Abstract
In this paper, I argue that while truth-conditional semantics in generative linguistics provides lots of good semantic explanations, truth-conditions do not play an important role in these explanations. That is, the fact that expressions have the particular truthconditional contents (extensions or intensions) they have does not even partly explain facts about semantic phenomena. Rather, explanations of semantic phenomena appeal to extra-truth-conditional properties attributed to expressions via their lexical entries. Focusing on recent truth-conditional work on gradable adjectives and degree modifiers by Kennedy and McNally (Language 81:345–381, 2005), I show that the best explanations of semantic anomaly and entailment for these expressions are non-truth-conditional—they do not depend on the fact that these expressions have the truth-conditional contents they have. I then provide reasons for thinking that the point generalizes beyond gradable adjectives and degree modifiers to other expressions, and beyond anomaly and entailment to other semantic phenomena. Truth-conditional content, generally, is extrasemantic.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Chomsky, N. (1986). Knowledge of language. New York: Prager.
Chomsky, N. (2000). New horizons in the study of language and mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Field, H. (1972). Tarski’s theory of truth. Journal of Philosophy, 69(13), 347–375.
Fodor, J., & Lepore, E. (1998). The emptiness of the lexicon: Critical reflections on James Pustejovsky’s “The generative lexicon”. Linguistic Inquiry, 29(2), 269–288.
Glanzberg, M. (2009). Semantics and truth relative to a world. Synthese, 166(1), 281–307.
Glanzberg, M. (2011). Meaning, concepts, and the lexicon. Croatian Journal of Philosophy, 11(1), 1–29.
Glanzberg, M. (2014). Explanation and partiality in semantic theory. In A. Burgess & B. Sherman (Eds.), Metasemantics (pp. 259–292). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Guasti, M. T. (2002). Language acquisition: The growth of grammar. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Heim, I., & Kratzer, A. (1998). Semantics in generative grammar. New York: Blackwell.
Higginbotham, J. (1989). Knowledge of reference. In A. George (Ed.), Reflections on Chomsky (pp. 153–174). Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Jackendoff, R. S. (1990). Semantic structures. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Kennedy, C. (2007). Vagueness and grammar: The semantics of relative and absolute gradable adjectives. Linguistics and Philosophy, 30(1), 1–45.
Kennedy, C., & McNally, L. (1999). From event structure to scale structure: Degree modification in deverbal adjectives. In T. Matthews & D. Strolovitch (Eds.), Proceedings of SALT 9 (pp. 163–180). Ithaca, NY: CLC Publications.
Kennedy, C., & McNally, L. (2005). Scale structure, degree modification, and the semantics of gradable predicates. Language, 81(2), 345–381.
Larson, R. K., & Ludlow, P. (1993). Interpreted logical forms. Synthese, 95(2), 305–355.
Larson, R., & Segal, G. (1995). Knowledge of meaning. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Lewis, D. (1975). Languages and language. In K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science (pp. 3–35). Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
Lewis, D. (1980). Index, context, and content. In S. Kanger & S. Öhman (Eds.), Philosophy and grammar (pp. 79–100). Dordrecht: Reidel.
Ludlow, P. (2011). The philosophy of generative linguistics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Napoletano, T. (2015). Compositionality as weak supervenience. Synthese, 192(1), 201–220.
Pagin, P., & Westerståhl, D. (2010). Compositionality I: Definitions and variants. Philosophy Compass, 5(2), 250–264.
Partee, B. H. (1979). Semantics—Mathematics or psychology? In R. Bäuerle, U. Egli, & A. von Stechow (Eds.), Semantics from different points of view (pp. 1–14). Berlin: Springer.
Partee, B. H. (2011). Formal semantics: Origins, issues, early impact. The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication, 6, 1–52.
Pietroski, P. M. (2010). Concepts, meanings and truth: First nature, second nature and hard work. Mind and Language, 25(2), 247–278.
Schiffer, S. (2015). Meaning and formal semantics in generative grammar. Erkenntnis, 80(1), 61–87.
Soames, S. (1992). Truth, meaning, and understanding. Philosophical Studies, 65(1–2), 17–35.
Soames, S. (2012). What is meaning?. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Szabó, Z. G. (2000). Compositionality as supervenience. Linguistics and Philosophy, 23, 475–505.
Szabó, Z. G. (2012). The case for compositionality. In W. Hinzen, M. Werning, & E. Machery (Eds.), The Oxford handbook on compositionality (pp. 64–80). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
von Fintel, K., & Heim, I. (2011). Intensional semantics. Lecture notes, MIT. http://lingphil.mit.edu/papers/heim/fintel-heim-intensional.pdf.
Yalcin, S. (2014). Semantics and metasemantics in the context of generative grammar. In A. Burgess & B. Sherman (Eds.), Metasemantics (pp. 17–54). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
Publisher's Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
This paper has benefited greatly from the feedback of Lionel Shapiro, Zoltán Szabó, Kate Stanton, Yale’s ELLMM City Workgroup, the participants in the UConn Philosophy Department’s Brown Bag series, Aidan Gray, David Ripley, Bill Lycan, Jared Henderson, Junyeol Kim, and two anonymous reviewers.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Napoletano, T. How important are truth-conditions for truth-conditional semantics?. Linguist and Philos 42, 541–575 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10988-019-09261-y
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10988-019-09261-y