Exploring patterns of forest governance quality: Insights from forest frontier communities in Zambia’s Miombo ecoregion

Highlights

• Mean scores for forest governance indicators are generally low.

• Governance scores of different arrangements do not differ significantly.

• Factors considerably reflect the indicators from the GFI framework.

• Formal and customary rules and institutions are clearly differentiated on the ground.

• There is a high variability of governance processes within and across provinces.

Abstract

Good forest governance is a prerequisite for sustainable forest management and the successful implementation of initiatives that aim to reduce deforestation and forest degradation. The necessity for good governance is high in Zambia’s Miombo ecoregion, which is characterised by persistent deforestation that also threatens forest-dependent livelihoods. Zambia has adopted policies and initiatives to improve forest governance. We use the Governance of Forests Initiatives (GFI) indicator framework from the World Resource Institute in 24 communities in the Miombo ecoregion to examine Zambia’s status in this respect. The Wilcoxon rank test is applied to compare the de facto governance performance between different arrangements with differing tenures and restrictions to forest access and use. We employ factor analysis to test the applicability of the GFI framework based on community perceptions and cluster analysis to examine whether patterns of community clusters reflect the governance structure of the provincial local government administration. Comparative results show low mean scores for governance indicators, which do not differ significantly between arrangements. This indicates a weak de facto forest governance performance across arrangements, specifically characterised by an inadequate enforcement of rules and restrictions on use, insufficient institutional financial, human and technical capacities and unsatisfactory participatory land use planning and forest policy-making processes. We recommend support for financial and technical institutional capacities combined with coordination mechanisms to permit the satisfactory enforcement of forest rules. Frequent monitoring, apprehension and graduated sanctions are proposed as part of the rule enforcement procedures. Stringent de jure requirements coupled with capacity building for participatory land use planning and public policy participation also need to be adopted. This would also contribute towards achieving targets for Zambia’s climate change response strategy, national development plan 2017–2021 and REDD + preparedness phase. The factor analysis largely confirms the GFI framework’s suitability for governance analysis on the ground since factors generally mirror GFI indicators. However, because de facto governance processes sometimes do not precisely reflect thematic areas of the framework, we warn against the use of single indicators to exclusively represent a thematic area. Similarly, specific attention has to be paid to customary rules and institutions when applying the GFI framework because compared to the framework, the respective aspects are more clearly differentiated on the ground. Cluster analysis reveals a high variability of governance processes within and across provinces. Decentralization measures should take into account clusters that may in some cases follow administrative levels or in other cases go beyond the established administrative boundaries. Specifically, initiatives to integrate customary structures into the decentralized governance structure should take these regional differences into account.

Introduction

Globally, forests are under enormous pressure from deforestation and forest degradation. Approximately 7.6 million hectares of forest are lost annually, especially in the poorest tropical regions (FAO, 2015). Deforestation is a result of several factors, many of them related to poor forest governance (Eliasch, 2012; Umemiya et al., 2010; Kanninen et al., 2007; Kaimowitz, 2012), which has failed to regulate anthropogenic pressures. Deforestation is linked to increased greenhouse gas emissions (Seymour and Busch, 2016), the loss of a functioning forest ecosystem (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2003), and the deterioration of socio-economic conditions, particularly in Africa with its more than 160 million forest-dependent households (FAO, 2018). There is thus a need for improved forest governance, especially since governance is considered a precondition for sustainable forest management and for the successful implementation of global initiatives such as Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+), Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) (Pettenella and Brotto, 2012) and forest landscape restoration (Mansourian, 2016).

The necessity for improved forest governance is high in countries like Zambia, which has alarmingly high deforestation rates with around 0.63 % annual forest loss between 2000 and 2018 (Hansen et al., 2013; Global Forest Watch, 2018). The greatest loss is reported in the Miombo ecoregion, the most extensive forest type in Zambia, covering 45 % of the total land area (Matakala et al., 2015). The Miombo is characterized by the dominance of Brachystegia, Julbernardia and Isoberlinia tree species (Matakala et al., 2015). The woodlands are of significant economic importance, providing a variety of ecosystem goods and services essential for human wellbeing including firewood, charcoal, timber and non-timber forest products (Turpie et al., 2015). The ecosystems are experiencing considerable deforestation due to charcoal production, firewood collection and clearing for farming (Kalinda et al., 2008). Deforestation not only threatens the livelihoods of rural Zambians, who derive nearly 44 % of their income from the Miombo forest ecosystem goods and services (Kalaba, 2013), it also undermines Zambia’s commitment towards the Aichi biodiversity targets, i.e. to reduce biodiversity loss through deforestation and forest degradation by 25 % by 2020 (MLNREP, 2015).

