Abstract
We show that the comparison of the two-part licensing mechanisms considered in the San Martín and Saracho (2015) context is exactly identical to that in Colombo and Filippini (J Econ 118:47–76, 2016) context. This means that the results obtained in Colombo and Filippini (J Econ 118:47–76, 2016) when the patentee chooses between per-unit and ad valorem royalties are incorrect. We conclude that when the convexity of the cost function is not too low, the patentee prefers to license by means of a royalty on the value of sales.
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Notes
When the production cost after the innovation is zero, as is the case in SMS, revenue royalty contracts and ad valorem royalty contracts cannot be distinguished. In CF, firms produce with strictly convex costs and after the innovation production costs are positive. As a consequence, in that context, it is possible to distinguish between both kinds of mechanisms.
References
Colombo S, Filippini L (2016) Revenue royalties. J Econ 118:47–76
San Martín M, Saracho AI (2015) Optimal two-part tariff licensing mechanisms. Manch School 83:288–306
Vives X (1999) Oligopoly princing: old ideas and new tools. MIT Press, Cambridge
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Financial support from Spanish government, Grants ECO 2015-66027-P and PID2019-106146GB-I00 and from the Departamento de Educación, Universidades e Investigación del Gobierno Vasco IT-869-13 and IT-1367-19 is gratefully acknowledged. Any errors are ours alone.
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San Martín, M., Saracho, A.I. Revenue royalties: comment. J Econ 132, 187–192 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-020-00721-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-020-00721-9