Abstract
In Hannes Leitgeb’s article What truth depends on (Leitgeb in J Philos Logic 34:155–192, 2005) the author provides a formally correct and materially adequate truth definition for the set of all grounded sentences, defined as the least fixed point of a monotone operator of semantic dependence. In this paper we will focus on the mathematical aspects of Leitgeb’s notions of dependence, grounding and truth, recasting Leitgeb’s construction in a functional setting in which we establish some new facts about these notions.
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Acknowledgements
Parts of this article were presented at the workshop on “Formal truth theories” held in Warsaw in September 2017: I wish to thank both the organisers and the audience of this event. I am also indebted to Martin Fischer for suggesting me a refinement of an older version of Theorem 4.11.
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Rivello, E. Notes on Leitgeb’s What Truth Depends on. Stud Logica 108, 1235–1262 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-019-09895-w
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-019-09895-w