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Publicly Available Published by De Gruyter July 25, 2019

Net Neutrality and Mobile App Innovation in Denmark and Netherlands 2010–2016

  • Roslyn Layton EMAIL logo

Abstract

Net neutrality or “Open Internet” rulemaking has been ongoing for more than a decade. Some 50 nations have adopted formal rules including the US (then repealed), the European Union, India, and many countries in Latin America. Among other arguments, it is asserted that net neutrality rules are necessary for application innovation. While the focus for policymakers has largely been to make rules, there is less attention on how to measure the impact of such rules and how well they achieve their innovation goals. The article summaries a specific research investigation to what degree the introduction of rules in a given country stimulates innovation in that country’s mobile app ecosystem. The focus in on mobile networks because it allowed the most consistent data across countries. The study covered 53 countries, their net neutrality policies (or lack thereof), and the results to the respective mobile application ecosystems of the countries adopting rules between the period of 2010–2016. This investigation tests the proposition that countries which adopt net neutrality rules should experience an increase in mobile app development innovation within their national economy. To test this, a statistical methodology was developed based upon measuring the number of locally developed mobile apps in the country for relevant periods before and after rules are imposed and the corresponding app downloads, usage, and revenue. Measurement was conducted with two independent toolsets and adjusted for the sophistication and penetration of advanced mobile networks in the country. To make more meaningful comparisons and avoid inevitable heterogeneity across the countries, the investigation focuses on two similar countries with different rules, Denmark with soft rules (self-regulation) and Netherlands with hard rules (legislation). The study reviewed the leading theories of innovation as well as the foundational papers in net neutrality to explain the observed discrepancies. The research finds significant statistical support for “soft” net neutrality measures adopted on a voluntary basis. Hard rules adopted through legislation and regulation were not associated with greater mobile app development for the given country. Denmark increased in local mobile app development while Netherlands decreased. Additionally, the explosion of mobile apps from countries with no net neutrality rules and the general dearth of mobile apps from countries which have had hard rules for years runs counter to expected results. This suggests that policymakers revisit their assumptions and expectations for net neutrality policy.

1 Introduction

The 2015 Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) Open Internet Order concluded that hard net neutrality rules are necessary to “protect free expression and innovation on the Internet and promote investment in the nation’s broadband networks.”[1] The order’s strongly worded emphasis on protecting innovation and promoting investment implied that the agency had performed a robust analysis, in particular an empirically based assessment of the regulation’s likely impact. But the 400-page order contains no such reference.

The European net neutrality legislation titled “laying down measures concerning open internet access” states that its goal is to “guarantee the continued functioning of the internet ecosystem as an engine of innovation[2] (italics added). Note that the term “net neutrality” does not appear in the statute.

In a press release announcing the new guarantee of an Open Internet, the European Commission explained, “Creating the right conditions for digital networks and services to flourish is a key objective of the Commission’s plan for a Digital Single Market… The EU will have the strongest and most comprehensive open Internet rules in the world.”[3]

It further noted,

Net neutrality is crucial for users and businesses. It ensures that Europeans have access to the online content and services they wish without any discrimination or interference (like blocking or slowing down) by internet access providers. This is also very important for start-up businesses that commercialize their products and services via the internet and need to be able to compete on an equal footing with larger players.[4]

The FCC offered its own theory of internet innovation in the 2015 Open Internet Order, declaring that “Internet openness drives a ‘virtuous cycle’ in which innovations at the edges of the network enhance consumer demand, leading to expanded investments in broadband infrastructure that, in turn, spark new innovations at the edge.”[5] However these rules were removed 2 years later as the agency found no evidence for the purported claims of innovation, and it also documented declines in network investment and deployment during the period the rules were in place.[6] Consequently the FCC restored the regime internet to oversight by the Federal Trade Commission which had been in place from 1996.[7] Nevertheless, internet regulation such as net neutrality remains controversial and is being litigated in court, driven by supporters of the virtuous circle theory, notably a trade association for the large platform companies of Silicon Valley.[8]

Net neutrality rules are frequently, though not entirely, based on the premise that such rules will protect and/or stimulate “innovation” by third party application providers (“edge providers” in American parlance).[9] The rules are associated with a series of requirements and restrictions for broadband and internet services providers (ISPs). “Without Net Neutrality, the next Google would never get off the ground,”[10] observes Save the Internet, a leading global advocate for net neutrality.

