Abstract
By enacting equality laws the liberal state decides the limits of liberal tolerance by relying on content-based rather than content-neutral considerations. Equality laws are not and cannot be neutral. They reflect a content-based moral decision about the importance and weight of the principle of equality vis-à-vis other rights or interests. This leads to the following conclusions: First, since equality laws in liberal democracies reflect moral-liberal values, conscientious objections to equality laws rely, almost by definition, on unjustly intolerant, anti-liberal and morally repugnant values. Secondly, we should not shy away from explicitly relying on moral-liberal views when deciding whether it is justified to grant exemptions from equality laws. Thirdly, conscientious objections to equality laws should normally not be tolerated or accommodated by the state, because conscientious objections that rely on what is rightly perceived as unjustly intolerant, anti-liberal and morally repugnant values should not be tolerated in a tolerant-liberal democracy.
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My thanks are due to Megan Davidson for her superb research assistance and thoughtful comments on previous drafts, to John Adenitire and an anonymous reviewer for their exceptionally challenging and helpful comments, and to Faiza Ahmed for her help in preparing the paper for publication. Research Fellowship at the Jean Monnet Research Centre, Trento University, Italy, allowed me to complete writing the paper in an ideal academic environment.
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Nehushtan, Y. Conscientious objection and equality laws: Why the content of the conscience matters. Law and Philos 38, 227–266 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-019-09347-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-019-09347-5