Towards a dual process model of foreign policy ideology

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Highlights

  • •

    Presents evidence for a dual-process model of foreign policy ideology linked to previous frameworks.

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    Dual-process model suggests there is a foreign policy manifestation of previous models of ideology.

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    Reviews studies indicating how foreign policy orientations act as heuristics and schemas that bias interpretation of incoming information.

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    Notes how ideology allows ordinary individuals to make sense of foreign policy by drawing on underlying belief system.

Research on foreign policy ideology indicates a two-dimensional structure with clear parallels to numerous dual-process psychological frameworks. In foreign affairs, as in domestic affairs, individual differ in their underlying motivation to both provide and protect, captured by the constructs of cooperative internationalism (CI) and militant internationalism (MI), respectively. Recent studies indicate that the former is associated with the values of self-transcendence (universalism in particular) and individualizing moral foundations, the latter with conservation values and binding moral foundations. CI and MI serve as foreign policy orientations that allow ordinary individuals to develop attitudes about specific foreign policy questions even without significant knowledge but also bias the interpretation of incoming information.

Section snippets

Dual process models of political psychology and the structure of foreign policy beliefs

A number of frameworks identify a two-dimensional, dual-process model of ideology: ‘One dimension has been labeled authoritarianism, social conservatism, or traditionalism, at one pole, versus openness, autonomy, liberalism or personal freedom at the other pole. The second dimension has been labeled economic conservatism, power, or belief in hierarchy or inequality at its one pole versus egalitarianism, humanitarianism, social welfare or concern at its other pole’ ([10: 46]). The first

Convergent evidence for the dual-process model of foreign policy

There is also substantial convergent evidence for the dual-process model in studies not explicitly designed for the purpose, both at the mass level and in the actual foreign policy practice of nation-states. Generalized trust, a core dispositional trait marked by a belief that others are generally good, has a strong effect on support for international aid [19]. Generalized trust indicates a schema that the world is neither competitive nor dangerous, opening up the possibility for

The effect of foreign policy beliefs on information processing

The dual-process model of foreign policy expects that since attitudes on foreign policy rest on motivational goals and are associated with schemas that help individuals make sense of the world, they will have a strong impact on perception and likely lead to bias in information-processing. Just as conservatives and liberals do not change their beliefs in light of objective, disconfirming information as rationalist, Bayesian models would expect [33, 34, 35], Americans low in cooperative

Elite cues and the mass public

There is still substantial skepticism in the field of political science that the mass public is capable, or inclined, to develop attitudes on foreign affairs. Many draw on cue theories, arguing that boundedly rational members of the mass public ape the foreign policy views of elites, usually leaders of their political party, to ease their decision-making burden [39,40]. This is part of a broader tradition emphasizing heuristics in foreign policy attitude formation [41]. Non-partisan expert

Future research agenda

Progress aside, there are still a number of substantial questions that have not been addressed in the literature. First, whereas dual-process models generally develop frameworks whose motivational goals are ultimately rooted in personality and social environment, there has not been much of an effort to work backwards in the causal chain when it comes to foreign affairs, save a few studies on the personality antecedents of foreign policy views [44]. Second, where the dual-process model expects

Conclusion

These remaining issues notwithstanding, evidence for the dual-process model indicates that foreign policy is hardly a separate domain of belief formation than domestic politics. Both exhibit similar structures suggesting that individuals use the same organizing principles and values when it comes to internal or external politics.

Credit author statement

I am responsible for all aspects of the writing of this document.

Conflict of interest statement

Nothing declared.

References and recommended reading

Papers of particular interest, published within the period of review, have been highlighted as:

  • • of special interest

  • •• of outstanding interest

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