While policymakers and advocates express the urgent need for rules, they are not clear whether such rules will ensure the status quo level of application innovation or increase innovation. If the former, it would seem to follow that countries without such rules would fall in their level of innovation. It suggests that European policymakers expect their rules to make the European innovation economies more productive, as Europeans overwhelmingly use American and Asian internet innovation. While the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications issues annual report on the implementation of the legislation,[11],[12] there is no official report investigating whether the legislation achieves its policy promises.

Tim Wu, who developed the net neutrality concept, professed that broadband networks should be operated to deliver a “neutral platform” for third party applications and services.[13] Wu asserts that “network neutrality must be understood as a concrete expression of a system of belief about innovation.” His premise is that there is an inherent conflict between “private interests of broadband providers and the public’s interest in a competitive innovation environment centered on the Internet,” and thus telecom regulators must therefore enforce a “non-discrimination” regime on broadband providers. His non-discrimination principle can be summarized as, “Absent evidence of harm to the local network or the interests of other users, broadband carriers should not discriminate in how they treat traffic on their broadband network on the basis of inter-network criteria.”

Wu’s premise is that there is an inherent conflict between “private interests of broadband providers and the public’s interest in a competitive innovation environment centered on the Internet.” He mentions the debate between proponents of “open access” who want structural remedies to prohibit the vertical integration of content and broadband provision to ensure the “neutrality” of the network versus those who believe that such remedies will slow broadband development. In Wu’s conception, net neutrality is necessary to ensure “fair evolutionary competition in any privately owned environment” and states that regulation “tries to help ensure that the short-term interests of the owner do not prevent the best products or applications becoming available to end-users.” He states that net neutrality is necessary to preserve “a Darwinian competition among every conceivable use of the Internet so that the only the best survive.” The end game of net neutrality, Wu’s “design principle,” appears to be an “open network” where there is little to no intellectual property. This underpins the notion of free information in the “creative commons” espoused by Larry Lessig, Wu’s thesis advisor.[14]

Wu’s analysis remains compelling, but the opposite outcome should also be considered. Net neutrality could cement the position of the largest players to the detriment of new entrants. Indeed, rules that require treating data the same have the perverse effect of rewarding the large companies which already have traffic, revenue, and users. It is precisely start-ups which need differentiation in order to be found and to compete. Policymakers fail to realize that in the countries with the strictest net neutrality rules, the market shares of the largest American platforms have only increased.[15] Indeed, the only countries which have innovated platforms which compete at the scale of Google and Facebook are Russia and China, countries with no net neutrality rules. It could be that net neutrality is a policy that works to strengthen existing American platforms over competing innovation. As such, it could be counterproductive to Europe if the policy goal is to promote European innovation. In the vast literature on net neutrality, there are little to no empirical tests comparing the efforts of different national policies and, more importantly, whether the policies delivered the promised results.

The goal of net neutrality is to protect a low-cost and unconstrained environment for application and service innovation at the edge, which takes precedence over innovation by broadband internet access service (BIAS) providers and even consumer preferences.[16] Net neutrality implements a set of price and traffic controls on BIAS providers to give “edge providers,” or third-party application developers, an advantage. Following the 2015 FCC’s logic, the next app at the edge, whether “Angry Birds” or Instagram, is more important than innovation within the network – for example, the development of the 5G mobile wireless standard. This view conflicts with established academic theories of innovation, such as complementary assets, the idea that apps and networks evolve together symbiotically,[17] and two-sided markets, the idea that supply and demand allow different parties to match their preferences.[18]

The 2015 order failed to explain why innovation at the edge is more important than in other parts of the network or why such an extreme regulatory change was immediately required to preserve it. Indeed, the order failed to distinguish between incremental improvements to existing internet products and truly ground-breaking invention, or what is referred to in management literature as fundamental or “disruptive innovation.”[19]

Research undertaken at Aalborg University represents a preliminary step to address the gap between research and net neutrality policy.[20] This article summarizes that research which focused on a systematic investigation across 53 countries to determine the results of net neutrality before and after rules were imposed to see whether the policy delivers the promised innovation at the edge. Note that all tables are printed from the original research.

The research investigated changes in mobile app stores over the period 2010–2016. The investigation was confined to mobile apps on mobile networks. The specific research questions were: To what degree does introducing net neutrality in a given country stimulate edge providers’ innovation on mobile networks? In other words, how many more mobile apps does a country make once it establishes net neutrality rules? How do the different frameworks affect edge innovation?

