Electricity customers’ financial and reliability risk protection utilizing insurance mechanism
Introduction
These days, electricity consumers have become active players in the modern power system. Hence, it is essential to provide a mechanism that enables the customers to participate in the power market [1]. One of the effective structures that enable electricity customers to participate appropriately in the electricity market is real-time pricing (RTP) [2], [3]. Through the RTP, customers, even the end-used one, are presented with a ‘price signal’ that more accurately conveys the actual costs of electricity generation and supply-side [4]. The price signal incentivizes the customers to reduce or shift electricity usage from the peak to the off-peak periods [5]. Electricity market price volatility reduction is the most notable advantage of RTP [6]. However, some rigid barriers restrict customers’ participation in RTP [7]. The most important of these barriers are:
- –
Complexity of market participation and lack of experience.
- –
Measurement and communication costs.
- –
Economic risks and volatilities of the market prices.
These barriers motivate the customers to purchase their electricity energy via the flat-rate pricing method or use a protection mechanism against the market price risks. A well-designed risk hedging mechanism would help relieve the customers’ concern by preserving them against the market risks [8]. Risk hedging contract enables the customers to manage their electricity cost by sharing electricity market risks with the risk hedger [9]. Flat-rate pricing and real-time pricing methods can be interpreted through the risk hedging concept. In flat-rate pricing, the risks of the market price fluctuations are covered completely. Therefore, the customers pay only the average price of the market as the premium. In RTP, customers select self-risk hedging by paying the variable market price for the electricity energy [10].
Electricity consumers’ risks not only involve the market price but also furthermore include the quality and reliability of the delivery service. In the current regulatory schemes to improve electricity customers’ reliability, the average of the service is employed as the criterion to incentivize or penalize the utility company [11], [12]. Although these schemes can improve the reliability, they do not consider the customer’s personal preferences. To consider the customers’ preferences, some studies, [13], [14], propose reliability improvement schemes in which electricity customers can choose their desired service level. The inflexibility of the electrical grid remains another challenge limiting the provision of electricity services based on the customers’ preferences. For example, regardless of their preferences, all of the customers in a grid receive the same service quality. Insurance is an efficient risk hedging mechanism that can overcome the challenges mentioned above by providing various electricity services and purchasing options.
Several aspects of insurance and its application in the power system have been studied so far. Refs. [15] and [16] have studied the insurance mechanism to protect generation units against forced outage risks. A novel insurance protection has been provided by independent system operator for electricity bilateral contract in [17]. Insurance mechanisms can also be used to cover renewable resources risks. In [18], an insurance mechanism has been designed to cover wind generation trading risks in the electricity market. Ref. [19] has provided insurance support for small hydropower sector investors. The paper has created a trade-off to divide the project costs risks between the insurance company and the investors.
Some other studies have investigated reliability insurance for electricity sectors. In [20], the reserve market has been considered as an insurance mechanism in which generation units collect the premium from who purchases the insurance and provide a reliable power supply in return. In [21], the distribution company has provided different electricity services via different insurance contracts. The distribution company uses the collected insurance premiums to improve electricity service or pay reimbursement. Another reliability insurance scheme has been introduced in [22], which allows the consumers to determine their value for reliability based on their preferences. The utility company has to reimburse the consumers according to their outage value when the electricity outage occurs. In addition to selling commoditized kilowatt-hours (kWh), Ref. [23] has suggested the electricity firms sell reliability insurance. The proposed insurance can reduce both the price and volume risks of firms by receiving a stable revenue. Ref. [24] has introduced a reliability insurance scheme overlay on energy electricity markets, in which financial protection is provided to the consumers against electricity outages. From the proposed insurance scheme, the collected premiums are used to invest in electricity generation or pay the reimbursement. Also, Ref. [25] has proposed distributed generation (DG) provides the reliability insurance mechanism.
