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From Financial Misdemeanants to Recidivists: The Perspective of Social Networks

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2019

Fenghua Bao ,
Yapu Zhao ,
Longwei Tian Open the ORCID record for Longwei Tian [Opens in a new window]  and
Yuan Li
Fenghua Bao
Affiliation:
Shanghai Jiao Tong University, China
Yapu Zhao
Affiliation:
Tongji University, China
Longwei Tian*
Affiliation:
Shanghai Jiao Tong University, China
Yuan Li
Affiliation:
Tongji University, China
*
Corresponding author: Longwei Tian (tianlongwei@sjtu.edu.cn)
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Abstract

Acts of financial misconduct in business affect firms in many negative ways. Therefore, why do certain misdemeanants repeatedly commit these acts? We suggest that financial misdemeanants with different social networks will perceive the costs and benefits of committing financial frauds differently, thereby affecting the likelihood of committing financial frauds in the future. To be specific, we suggest that politically connected misdemeanants are less likely to recommit financial frauds, while misdemeanants at interlock network center are more likely to recommit financial frauds. In addition, we propose that misdemeanants are less likely to recommit financial frauds when their partners in the interlock network community are punished for financial frauds. To test our theory, we collected panel data from Chinese listed firms from 2005 to 2014 and employed event history analysis (EHA).

摘要

财务违规一旦被发现会给企业带来很多消极影响。那么，为什么有些企业会重复违规呢？本研究认为，违规企业的社会网络会影响违规企业对再次违规所面临的成本收益的判断，进而影响其重复违规的可能。具体而言，我们认为有政治关系的违规企业重复违规的可能性较低，而处在董事连锁网络中心位置的违规企业更有可能重复违规。此外，当违规企业所处的董事连锁网络小群体的伙伴因财务违规受过惩罚时，该企业重复违规的可能性会降低。运用事件分析方法（EHA），我们对2005年到2014年中国上市公司财务违规面板数据进行了分析，验证了本文的理论和假设。

Аннотация

Финансовые нарушения в бизнесе оказывают негативное влияние на компании. В таком случае, почему определенные нарушители постоянно совершают эти проступки? Мы предполагаем, что финансовые правонарушители с различными социальными связями будут по-разному воспринимать преимущества и недостатки, связанные с финансовыми махинациями, что влияет на вероятность совершения финансовых нарушений в будущем. Прежде всего, мы считаем, что нарушители с политическими связями реже совершают финансовые проступки, в то время как нарушители, которые находятся в центре сети социальных отношений, с большей вероятностью повторно совершают финансовые мошенничества. Кроме того, мы предполагаем, что нарушители с меньшей вероятностью вновь совершают финансовые махинации в том случае, если их партнеры в сети социальных отношений получают наказание за финансовые проступки. Для того, чтобы проверить нашу теорию, мы собрали панельные данные из китайских компаний, зарегистрированных на фондовой бирже в период с 2005 по 2014 годов, и провели исторический анализ событий.

Resumen

Los actos de malversación financiera en los negocios afectan las empresas de muchas maneras negativas. Por lo tanto, ¿por qué ciertos delincuentes de delitos menores cometen repetidamente estos actos? Sugerimos que los delitos financieros menores con diferentes redes sociales percibirán de manera diferente los costos y los beneficios de cometer fraudes financieros, por ende, afectando la probabilidad de cometer fraudes financieros en el futuro. Para ser específicos, sugerimos que los delincuentes de delitos menores menos políticamente conectados son menos propensos a volver a comer fraudes financieros. Además, proponemos que los delincuentes de delitos menores son menos propensos a volver a cometer fraudes financieros cuando sus aliados en la red comunitaria entrelazada son castigados por fraudes financieros. Para probar nuestra teoría, recolectamos datos de panel de empresas chinas que cotizan en bolsa entre el 2005 al 2015 y usamos análisis histórico de eventos.

Keywords

cost benefit analysisEHAfinancial misconduct recidivismsocial networks财务违规社会网络成本收益分析事件分析рецидивизм финансовых проступковсоциальные связианализ затрат и выгодисторический анализ событийreincidentes de malversación financieraredes socialesanálisis de costo beneficioanálisis histórico de eventos
Type
Article
Information
Management and Organization Review , Volume 15 , Issue 4 , December 2019 , pp. 809 - 835
Copyright
Copyright © 2019 The International Association for Chinese Management Research 

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Footnotes

Accepted by: Senior Editor Lin Cui

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