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Annual Review of Resource Economics

Volume 12, 2020

Relational Contracts in Agriculture: Theory and Evidence

Abstract

We appraise the current status of relational contract theory, along with associated empirical studies, with the goal of providing an orientation to the field to economists who may not have expertise in contract theory. We begin with a theoretical discussion focusing mainly on intuition and the usefulness of the theory for conceptualizing applied agricultural contracting problems. We also discuss current theoretical challenges and the current state of empirical research on relational contracts. We conclude by discussing potentially fruitful areas for future research.

Keyword(s): agricultural contracts, incentives, JEL C73, JEL D82, JEL D86, JEL L23, JEL L24, relational contracts, repeated games, trust
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/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-resource-101719-034514
2020-10-06
2024-04-19
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/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-resource-101719-034514
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  • Article Type: Review Article

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