Abstract
Zagaria et al. (Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, X 1–44, 2020) argue that psychology is a science marked by theoretical chaos and that it is possible to rectify this by letting the theoretical framework of evolutionary psychology serve as a foundation for psychology at large. While agreeing to the fact that psychology lacks direction, I maintain that this problem is not theoretical and hence, not rectifiable through the postulations of a theory. Following Wittgenstein, I argue that the disorganised state of psychology is due to an insufficient sensitivity to the meaning of psychological terms in ordinary language. In short, psychology’s problem is grammatical. Hence, what needs to be done is to examine the grammar of psychological concepts. Many scholars have contributed to this kind of examination but few as extensively as Harré, who stressed the primacy of the concept of a person for discourses about human mental powers and their exercise. This is the Taxonomic Priority Principle. Grounding psychological research in evolutionary theory would amount to a violation of it and thus, I claim that it is mistaken to do so. The approach best suited to administer this principle is that of cultural psychology.
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Smedlund, M.B. On the Foundations of Psychology: the Problem Is Grammatical, Not Theoretical. Integr. psych. behav. 55, 181–188 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12124-020-09569-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12124-020-09569-6