Following the net neutrality logic, it hypothesized that countries that made more “hard,” stringent, and strict net neutrality rules with price and traffic controls via regulation or legislation would perform as measured by the number of new mobile apps at the edge versus countries which merely adopted “soft” multistakeholder or voluntary rules.

The investigation found significant statistical support for “soft” voluntary net neutrality rules and increased mobile app innovation, but not for “hard” net neutrality. Countries that adopted net neutrality through legislation and regulation did not display an increase in mobile app development. The results suggest that hard net neutrality policy, such as the rules adopted in the EU and the US in 2015 may not be as effective as purported.

2 Research Design

Policymakers could learn a lot from studying the experience of net neutrality around the world. Over the past decade there have been a series of natural experiments on net neutrality at the nation-state level, providing an opportunity to study the policy instruments and their effects.

Net neutrality rules around the world can be characterized as either “soft” or “hard.” Soft, or voluntary, rules consist of principles, codes of conduct, multi-stakeholder dialogue, and self-regulation. In soft regimes, the telecom regulator plays the role of a facilitator, allowing experimentation and partnerships in the internet value chain but maintaining the ability to intervene if harm occurs.

Hard rules, on the other hand, are mandatory and punitive. Promulgated through legislation by a parliamentary body or regulation by a sector specific national regulatory authority, these rules generally prohibit blocking, throttling, and prioritization as well a price and traffic differentiation.

Beginning in 2009, the Nordic countries implemented voluntary soft rules. For some 5 years these rules were largely successful: Mobile application innovation continued, there were no significant violations, and there was no litigation against regulators.

However, in April 2016, the 28 nations of the European Union and subsequently Norway implemented hard rules through legislation. Significantly, the Netherlands and Slovenia were the first European movers to create a net neutrality law in 2012, following Chile, which in 2010 became the first nation to make such a law. Most nations in Latin America have adopted hard net neutrality rules. India imposed a 2-year ban on zero rating in January 2016[21] and is still in the process of making net neutrality rules[22] (See Table 1). Unsurprisingly, the effort to make harder, bright-line rules has been coupled with litigation against regulators in many countries, as bright-line rules frequently conflict with competition principles and constitutional laws.[23]

Table 1:

Countries with Soft vs. Hard Rules for Net Neutrality with Year of Implementation.

Soft rules Hard rules
Sweden 2009 Chile 2010
Norway 2009 Canada 2010
Japan 2010 The Netherlands 2012
France 2010 Colombia 2011
Denmark 2011 Peru 2012
UK 2011 Slovenia 2012
South Korea 2011 Turkey 2012
Austria 2013 Argentina 2013
Switzerland 2014 Israel 2013
Ecuador 2013
Brazil 2014
Mexico 2014
Italy 2015

A separate study on the mobile app economy notes that about 95 percent of the value of the mobile app economy is concentrated in just 10 markets.[24] While this was not a study about net neutrality policy, the high-level results suggest that benefits from the policy do not necessarily flow to the countries that make rules. Countries in Latin America that have had hard net neutrality rules for years comprise a small fraction of the value of the mobile app economy, while China, which has no rules, continues to count for an increasing share of mobile app innovation. China became the world’s largest app market by downloads in 2016, with more than 50 billion downloads and some USD $10 billion in revenue.[25]

3 Data

3.1 An Empirical Investigation of the Rules

To address the gap in regulators’ analysis, the study evaluated the impact of net neutrality rules across countries. The investigation tested the proposition that countries that adopt net neutrality rules should experience an increase in mobile app innovation, whether in the number or rank of apps produced in the national economy. A statistical methodology was developed to measure the number of locally developed mobile apps in the country for relevant periods before and after rules were imposed, as well as the corresponding levels of downloads and, where possible, revenue. Two independent tool sets were employed for measurement, and the analysis was adjusted for the sophistication and penetration of advanced mobile networks in the country.

To make more meaningful comparisons and avoid inevitable differences between countries, the investigation focused on two similar countries with different rules: Denmark which adopted soft rules (self-regulation) in 2011 and the Netherlands which promulgated hard rules (legislation) in 2012. The countries Denmark and Netherlands are similar in many market respects, but they differ in their paths on net neutrality. Both countries score well on the EU’s Digital Agenda Scoreboard[26] and the ICT Development Index (IDI; Ovum 2016).[27] Both have competitive broadband markets with multiple broadband networks. The people of both countries are multilingual, well-educated, and generally adoptive of digital technologies. Both have populations of internet entrepreneurs, computer engineers, app developers, and startup companies. Smartphones had been available for at least 5 years in both countries before the research was undertaken.

