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Constitutional Correction as a Third Democratic Revolutionary Moment in Central Eastern Europe

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Abstract

The paper discuss constitutional problem in Central-Eastern Europe but especially in Poland. After review of literature which use label “populism” without any analyses the paper look at the constitutional changes as the third moment in revolutionary process which started in 1980.

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Notes

  1. Avbelj (2016).

  2. Furedi (2017).

  3. Zielonka (2018); see also: Eatwell and Goodwin (2018).

  4. See: a report by Klub Jagielloński on public transportation, April 2018: https://klubjagiellonski.pl/2018/04/17/publiczny-transport-zbiorowy-w-polsce-studium-upadku/.

  5. “Wykluczenie cyfrowe w Polsce”, a 2015 study by the Polish Senate’s Bureau of Research https://www.senat.gov.pl/gfx/senat/pl/senatopracowania/133/plik/ot-637_internet.pdf and 2016 data concerning education exclusion, see: http://fdds.pl/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Wlodarczyk_J_Ganko_N_2011_Wykluczenie_edukacyjne.pdf.

  6. See Sawczuk (2018).

  7. Jan-Werner Müller wrote “The claim to exclusive moral representation of the real or authentic people is at the core of populism” Jan-Werner Müller (2017). See also: Mudde and Rivira Kaltwasser (2017). See also: Rivira Kaltwasser, Cristobal, Populism and the Question of How to Respond to It in; Rovira Kaltwasser et al. (2017).

  8. This notion is often used by the most prominent leaders of the Law and Justice party. The former president of the Constitutional Tribunal, Marek Safjan, claimed that legal impossibilism is an essential element of constitutional judiciary. “I consider it in positive terms, not in negative terms. And this is the difference between my opinion and the opinion of those who claim it to be otherwise. I’m convinced that the function of the constitutional courts is designed exactly to pose obstacles to parliamentary majorities wishing to do as they please, ignoring the restrictions that need to be abided by in a democratic state respecting fundamental rights. Such obstacles are there for such majorities to show them the limits of their aspirations” in: https://www.tygodnikprzeglad.pl/prawo-wedlug-pis/. This is a classical liberal-constitutional approach. I think that the notion of “legal impossibilism” refers to the excess of formalism, not to “checks and balances”. For a critical review of the notion in question from the point of view of the theory of law see: Zajadło (2017).

  9. Zakaria (2007).

  10. Diamond (2002).

  11. Scheppele (2014) and by the same author Scheppele (2017).

  12. Bugarič and Ginsburg (2016); see also: Bugarič (2018), Populism, manuscript 2018.

  13. T. Ginsburg, check…….

  14. Huq and Ginsburg (2018), at 118.

  15. Landau (2013).

  16. Ibid., p. 285.

  17. Furedi (2017).

  18. Pitkin (1987).

References

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Czarnota, A. Constitutional Correction as a Third Democratic Revolutionary Moment in Central Eastern Europe. Hague J Rule Law 11, 397–406 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40803-019-00112-3

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