Although different insurance mechanisms have been investigated for different electricity sectors, utilizing financial insurance to protect electricity customers’ risks is neglected. Moreover, the existing reliability insurance mechanisms include some weakness to provide electricity service based on the customers’ preferences. In this paper, a novel insurance mechanism based on the concept of the utility function is designed to protect the electricity customers’ concerns. From economics, the function that can explain people’s behavior against risk hedging mechanism is utility function [26]. Therefore, this paper utilizes the utility function to identify electricity customers’ viewpoints and design financial and outage insurances mechanisms (FIM and OIM). In the FIM, each customer selects a strike price, which represents the maximum price that the customer is ready to purchase from the market. When the market price is lower than the strike price, the customer pays the market price for electricity energy consumption. Otherwise, the insurer is responsible for paying the difference between the market price and predetermined strike price. Selected strike prices can be interpreted as the insurance deductibles. In the insurance literature, deductible represents the part of the claim that the policyholder takes by himself/herself. By selecting different deductibles, all customers can take part in the electricity market based on their preferences. Moreover, OIM is used to cover electricity outage risks, where each customer selects his/her outage value and pays a premium to prevent the risk. To reduce the reimbursement, the insurer can manage the outage by applying different outage levels to the customers based on their outage values. Through the OIM, the customers can select various electricity services based on their preferences. The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
- •
The utility function is employed to measure the electricity customers’ preferences considering different risk aversion behaviors.
- •
A new load model is designed based on the customers’ risk aversion behavior.
- •
Customer welfare is modeled only as a function of electricity price and the customers’ risk aversion coefficient.
- •
The risk aversion coefficients are estimated via price-elasticity of electricity demand.
- •
A novel insurance mechanism is designed to cover electricity customers’ concerns due to electricity market price and electricity outage risks.
- •
Maximum tolerable (minimum acceptable) insurance premium is determined based on the customers’ (insurer) viewpoint considering different utility functions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the utility theory. In this section, electricity customers’ behavior is modeled via different utility functions. Sections 3 Financial Insurance Mechanism (FIM), 4 Outage Insurance Mechanism (OIM) describe financial and outage insurance mechanisms. The numerical results are addressed in Section 5. Finally, the paper is concluded in Section 6.
Section snippets
Utility function
Utility function measures the customer’s satisfaction as a function of his/her consumption. Application of the utility function application in the power system has been investigated in some studies. For example, Utility function has been employed in [27] to model electricity customers’ preferences to study electricity customers’ consumption patterns. Ref. [28] has defined social welfare due to electricity consumption in terms of customer’s utility function and electricity cost. Using
Financial Insurance Mechanism (FIM)
This paper uses RTP to sell electrical energy, which exposes electricity customers to the market price fluctuations risk. To preserve the customers from the price fluctuations risk, this paper suggests that the utility company (or retailer) provides different financial insurance contracts. These contracts are designed to relieve the customer’s concerns and facilitate participation in RTP in which, each customer determines a strike price. Determined strike price represents the maximum price that
Outage Insurance Mechanism (OIM)
If the reliability is poor, customers suffer from a high interruption level, which reduces their customers’ welfare. On the other hand, providing a very high-reliability level needs high investment and maintenance costs. Customers have to pay the costs through their tariffs, which also decreases the customers’ welfare. This paper suggests that the regulator transfers the reliability level selection burden to the customers through the outage insurance mechanism. Outage insurance allows the
Numerical results
The proposed insurance mechanisms have been tested on a sample test system, which is shown in Fig. 5. The generators and load data are presented in Table 2, Table 3. It is assumed that the system load is divided equally between different load buses where each bus contains only two types of customers. Each bus’s demand is divided equally among the different customers’ types.
