Abstract
Cultural differences can be a source of ambiguity in coordination games. As players are likely to experience more ambiguity when playing a different culture, we expect players to choose safer strategies. We run experiments with a stag hunt and bargaining coordination game. Using a between-subjects design, we vary the identity of the opponent between someone of the same culture or a different culture. We compare the responses of British and East Asian students at the University of Exeter and show the cultural identity of the opponent by physical appearance. While we find no significant differences between treatments for East Asians, the British choose the safer option in the stag hunt and demand more of the pie in the bargaining game when faced with an opponent from a different culture.
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Notes
Minimal groups are where participants are randomly allocated to groups and given an arbitrary label such as the “blue” or “yellow” group.
We understand that there are vast differences within both East Asian and Western cultures. However, the countries we classed as either East Asian or British all rank very similarly on Hofstede’s cultural dimensions (1980). For example, on individualism, China, Vietnam, and Thailand all score 20 while Hong Kong scores 25. This compares to the UK’s 89, Australia’s 90, and the United States’ 91.
Brislin and Lonner (1973, p. 70) note that experimenter demand effects, or “courtesy bias”, are particularly prevalent in Eastern cultures, where participants like to please the experimenter.
We ran two sessions here to swap which side of the room the East Asians and British were seated on, in case this had any effect on their behaviour. There were no significant differences in behaviour between these sessions.
According to our follow-up questionnaire, no participants were from mixed culture or immigrant families.
We chose a one-sided test as our hypothesis that participants would choose safer strategies when faced with an opponent from a different culture is directional.
We used a two-sided test here as the result is opposite to our hypothesis.
We averaged expected demands for each treatment. Several participants wrote “15 or 25” for the expected demands, in which case we took an average of 20.
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Acknowledgements
We are grateful to Miguel Fonseca, Brit Grosskopf, Simon Gächter, Jürgen Eichberger, Jörg Oechssler, and two anonymous referees for their valuable suggestions and feedback. We are also grateful to seminar participants at the University of Exeter, the FUR Conference, and the ESA World Meetings for their helpful comments. We also thank Anna Morozova and Bing Chao for assistance in running the experiment. Finally, we thank the University of Exeter’s Behaviour, Decisions and Markets research centre for funding our experiment.
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Experiment instructions
1.1 Instructions
You are about to take part in an experiment. Your payoff from this experiment will depend on the decisions you make during the experiment. Therefore, it is important that you carefully read and understand these instructions.
Please do not communicate with the other participants at any stage during the experiment. If you have a question, please raise your hand and the experimenter will assist you.
Your earnings from the experiment will be in Experimental Currency Units (ECU). Each ECU is worth £XX (£0.05 for stag hunt, £0.20 for bargaining game). After the experiment, your earnings will be converted into pounds, and you will be paid anonymously in cash before you leave the room. You will also receive a £2 show-up fee, in addition to any money earned during the experiment.
The experiment will start with a questionnaire which will shortly appear on the computer screen. Please complete the questions and then click the “OK” button at the bottom of the screen.
After everyone has completed the questionnaire, instructions will be handed out for the next stage of the experiment.
1.1.1 Stag hunt instructions
In the next stage of the experiment, you will play the game described below. You will be randomly matched with another player who is sitting on the other side of the room to you.
The game consists of a choice between 1 and 2. Your payoff depends on both your own choice and the choice of the player you are matched with, who is sitting on the other side of the room.
The payoff table for this game is illustrated below. The numbers in the table correspond to your payoffs in ECU, for every possible combination of choices by you and the other player. The first number in each cell is your payoff and the second number is the other player’s payoff.
If both you and the other player choose 2, you each receive a payoff of 60 ECU. If both players choose 1, you each receive a payoff of 40. If one player chooses 2 while the other chooses 1, the player choosing 2 receives 0 while the player choosing 1 receives 40.
Please input your choice of 1 or 2 into the computer when asked to do so. You will not know the choice of the other player until after you have made a decision.
If you have a question, please raise your hand and the experimenter will assist you.
Your choice | Other player’s choice | |
|---|---|---|
2 | 1 | |
2 | 60, 60 | 0, 40 |
1 | 40, 0 | 40, 40 |
1.1.2 Bargaining game instructions
In the next stage of the experiment, you will play the game described below. You will be randomly matched with another player who is sitting on the other side of the room to you.
You and another player are allocated 40 ECU to share between you. You need to decide how much of the 40 ECU you will demand for yourself and the other player will do the same. If the total demands from you and the other player exceed 40 ECU, you will both receive 0. If the total demands are less than or equal to 40, each of you will receive the amount you demanded.
The payoff table for this game is illustrated below. The numbers in the table correspond to your payoffs in ECU, for every possible combination of choices by you and the other player. The first number in each cell is your payoff and the second number is the other player’s payoff.
As an example, if you choose 25 and the other player chooses 15, the total demands are 40. In this case, you will receive 25 and the other player will receive 15. However, if you choose 25 and the other player also chooses 25, the total demands are 50. In this case, you will both receive 0.
As another example, if you choose 10 and the other player chooses 15, the total demands are 25, which is less than 40. In this case, you will receive 10 and the other player will receive 15.
Please input your choice of 10, 15, 25, or 30 into the computer when asked to do so. You will not know the choice of the other player until after you have made a decision.
If you have a question, please raise your hand and the experimenter will assist you.
Your choice | Other player’s choice | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
30 | 25 | 15 | 10 | |
30 | 0, 0 | 0, 0 | 0, 0 | 30, 10 |
25 | 0, 0 | 0, 0 | 25, 15 | 25, 10 |
15 | 0, 0 | 15, 25 | 15, 15 | 15, 10 |
10 | 10, 30 | 10, 25 | 10, 15 | 10, 10 |
Appendix 2: Follow-up questionnaire
Please answer the following questions and click the "OK" button when complete.
How did you decide what option to choose?
What did you think the other player would choose?
Did you consider the identity of the other player when making your decision?
If you answered “yes” above, what aspects of the other player's identity did you consider?
What do you think this experiment was about? (Optional).
-
OK button.
Please answer the following questions and click the “OK” button when complete.
Age (in years):
Gender:
Subject major:
Nationality:
Nationality(ies) of your parents:
Country of birth:
Native language:
Second languages:
-
OK button.
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Peryman, J., Kelsey, D. Ambiguity when playing coordination games across cultures. Theory Decis 90, 485–505 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-020-09765-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-020-09765-1