There was no weighting for the type of app or its publisher as that would violate the net neutrality precept that all data are equal. As such, a video game app was considered the same as an e-government app. The analysis consisted of counting all discrete apps that appeared in app stores in Denmark and the Netherlands and then identifying the country in which the app was made and its corresponding net neutrality regime.[28] Specific measurements were taken in both countries at the same time period to compare results before and after. The first measurement was taken for the time period of 2011–2012, as that was the earliest year that data was available for the two countries. The second measurement was taken for 2016, 5 years after the Danish rules were in place and 4 years after the Dutch.

To test the assertions of net neutrality, it was hypothesized that countries with hard net neutrality rules should exhibit a higher degree of locally made innovation. The research included the following steps:

  1. The 53 countries were organized based on their type of net neutrality rules, resulting in three categories: countries with soft rules, countries with hard rules, and countries with no rules.

  2. As the 53 countries are heterogeneous, the research drilled down on two similar countries, Denmark and the Netherlands. Denmark opted for self-regulation in 2011, while the Netherlands imposed hard rules in 2012.

  3. Measurements were taken across the countries using App Annie, the leading market research tool to measure downloads in mobile app stores. Activity was measured in the Google Play and the Apple App Store for 2011–2012 and 2016 in both Denmark and the Netherlands. Tables were made of the top 250 apps in each country for the two periods, as measuring the top 200 apps in any country is statistically significant for the vast majority of activity in the app store for the given country.

  4. Similar measurements were made with a competing tool, Apptopia, to see how and whether results differed, bearing in mind that tools are not perfect substitutes.

  5. The results were then reviewed for additional factors, such as the level and sophistication of mobile networks and the types of mobile broadband subscriptions in the market.

The results of the investigation did not support the hypothesis that hard rules promoted more innovation. From 2012 to 2016, Denmark increased its local mobile app development, while the Netherlands decreased its development, both to a statistically significant degree.[29] Over the period, Denmark produced 115 of the top apps in the country, while the Netherlands produced 102 (Table 2). At the time of measurement, both Denmark and the Netherlands had four mobile network operators and multiple mobile virtual network operators.

Table 2:

Countries of Origin for Top Apps Used in Denmark and the Netherlands (2010–2016).

Soft rules Apps No Rules Apps
Austria 6 Australia 22
France 21 Belgium 3
Japan 7 Belarus 2
Norway 11 Bulgaria 1
South Korea 5 China 21
Switzerland 11 Czech Republic 4
Sweden 37 Egypt 1
UK 52 Finland 21
Total 150 Germany 26
Average 18.75 Hong Kong 2
Denmark 115 India 3
Ireland 2
Hard rules Croatia 2
Argentina 4 Lebanon 3
Brazil 1 Liberia 1
Canada 7 Lithuania 2
Israel 6 New Zealand 4
Italy 1 Russia 5
Turkey 1 South Africa 1
Total 20 Spain 1
Average 3.33 United Arab Emirates 1
The Netherlands 102 Vietnam 2
Total 130
USA 302
Table 3:

App Store Rankings for Apps from Different Net Neutrality Regimes.

Denmark, 2012 Denmark, 2016 The Netherlands, 2011 The Netherlands, 2016
Mean
 Locally made 41.97 26.50 31.17 42.57
 USA 21.37 20.03 18.37 14.43
 Soft rules 42.29 53.20 47.80 43.13
 Hard rules
 No rules 37.80 53.93 51.86 41.97
Median
 Locally made 43.5 27 34 46
 USA 23 21 16.5 13.5
 Soft rules 40 59 48.5 38.5
 Hard rules
 No rules 42 51 49 45.5

As for the total apps used in Denmark and the Netherlands during the period, just 20 apps were produced in countries with hard net neutrality rules. Notably, a significant number of apps (150) were produced in soft-rule countries. Countries with no rules produced a significant number of apps (130) that were subsequently consumed in Denmark and the Netherlands. The US accounted for 302 apps, but these apps were published before the 2015 Open Internet Order. Note that the Open Internet Order in the US only came into effect in April 2015, so there was not a full year to assess the effect.

