fpCh)+dw^fdp(1μ^)(wm+pCh)wm+w^f]wm+μ^w^f+(1μ^)pCh+α4dμ^dpw^f(wmw^f)+dw^fdpwm(1+μ^)w^f(wm+μ^w^f)(1+μ^)<>0
Proof of Proposition 9

Using (7), (5), (35) and (37):

dWelfares¯dwm=α2wm+α3μ^(w^fpCh)(wm+pCh)(wm+μ^w^f+(1μ^)pCh)α3wm+μ^w^f+(1μ^)pCh[dμ^dwm(w^fpCh)+μ^dw^fdwm]<>0

Using (7), 5), (6), (35) and (37):

dWelfarew¯dwm=α2(1+dw^fdwm)wm+w^fpCh+α3(1μ^)[dw^fdwm(wm+pCh)(w^fpCh)](wm+w^f)(wm+μ^w^f+(1μ^)pCh)+α4[(1+μ^)(dw^fdwmwmw^f)+dμ^dwm(wmw^f)]w^fw^f(wm+μ^w^f)(1+μ^)<>0
dAverageWelfarew¯dwm=dμ^dwm12α1Ch+α2(1+dw^fdwm)wm+w^fpCh+α3(1μ^)[dw^fdwm(wm+pCh)(w^fpCh)](wm+w^f)(wm+μ^w^f+(1μ^)pCh)+α4[(1+μ^)(dw^fdwmwmw^f)+dμ^dwm(wmw^f)]w^fw^f(wm+μ^w^f)(1+μ^)<>0

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Published Online: 2019-07-10

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