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NTU-bankruptcy problems: consistency and the relative adjustment principle

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Abstract

This paper axiomatically studies bankruptcy problems with nontransferable utility by focusing on generalizations of consistency and the contested garment principle. On the one hand, we discuss several consistency notions and introduce the class of parametric bankruptcy rules which contains the proportional rule, the constrained relative equal awards rule, and the constrained relative equal losses rule. On the other hand, we introduce the class of adjusted bankruptcy rules and characterize the relative adjustment principle by truncation invariance, minimal rights first, and a weak form of relative symmetry.

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Notes

  1. Alternatively, one can interpret a bankruptcy problem with nontransferable utility as a bargaining problem with claims (cf. Chun and Thomson 1992) where the disagreement point equals the zero vector, or as a Nash rationing problem (cf. Mariotti and Villar 2005) where the admissible allocations are nonnegative. Contrary to these models, we allow for a nonconvex estate and claims which exceed the maximal individual payoffs within the estate.

  2. This type of theorem can be formulated for any bankruptcy rule satisfying bilateral consistency and converse consistency.

  3. Peters et al. (1994) introduced a similar property for bargaining solutions.

  4. The adjusted proportional rule for TU-bankruptcy problems was introduced by Curiel et al. (1987). In the context of bargaining problems with claims (cf. Chun and Thomson 1992), a similar adjusted proportional rule was introduced by Herrero (1997).

  5. For TU-bankruptcy problems, Aumann and Maschler (1985) called this standard solution the contested garment principle. Later, Thomson (2003) named it the concede-and-divide principle.

  6. For an arbitrary number of claimants, this formula corresponds to the adjusted proportional rule.

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Correspondence to Bas Dietzenbacher.

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B. Dietzenbacher: Support from the Basic Research Program of the National Research University Higher School of Economics is gratefully acknowledged.

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Dietzenbacher, B., Borm, P. & Estévez-Fernández, A. NTU-bankruptcy problems: consistency and the relative adjustment principle. Rev Econ Design 24, 101–122 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-019-00227-x

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-019-00227-x

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