Over the period, some apps were retired, some were merged into other platforms, and others continued in successive versions. The original research documents these evolutions.[30]

Table 3 shows the statistical results of the rankings for apps from each type of net neutrality regime. For example, the average Danish app increased in rank in the app store from 42 to 26 over the period, but the average Dutch app fell in rank from 31 to 43. The changes in rank status are statistically significant. There were so few apps from countries with hard rules that the rank analysis could not be performed.

Table 4:

The Global Success of “Subway Surfers.”

Denmark The Netherlands
90 Days in 2016 Downloads Revenue Downloads Revenue
“Subway Surfers” 4.5 Million $3.6 Million
Top 18 Apps 8.2 Million $5.5 Million 2.7 Million $3.6 Million

Over the period, Denmark succeeded in producing several “killer apps,” which were adopted globally, notably the game “Subway Surfers” by Kiloo. Downloads and revenue of this single app over 90 days in 2016 exceeded the total downloads and revenue of the top 18 Dutch-made apps in the Netherlands for the same period (Table 4). Even with the world’s toughest net neutrality law, the Dutch did not succeed to produce a killer app for consumers during the period.

Table 5:

Mobile Broadband Subscriptions in Denmark and the Netherlands.

Denmark 2013 2014 2015 2016
 2G percentage of total subscriptions 26.3 22.0 17.9 14.3
 3G or 4G percentage of total subscriptions 73.7 78 82.2 85.6
 Prepaid percentage of subscriptions 17.2 17.7 17.6 17.1
 Postpaid percentage of subscriptions 82.8 82.3 82.4 82.9
The Netherlands
 2G percentage of total subscriptions 41.4 32.8 23.8 16.8
 3G or 4G percentage of total subscriptions 58.7 67.2 76.3 83.2
 Prepaid percentage of subscriptions 37.3 39.1 38.8 37.6
 Postpaid percentage of subscriptions 62.7 60.9 61.2 62.4

The net neutrality regime alone probably does not explain the differences between Denmark and the Netherlands regarding the success of their respective mobile apps, so the level and type of mobile broadband networks and subscriptions were also investigated. Denmark enjoyed a significantly higher rate of adoption of next-generation (3G and 4G) network subscriptions for mobile broadband. Moreover, Denmark displayed a significantly higher rate of postpaid mobile subscription (Table 5). A country with a high rate of postpaid advanced mobile broadband subscriptions offers critical mass for app developers to deploy their innovations.

In general, there was more economic freedom in Denmark during the period. Danish mobile operators were allowed permission-less innovation and, as a result, exhibited a significantly higher percentage of subscriptions for next-generation mobile networks and postpaid subscriptions for data. Moreover, Danish mobile operators enjoyed more freedom to experiment in ways to get users to adopt next-generation mobile networks. The country’s mobile operators have employed free data for more than a decade to incentivize users to try mobile broadband subscriptions. They are also aggressive to partner with local content companies to promote Danish content.

Such efforts, however, were discouraged in the Netherlands. Indeed, the net neutrality law prohibited offering zero rating or free data for stand-alone services. This was struck down in early 2017, as the court ruled that it violated the new EU net neutrality law.[31]

The investigation found significant statistical support that soft net neutrality rules adopted voluntarily could promote edge innovation. However, hard rules adopted through legislation and regulation were not associated with greater mobile app development for the given country. Additionally, the explosion of mobile apps from countries with no net neutrality rules and the general lack of mobile apps from countries that have had hard rules for years run counter to net neutrality claims. This suggests that policymakers should revisit their assumptions and expectations for net neutrality policy.

3.2 Limitations of this Approach

As is detailed in the original research, there are many limitations to this approach and the research attempted to find alternative methods to compensate for deficiencies. At the outset, while many regulators proffer that their policies will work, they are not required to “prove” them empirically. As such, there is no standard methodology which could be independently assessed.

Measurements were made with professional industrial grade tools used globally by internet marketers. However regulators do not use such tools. These tools and datasets were not developed with the theories and use cases suggested by Wu’s conception of the Internet, that of “edge providers” creating innovation. Though there are firm and sector level datasets, prevailing theories of innovation suggest that an ecosystem creates innovation, in other words that the parts of a system work together in symbiotic ways. Net neutrality contradicts that view in that it suggests that one actor (BIAS providers) need to be controlled so that another (edge providers) can flourish. As such, the ability to measure only the edge providers required finding such a dataset. Manual adjustments were made, and data has been taken from two data sets from competing vendors to avoid selection bias.