Specifying RACs plays an essential role in the success of the proposed insurance mechanisms. Social studies are required
Conclusion
This paper designs novel financial and outage insurance mechanisms to cover concerns of electricity customers. The main advantage of insurance mechanisms is replacing the uncertainty caused by the probability of financial and outage loss by receiving reimbursement. From the financial (outage) insurance mechanism, the efficient signal is sent to the customers (utility company) who are (is) able to amend electricity demand (the network conditions) and reduce the market fluctuations (improve the
CRediT authorship contribution statement
Amir Niromandfam: Writing, Conceptualization, Methodology, Software, Data curation. Saeid Pashaei Choboghloo: Writing - review & editing, Data curation, Conceptualization. Ahmad Sadeghi Yazdankhah: Formal analysis, Investigation, Validation. Rasool Kazemzadeh: Supervision, Investigation, Writing - review & editing.
Declaration of Competing Interest
The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.
References (38)
- et al.
Real-time based approach for intelligent building energy management using dynamic price policies
Sustainable Cities Soc.
(2018) - et al.
Demand side response to mitigate electrical peak demand in eastern and southern Australia
Energy Procedia
(2011) - et al.
Modeling and prioritizing dynamic demand response programs in the electricity markets
Sustainable Cities Soc.
(2020) - et al.
Uptake and usage of cost-reflective electricity pricing: Insights from psychology and behavioural economics
Renew. Sustain. Energy Rev.
(2016) - et al.
The costs and benefits of real-time pricing: An empirical investigation into consumer bills using hourly energy data and prices
Electr. J.
(2018) - et al.
Designing risk hedging mechanism based on the utility function to help customers manage electricity price risks
Electr. Power Syst. Res.
(2020) The financial and physical insurance benefits of price-responsive demand
Electr. J.
(2002)- et al.
A risk-based model for performance-based regulation of electric distribution companies
Util. Policy
(2017) - et al.
Customer satisfaction based reliability evaluation of active distribution networks
Appl. Energy
(2016) - et al.
Insuring unit failures in electricity markets
Energy Econ.
(2010)
A comparison of risk measures for accidents in the energy sector and their implications on decision-making strategies
Energy
Insurance strategy for mitigating power system operational risk introduced by wind power forecasting uncertainty
Renew. Energy
Managing and operating the reserve market as one insurance system
Electr. Power Syst. Res.
CDF-based reliability insurance contracts considering free-riding
Int. J. Electr. Power Energy Syst.
From vertical to horizontal unbundling: A downstream electricity reliability insurance business model
Energy Policy
Market design for resource adequacy: A reliability insurance overlay on energy-only electricity markets
Util. Policy
Second revenue stream for distributed generation in the presence of reliability insurance
Int. J. Electr. Power Energy Syst.
Households’ response to changes in electricity pricing schemes: bridging microeconomic and engineering principles
Energy Econ.
A novel behavioral real time pricing scheme for the active energy consumers’ participation in emerging flexibility markets
Sustain. Energy Grids Netw.
Cited by (7)
The electricity market in Brazil: A multilevel perspective of sector agents for liberalization to residential consumers
2023, Energy for Sustainable DevelopmentCustomer engagement strategies in retail electricity markets: A comprehensive and comparative review
2022, Energy Research and Social ScienceCitation Excerpt :While adverse conditions of low-income groups may be driven by multiple factors (i.e., costs associated with food, clothing, commuting and caring responsibilities etc.), if energy is a factor (depending on individual household circumstances), Nelson et al. suggest that energy retailers must create a fairer deal to mitigate the sometimes extreme circumstances for their low-income customers [86]. Niromandfam et al. [140] discuss that real-time pricing is an effective structure to allow customers to participate in the power market. However, the authors recognise, particularly for vulnerable customers, that restrictive barriers (e.g., market participation complexity and volatility of market prices) are in place and their research study explores a risk hedging mechanism that aims to alleviate customer concern by shielding them from market risks.
Research on Electricity Customer Behavior Prediction Based on Improved Time Convolutional Network
2022, 2022 2nd International Conference on Electrical Engineering and Control Science, IC2ECS 2022Insurance Premium Setting Based On Power System Reliability Analysis
2022, Proceedings of 2022 IEEE 5th International Electrical and Energy Conference, CIEEC 2022