Elsevier

Current Opinion in Psychology

Volume 40, August 2021, Pages 20-23
Current Opinion in Psychology

Beliefs of children and adults in religious and scientific phenomena

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2020.08.003Get rights and content

Highlights

  • People are more confident of the existence of scientific than religious entities.

  • They give similar justification for believing in scientific and religious entities.

  • Adults justify their beliefs by referring to authority more often than children do.

Within the domains of both science and religion, beliefs in unobservable phenomena – such as bacteria or the soul – are common. Yet given the radically different trajectory of scientific as compared to religious beliefs across human history, it is plausible that the psychological basis for beliefs in these two domains is also different. Indeed, there is evidence from children and adults in various cultures that people have greater confidence in their scientific beliefs than in their religious beliefs. However, when individuals are invited to indicate the basis for their beliefs within each domain, a surprisingly similar pattern of justification is apparent.

Introduction

Belief in the existence of invisible phenomena is wide-ranging. In the scientific domain, for example, people believe in bacteria and electricity and in the religious domain, they believe in God and the soul [1,2]. It has sometimes been proposed that the psychological basis for belief in these two domains is similar [3] and that scientific and religious beliefs readily coexist [4]. However, it is also argued that scientific and religious beliefs differ in their relation to rationality [5]. Indeed, belief in the existence of bacteria and electricity became widespread only in the course of the 19th century, whereas belief in God and the soul predates organized science by many centuries [6,7]. Inversely, children endorse and invoke naturalistic explanations from an early age whereas they are slow to embrace religious or supernatural explanations [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14].

Hence, we might expect marked differences in the way that contemporary children and adults come to believe in and conceptualize invisible scientific phenomena on the one hand and religious phenomena on the other. As we will describe, there is some indication of that differentiation because children as well as adults express somewhat greater confidence in the existence of scientific as compared to religious entities. However, that differentiation is generally a matter of degree rather than kind. By contrast, there are surprising similarities in the patterns of justifications produced for scientific and religious beliefs [15]. Below, we first describe the evidence showing modest differences in confidence before turning to a description of the unexpected parallels in patterns of justification.

In a series of experiments, young children in the UK and U.S.A. were asked to indicate their confidence in the existence of various, ordinarily invisible entities, including scientifically established entities (e.g. germs, oxygen) and widely endorsed special beings (e.g. God, the Tooth Fairy) [16]. Children aged 5–6 years confidently endorsed the existence of both types of entity, but they were more confident about the existence of the scientific entities than about the special beings.

Subsequent studies have confirmed this pattern of differential confidence. For example, children growing up in a Tseltal-speaking Mayan community in Mexico were asked about the existence of germs and oxygen as well as ijk’al, cave spirits that emerge at night, and ch’ulelal, the souls of the dead. Like the children in the UK and the U.S., the Mayan children expressed more confidence in the scientific entities than in the special beings [17]. Similarly, children aged 10–12 years attending a Catholic school in Spain expressed more confidence in the existence of scientific (e.g. germs and oxygen) as compared to religious (e.g. God and the soul) entities [18]. When U.S. undergraduates were interviewed about scientific phenomena such as genes, X-rays and black holes and religious phenomena such as God, the soul and angels, they also expressed greater confidence in the existence of the scientific as compared to the religious entities [19].

The pattern described so far might reflect the fact that, in most Western countries, there is a pervasive consensus regarding the existence of various scientific entities, such as bacteria, oxygen, and electricity, but less of a consensus regarding religious phenomena. If children and adults were sensitive to this differential consensus, they might calibrate their own personal confidence accordingly. Indeed, children are likely to hear family members refer to a lack of consensus when discussing special beings but not when discussing scientific entities [20] and they are less likely to expect other people to believe in special beings as compared to scientific entities [16]. Similarly, students in the U.S. students are less likely to expect other people to believe in religious as compared to scientific entities [19]. More generally, a sensitivity to consensus emerges early in development [21, 22, 23, 24, 25] and exerts a potent effect on professed belief among adults [26,27]. Hence, differential confidence may reflect the perception of a differential consensus in the surrounding community.

To further evaluate this possibility, Davoodi et al. conducted a study in Iran where it was plausible to expect a very high consensus regarding the existence of both religious and scientific phenomena [28]. According to a report of the World Values Survey association in 2005, less than 1% of the Iranian sample identified as belonging to non-Muslim denominations, and only 0.6% reported belonging to no religious denomination at all [29]. By contrast, in the countries represented in the studies described above, religious affiliation is more heterogeneous, with a considerable percentage of the population reporting no religious denomination (e.g. Mexico: 17%; Spain: 18%; and U.S.A. 20%). Despite the marked homogeneity of religious belief in Iran, when adults were presented with various scientific entities (e.g. germs, oxygen, electricity, atoms) and religious entities (e.g. God, angels, the soul, Heaven), they also reported greater overall confidence in the existence of scientific as compared to the religious entities, as did their 9-year-old children and 10-year-old children. Only 5-year-olds and 6-year-olds failed to display this pattern, expressing equally high levels of confidence in both domains.