Counting the number of apps as a proxy of innovation in the economy is an imperfect measure. The author could hypothesize that some set of social benefit apps may be more important than entertainment apps for example, but that would be introducing the author’s bias rather than focusing on what net neutrality suggests should be the outcome: “the best innovations.”

It is also recognized that users may download apps via Wi-Fi networks and then use them on mobile networks. There was no systematic way to account for the use of Wi-Fi, so it is assumed that Wi-Fi is a constant and countries are instead noted for the type and number of mobile networks present.

The measurement tools while powerful still had limitations in their flexibility and specificity.

It is also not clear to what degree actors know about net neutrality and whether the presence or absence of rules changes behavior. For example, would app developers move to markets with hard net neutrality rules? Do users download more apps because they know net neutrality rules are in place? These could be important questions but were outside the scope of this study.

Teece suggests that the level of mobile network infrastructure has something to do with the level of innovation, for example the Siri App on the iPhone can not work unless the phone runs on a 4G network. For example, the FCC’s virtuous circle theory posits that the level of innovation (and associated traffic) will increase the level of investment.[32] It believes that a state of neutrality will lead to innovation and then to investment. That theory was not modeled for this study. However, a cursory investigation was made to the level of mobile infrastructure by looking at a set of indicators[33] prepared by the GSM Association in the global mobile connectivity report.[34] This data set was used because it covered the largest numbers of countries with a number of relevant indicators for mobile infrastructure which were normalized so that meaningful comparisons could be made across countries.

4 Conclusion

This paper described an empirical study on net neutrality policy around the world, which explored whether net neutrality rules in different countries created more innovation at the edge. Hard rules were not associated with edge innovation, but soft rules were. This does not explain the success of countries such as Russia and China, which not only have no rules, but produce significant innovation at the edge. The work represents a preliminary attempt to assess the policy and should encourage other researchers and regulators to undertake investigations.

For example, in its recent report on the Open Internet to the European Parliament, the European Commission justifies the legislation by stating,

… end users and content application providers express great satisfaction with today’s state of affairs…One of the regulations objectives was to support the internet as an engine of innovation. Today, digital businesses are clearly flourishing as evidenced by start-up clusters in very dynamic places across Europe.[35]

No survey of end users and content application providers is offered to support such a conclusion. Moreover, it is interesting that the Commission looks to clusters, which existed well-before the legislation, as proof that the policy is working. An important counterfactual had legislation not been implemented. It is also interested why “very dynamic places” are noted as important. Was it not that net neutrality was supposed to work in all places, under all circumstances? Does it work differently in Greece compared to France for example? These are important elements of net neutrality policy which have not been duly addressed by net neutrality policymakers, and suggest areas of further research. Indeed if the number of startups and their concentration is to be measured, it can be noted anecdotally that since the repeal of the 2015 Open Internet rules in the US, the number of startups increased from 34,000 in 2017 to 40,500 in 2018.[36]

In any case, the research summarized here, a holistic assessment of the experience of net neutrality policy around the world, suggests a nuanced picture.[37] The peer-reviewed literature shows that net neutrality is not unambiguously good; sometimes the policy could be helpful, but at other times not.[38] The internet has many multifaceted markets with plenty of opportunities for abusing market power by app stores, operating systems, device makers, and content providers; broadband providers are not the sole actors of concern.[39] Moreover, a holistic analysis would have described the benefits of competition, partnerships, and differentiation that emerge when actors across the value chain depart from purely “neutral” or pro-edge arrangements. Most important would be the recognition that net neutrality policy is frequently detrimental to consumers,[40] particularly in prohibiting their ability to tailor their broadband experience across a range of parameters including price, quality, service, and security – not just speed, which the 2015 FCC misleadingly claims is the relevant metric.[41]

This paper provides a review of empirical research of net neutrality policy and mobile app innovation and highlights the deficiency of the original theory. Some possible inferences can be made for 5G mobile networks. Indeed, the leading countries for the rollout of these new networks are the US, China, and South Korea,[42] all countries with either soft or no net neutrality rules. Europe is lagging on deploying this technology. While 5G deployment is largely a function of investment and rollout policy, the net neutrality incantation that edge innovation matters more than that the fundamental innovation in networks falls flat in world where people expect to have next generation mobile standards.[43]

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Published Online: 2019-07-25
Published in Print: 2018-09-25

©2019 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

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