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Why Wake the Dead? Identity and De-extinction

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Abstract

I will entertain and reject three arguments which putatively establish that the individuals produced through de-extinction ought to be the same species as the extinct population. Forms of these arguments have appeared previously in restoration ecology. The first is the weakest, the conceptual argument, that de-extinction will not be de-extinction if it does not re-create an extinct species. This is misguided as de-extinction technology is not unified by its aim to re-create extinct species but in its use of the remnants of extinct populations as a resource. The second is the argument from authenticity; the populations produced by de-extinction technologies will be inauthentic if they are not of the extinct species and, therefore, will not be valuable. I argue authenticity is not required in conservation as the value of authenticity varies between people and cultures, and the novelty of de-extinct species will be equally desirable in many cases. The third argument is from retributive justice; we need the de-extinct population to have the same species identity as we owe a moral debt to the extinct population. I find the case for retributive justice unconvincing and argue that acting as if we have a duty to resurrect extinct species will result in a world with less species. Ultimately all the arguments that connect de-extinction technology to species identity fail, leaving us to consider a more complex calculus for the justification of de-extinction in conservation.

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Notes

  1. Higgs’ (2003) view is quite nuanced. This conceptual argument only appears in the larger context of his view, in which restoration projects must consider how to engage local human populations in a relationship with nature. As such, the conceptual argument may be considered instrumental for engaging the public in conservation projects. I recommend reading his book to understand how this conceptual argument sits within his larger ethical framework.

  2. I also believe this is the case for de-extinction but wish to focus on the normative rather than the metaphysical.

  3. For a deft and convincing refutation of Katz’s argument that restoration results in the domination of nature consider Andrew Light’s (2000) discussion. Light argues convincingly that restoration is an important part of environmental practice and addresses Elliot and Katz’s arguments on different grounds to my own.

  4. Some environmental ethicists believe intrinsic value is relational, depending on the agents who value the entity (Elliot 1992; Sandler 2010). If intrinsic value is relational, it is dependent the act of valuation by the relevant agents and ultimately their unique individual psychology. Therefore, my argument still bears on this type of value.

  5. This is based off estimates of human caused extinctions (Ceballos et al. 2015; Sandom et al. 2014). This does not mean we are in a good position to know whether any particular extinction was caused by human action. Instead these are estimates on the data around the difference between background rates of extinction and the rates of extinction when human populations either move into a region or rapidly expand in size. So, while we know extinctions occur, it is difficult to attribute individual extinctions to human actions.

  6. This I will fully admit involves entertaining the idea that we have to do some sort of utility calculation. But many deontologists defend threshold/non-absolutist/moderate forms of deontology duties can be weighed in some sense (Kagan 1998, pp. 79–84).

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  1. School of Philosophical and Historical Inquiry, University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia

    Christopher Hunter Lean

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Lean, C.H. Why Wake the Dead? Identity and De-extinction. J Agric Environ Ethics 33, 571–589 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10806-020-09839-8

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