We may also enquire about the pattern of belief among members of a religious minority. If the religious beliefs upheld in a particular minority are not endorsed, and even rejected, by the surrounding majority, minority members might react in one of two ways. If they perceive – especially as they get older and move beyond the family circle – that the wider community does not endorse their minority beliefs, their own confidence in those beliefs might be undermined, consistent with the speculation above. An alternative possibility is that the skeptical stance of the surrounding community might provoke a counter-reaction – notably, a firm and confident affirmation of their minority religious beliefs. In that case, members of a religious minority might not display the pattern of differential confidence described so far. Instead, they might express as much, if not more confidence in religious entities as scientific entities

With these possibilities in mind, Cui et al. interviewed both secular and Christian parents and their children in China [30]. All the secular parents indicated ‘no religious denomination,’ whereas all the Christian parents identified as ‘Protestant.’ Unsurprisingly, the secular parents and their children were confident about the scientific entities and dubious about the religious entities – effectively displaying a more extreme form of the differential confidence found in earlier studies.

Unlike the secular parents and their children, the Christian parents and their children were confident about both the scientific and the religious entities. Moreover, highlighting the key role of parental testimony in the domain of religion, Christian parents who were more confident about the religious entities had children who were more confident about the religious entities. Nevertheless, echoing earlier findings with adults, the parents expressed more confidence in the existence of the scientific as compared to the religious entities. Thus, despite their minority status, the parents did not affirm their belief in religious phenomena so strongly that the pattern of differential confidence was eliminated. Only among the Christian children were equivalent levels of confidence expressed.

Summarizing the results of these various studies, differential confidence in scientific as compared to religious entities is found in diverse cultural settings. It is evident among young adults in the US as well as parents in Iran and China. Not surprisingly, it is pronounced among secular adults, but it is also displayed in a more subtle fashion by religious adults, whether they belong to a Muslim majority in Iran or a Christian minority in China. Differential confidence is also found among some older children albeit less systematically than among adults. In sum, these findings indicate that even when they are confident about the existence of religious as well as scientific entities, children and especially adults are prone to voice more confidence in the existence of the scientific entities. However, as we will see in the next section, it is unlikely that these modest differences in confidence betray any radical difference in the way that religious and scientific phenomena are conceptualized.

When asked to justify their belief in the existence of a given phenomenon, 5-year-olds and 6-year-olds often mentioned the properties, especially the causal powers, of the entity in question [16]. This was true for both scientific and religious entities. For example, in justifying their belief in germs, a child might say: ‘Because germs are little thingies and if you don’t wash your hands, they can make you sick’ and in justifying their belief in God, a child might say: ‘Because how would everybody be alive and how would our time have started and stuff?’ Similarly, when college students were asked to justify their beliefs, they displayed a similar pattern in each domain. Thus, deferential justifications to an authoritative source (e.g. references to the Bible or to a science teacher) were the most frequent type of justification in each case [19]. This cross-domain similarity also emerged at the individual level: individuals who generated deferential justifications particularly often for scientific phenomena did the same for religious phenomena. Moreover, when students were asked to say what might lead them to change their belief in a given phenomenon, they often claimed that nothing could change their mind about the existence of either type. Thus, contrary to what might be expected, they did not systematically adopt an evidential or empirical stance toward the scientific phenomena. Summarizing these two studies, one conducted with children and the other conducted with adults, in each case, participants produced similar justifications in the two domains even if there was a notable developmental change in the content of their justification, with children mostly referring to the properties of the entity and adults mostly referring to authoritative sources.

To further probe the pattern of justifications, Davoodi et al. interviewed 4-year-olds to 11-year-olds in three cultural settings: children attending private parochial schools in the U.S.; Iranian children whose parents, with few exceptions, identified as Muslim; and Chinese children growing up in Christian Protestant homes [31••]. Thus, by design, all children were growing up in religious families. However, the families of the US and Iranian children espoused the dominant faith of their community, whereas the families of the Chinese children espoused a minority faith, given the predominantly secular beliefs of the surrounding majority.

Children in all three cultural settings confidently affirmed the existence of the religious phenomena – God, Heaven and angels. However, despite similar levels of confidence, their pattern of justification varied across the three cultural settings. In line with earlier findings, the U.S. and Iranian children mainly justified their beliefs in terms of the characteristics of the entity (e.g. ‘In everything we do, God is with us’; ‘Good people go to Heaven’). By contrast, the Chinese children, and especially the older Chinese children, mainly justified their beliefs in terms of authoritative sources (e.g. ‘My mom has told me about it’; ‘It’s in the Bible’). For the scientific phenomena, the pattern of justifications was stable across age and across all three settings. Children again mainly referred to the characteristics of the entity (e.g. ‘When we become sick, germs go into our bodies’) echoing the pattern observed earlier in the U.K and U.S. [16].

