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Definite Descriptions in Argument: Gettier’s Ten-Coins Example

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Abstract

In this article, I use Edmund Gettier’s Ten Coins hypothetical scenario to illustrate some reasoning errors in the use of definite descriptions. The Gettier problem, central as it is to modern epistemology, is first and foremost an argument, which Gettier (Analysis 23(6):121–123, 1963) constructs to prove a contrary conclusion to a widely held view in epistemology. Whereas the epistemological claims in the case have been extensively analysed conceptually, the strategies and tools from other philosophical disciplines such as analytic philosophy of language, logic and argumentation that Gettier deploys in the case have scarcely received any attention. This work abstracts from the epistemological content and examines Gettier’s handling of the definite description involved, and how that affects the cogency of his argument.

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Notes

  1. Yakubu (2016) critiques the manner of Gettier’s application of the rules of classical logic in that second argument.

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  1. Trent University, Oshawa, ON, Canada

    Yussif Yakubu

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Correspondence to Yussif Yakubu.

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Yakubu, Y. Definite Descriptions in Argument: Gettier’s Ten-Coins Example. Argumentation 34, 261–274 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-019-09507-w

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