Accounting for violent conflict risk in planetary defense decisions
Introduction
Planetary defense is commonly understood to refer to the defense of planet Earth against collisions with near-Earth objects (NEOs, which include asteroids, comets and meteoroids). Planetary defense involves the detection of Earthbound NEOs, the deflection of the NEOs onto non-Earthbound trajectories, the disruption of NEO structures into smaller fragments when Earthbound NEOs cannot be deflected away, and possibly also civil defense preparations to aid collision survivors.
Planetary defense programs can have several goals, including scientific discovery, public education, and compliance with domestic and international law. Arguably, the predominant goal is to reduce risks to Earth and its inhabitants. While the focus of planetary defense is on reducing risks from NEO collision, it may be possible for planetary defense programs to also affect other risks. If they do, then these other risks arguably should be accounted for in the design and implementation of planetary defense programs. This can include avoiding activities that decrease NEO risk but inadvertently increase other risks, and emphasizing activities that decrease (or at least do not increase) NEO risk and also decrease other risks.
This paper examines how to account for violent conflict risk in planetary defense programs. In a sense, NEO collision and violent conflict are very different types of risk: one is astronomical, and the other is social and geopolitical. However, both can involve large explosions that threaten substantial regional or even global damage. Planetary defense programs also utilize military technology, including nuclear explosives. These commonalities create several ways in which planetary defense programs can affect violent conflict risk. This paper examines three:
- (1)
Global risk management: the value of planetary defense as a model for the successful management of a global risk. The value here is for all global risks, including but not limited to violent conflict. The experience of the planetary defense community may contain insights that can be valuable for other efforts to address global risks. Planetary defense programs may be able to realize this value by documenting key aspects of their experience and sharing it with communities working on other risks.
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Nuclear deflection and disruption: the use of nuclear explosives for NEO deflection or disruption. Nuclear deflection and disruption programs can have several effects on nuclear weapons issues, potentially changing the risk of nuclear war and other violent conflict. Depending on the details, this could give reason for planetary defense programs to favor or disfavor nuclear explosives, or to pursue certain nuclear deflection/disruption program designs.
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Inadvertent NEO conflict: the prospect of NEO collisions being mistaken as violent attacks, inadvertently triggering violent conflict. Inadvertent conflict triggered by false alarm is a serious concern, especially for inadvertent nuclear war. Planetary defense programs may have opportunities to partner with militaries so as to help militaries correctly identify NEO collisions as such and avoid inadvertent NEO conflict.
This paper is in the tradition of risk analysis and risk management research that seeks to concurrently address multiple risks. This interdisciplinary field endeavors to work across traditional research and policy specializations (or “silos”) and develop policies that make the world safer from all risks. The concept of risk-risk tradeoffs has been developed for evaluating actions that could reduce one risk but increase another [1]. Nuclear deflection/disruption may be an example of this. The concept of co-benefits has been developed for actions that could decrease multiple risks and/or have other benefits [2]. Detecting incoming NEOs and reporting them to military authorities may be an example of this; ditto for developing and sharing insights on global risk management.
Some prior research has concurrently studied specific aspects of NEO and violent conflict risks. Implications of nuclear deflection/disruption for violent conflict has gotten the most attention [[3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10]]. Inadvertent NEO conflict is studied by Ref. [11,12] and has also been discussed by Refs. [13,14]. The idea of planetary defense as a model for global risk management is briefly proposed by Ref. [15]; to the best of the present author's knowledge, the idea has not been pursued further in any prior research.
This present paper synthesizes and extends this prior literature to contribute a more complete study of the implications of violent conflict risk for planetary defense programs. This paper is the first-ever survey of the full range of implications of violent conflict risk for planetary defense program decisions; the prior literature as outlined above is focused on specific aspects of the topic. Additionally, the paper contributes original analysis of the implications of international law, nuclear disarmament, and the taboo against nuclear weapons as they pertain to nuclear deflection. The paper further presents the first-ever quantitative risk analysis of the risk of inadvertent NEO conflict, as well as original discussion of the implications of inadvertent NEO conflict for planetary defense programs. Finally, the paper presents the first-ever extended discussion of planetary defense as a model for global risk management.
The overall aim of the paper is to help planetary defense programs better account for violent conflict in their program decisions. It is not the aim of the paper to definitively resolve which decisions should be made. Definitive resolution would require more detail than can be presented in one paper, including detail specific to a particular decision. Additionally, the decisions can also require the judgments of the decision-makers. It is not the role of this paper to suppose what those judgments should or would be. Therefore, many of the specific recommendations offered by this paper are for more detailed analysis in support of planetary defense decisions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 assesses planetary defense as a model for global risk management. Section 3 analyzes the effect of nuclear deflection/disruption programs on violent conflict risk. Section 4 examines inadvertent NEO conflicts. Section 5 concludes.
Section snippets
Planetary defense as a model for global risk management
This section presents an initial analysis of planetary defense as a model for global risk management, then describes future work in this direction that the planetary defense community could do. This work would not be a solution to planetary defense challenges per se, but instead would be a more general contribution to the management of global risks, including but not limited to violent conflict. This work is not necessarily worth the investment it would require of the planetary defense
Nuclear deflection and disruption
The exceptionally high energy density of nuclear explosives makes them an attractive option for NEO threat mitigation. For the largest NEO collisions, nuclear explosives may be the only viable option for deflection, provided sufficient lead time; for the most imminent collisions, nuclear disruption may be the only viable option [25]. Disruption is controversial because it does not necessarily eliminate the threat and in some cases may actually increase the damage to Earth by creating a larger
Inadvertent NEO conflict
NEO collisions within a certain size range produce explosions with energies comparable to the explosions of military bombs. It is possible for these NEO explosions to be mistaken as military bombings. It is likewise possible that those who make this mistake may then launch an attack that they believe to be a retaliation but is in fact the commencement of hostilities. Such a scenario falls within the broader class of inadvertent conflict. Some international security analysis expresses concern
Conclusion
Planetary defense programs can affect violent conflict risk in at least three ways: nuclear deflection/disruption, inadvertent NEO conflict, and as a model for addressing an extreme global risk. This paper examines each of these and its implications for planetary defense program decisions. Planetary defense programs for nuclear deflection/disruption may (or may not) involve a risk-risk tradeoff between NEO risk and violent conflict risk, which could mean favoring other NEO deflection/disruption
Declaration of competing interest
The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.
Acknowledgments
This paper has benefited from input from Robert de Neufville, Tony Barrett, Cordula Steinkogler, Scott Janzwood, Clark Chapman, Clemens Rumpf, Peter Brown, an anonymous reviewer, and the Acta Astronautica editors. McKenna Fitzgerald assisted with manuscript preparation. The paper was originally presented at the 6th IAA Planetary Defense Conference (PDC 2019, paper IAA-PDC-19-07-07), 29 April-3 May 2019, Washington, DC, USA. I thank the PDC audience for helpful comments. Any remaining errors are
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