Further research and analysis are needed but the following proposal draws together the findings with respect to both levels of confidence and patterns of justification. First, consistent with a large body of research, children believe in many scientific and religious entities, not on the basis of direct empirical observation, but on the basis of testimony provided by others [1,2,32]. In accordance with such testimony, children learn about the existence and properties of those entities and, when asked to justify their beliefs, they refer to those properties. In the course of development, awareness of the testimonial basis of belief increases – and adults cite the relevant sources, be they scientific or religious. Children’s awareness of the source of their beliefs is accelerated when societal variation in belief is made apparent. Thus, when Christian children in China spend more time beyond their family – notably in non-religious schools situated within the wider, secular community – they, like their parents, remain confident of their religious beliefs yet they also become aware of societal variation in such beliefs. Hence, unlike their peers in more homogeneous communities, they increasingly justify their religious beliefs by reference to family members and other authoritative sources within their immediate community. In future research, it will be informative to study children who belong to small sectarian minorities that, unlike the Christian community in China, are not part of worldwide faith. Arguably, a heightened awareness of the localized and distinctive status of the community might intensify members’ sensitivity to authoritative sources within it.

Section snippets

Conclusions

We have highlighted notable similarities in the pattern of belief with respect to scientific and religious entities. In each domain, confidence in the existence of unobservable phenomena is founded on testimony provided by other people. Across disparate communities, somewhat more confidence is expressed in scientific as compared to religious entities. Yet with respect to the justification of beliefs, a similar developmental pattern emerges for both religious and scientific entities. Thus,

Funding

The writing of this paper was supported by the John Templeton Foundation (59820).

Conflict of interest statement

Nothing declared.

References and recommended reading

Papers of particular interest, published within the period of review, have been highlighted as:

  • • of special interest

  • •• of outstanding interest

References (32)

  • P.L. Harris et al.

    Trust in testimony: how children learn about science and religion

    Child Dev

    (2006)
  • P.L. Harris

    Trusting What You’re Told: How Children Learn from Others

    (2012)
  • R. Horton

    African traditional thought and Western science

  • C. Legare et al.

    The coexistence of natural and supernatural explanations across cultures and development

    Child Dev

    (2012)
  • M. Hollis et al.

    Rationality and Relativism

    (1982)
  • S. Gaukroger

    Civilization and the Culture of Science: Science and the Shaping of Modernity, 1795-1935

    (2020)
  • V. Saroglou

    The Psychology of Religion

    (2020)
  • I. Huang

    Children’s explanations of strange phenomena

    Psychol Forsch

    (1930)
  • M. Mead

    An investigation of the thought of primitive children, with special relevance to animism

    J R Anthropol Inst

    (1932)
  • A.K. Hickling et al.

    The emergence of children’s causal explanations and theories: evidence from everyday conversation

    Dev Psychol

    (2001)
  • K.H. Corriveau et al.

    Judgments about fact and fiction by children from religious and non-religious backgrounds

    Cogn Sci

    (2015)
  • S.E. Nancekivell et al.

    She bought the unicorn from the pet store: six- to seven-year-olds are strongly inclined to generate natural explanations

    Dev Psychol

    (2017)
  • P.L. Harris

    Children’s understanding of death: from biology to religion

    Philos Trans R Soc B

    (2018)
  • C. Orozco-Giraldo et al.

    Turning water into wine: young children’s ideas about impossibility

    J Cogn Cult

    (2019)
  • P.L. Harris et al.

    Learning from testimony about religion and science

  • P.L. Harris et al.

    Germs and angels: the role of testimony in young children’s ontology

    Dev Sci

    (2006)
  • Cited by (14)

    • Belief, culture, & development: Insights from studying the development of religious beliefs and behaviors

      2022, Advances in Child Development and Behavior
      Citation Excerpt :

      As we emphasized in the previous section, learning within a religious domain is constrained by the fact that many religious phenomena are understood to be difficult or impossible to observe directly (White, 2021). Thus, rather than being driven by direct observation of the phenomena at hand, as in many of the domains of learning that have been the focus of cognitive development, learning about religious beliefs and behaviors is likely driven primarily by social processes, including cultural learning (Tomasello, 2000), social learning (e.g., Gelman, 2009), explicit teaching (Kline, 2015), learning through testimony (e.g., Harris & Corriveau, 2020), learning through text (Corriveau, Einav, Robinson, & Harris, 2014; Einav, Rydland, Grøver, Robinson, & Harris, 2018), and learning through participation, observation, and pitching in (Gauvain, 2001; Rogoff, 2003). In this sense, religion provides an opportunity to observe these social-cultural processes in the absence of learning mechanisms that hinge on the learner having direct perceptual access to the phenomenon of interest. (

    • Concepts, abstractness and inner speech

      2023, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
    View all citing articles on Scopus
    View full text