Several definitions are proposed for governance. In general, recent definitions understand governance as a broad and comprehensive concept that goes far beyond governments. Common governance definitions all denote rules/structures, actors and processes/practices (Mansourian, 2017; Larson and Petkova, 2011; Broekhoven et al., 2012; Giessen and Buttoud, 2014; Kishor and Rosenbaum, 2012). A widely accepted forest governance definition “comprises a) all formal and informal, public and private regulatory structures, i.e. institutions consisting of rules, norms, principles, decision procedures, concerning forests, their utilisation and their conservation, b) the interactions between public and private actors therein and c) the effects of either on forests” (Giessen and Buttoud, 2014). Since it is difficult to cover all aspects within the methodology of one study, while simultaneously maintaining scientific rigour, the definition can be adapted to reflect the relevant aspects (Giessen and Buttoud, 2014). As our study does not reflect on effects on forests, we define forest governenace as the “norms, processes, instruments, people and organizations that control how people interact with forests” (Kishor and Rosenbaum, 2012). The concept of “forest governance” is operationalized by several indicator frameworks. They include the “framework for assessing and monitoring forest governance” of the Food and Agriculture Organization (Kishor and Rosenbaum, 2012), the “natural resource governance framework assessment guide” of the International Union for Conservation of Nature (Campese, 2016), and the “governance of forest initiatives indicator framework” of the World Resource Institute (Davis et al., 2013). While these frameworks do not offer direct inferences on the economic, ecological and social outcomes of governance systems, they provide a comprehensive understanding of governance processes that is likely to contribute to improvements in the quality of decision-making and implementation (Rauschmayer et al., 2009). The Governance of Forest Initiative (GFI) indicator framework is widely recommended for forest governance assessments given its comprehensive coverage, providing a series of indicators for analysing different dimensions of forest governance systems (Agung et al., 2014; Brito et al., 2009). Although primarily practise-oriented, we hypothesize that the the GFI framework builds on aspects necessary for applying the normative concept (Giessen and Buttoud, 2014) as a scientific analytical approach, i.e value judegments on desirable conditions within a methodological framework to provide recommendations towards selected ends. Thus, it permits the integration of scientific and practical aspects and provides added value to real world challenges. Moreover, while previous models underscore either actors (Hardin, 1968) or rules/institutions (Goodin, 1996; Ostrom, 1990) as the theoretical basis, the GFI framework, with its practise-oriented approach, is able to integrate both aspects (Arts et al., 2014) as, based on theoretical foundations of the governance concept, it includes agency and structure components (Fischer et al., 2020). It emphasiszes the diversity of actors, the links between formal and informal practises and the rules that shape governance (Davis et al., 2013).

A few scientific studies have utilized the GFI framework to quantitatively analyze progress towards proposed governance improvements: Agung et al. (2014) and Pettenella and Brotto (2012) analyse the impact of REDD + readiness on forest governance in Indonesia and the successful features for REDD + project organizations, respectively. Such progress needs to be assessed specifically for communities with diverse forest governance arrangements. This implies the need to scientifically test the applicability of the proposed indicators on the basis of community perceptions. Community perceptions can indicate the extent to which governance structures are legitimated by community members (DeCaro and Stokes, 2013). Community perceptions have also been found to correlate with local compliance with rules for common pool resource management (Jenny et al., 2007). Furthermore, community perceptions may capture the de facto reality that exists on the ground, which was found to differ substantially from the fact-based de jure notions of laws (Kaufmann et al., 2011). Although perception-based measures have been criticized as reflecting factors other than governance, such as economic performance or poverty (Kurtz and Schrank, 2007), Kaufmann et al. (2007) found this notion does not withstand empirical scrutiny.

Several African countries including Zambia have adopted policies and initiatives that take the importance of forest governance into account. In Zambia, the revised decentralization policy of 2013 provides for the devolution of decision-making power, functions, responsibilities and resources to the provincial, district and sub-district levels to improve the quality of service delivery at the sub-national level, including forest management (GRZ, 2002). Zambia also developed a national strategy for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+), which integrates strengthening forest governance in the preparatory phase (Matakala et al., 2015). Zambia’s National development plan 2017–2021 similarly proposes improved forest governance as part of its strategies towards achieving sustainable forest use (Ministry of National Development Planning, 2017). The country has also developed strategies for the Convention on Biological Diversity, the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Kalaba et al., 2014), all of which contribute to sustainable development goal 15 on sustainable forest management (United Nations, 2015). Moreover, Zambia’s Forest Act of 2015 and Forest Policy of 2014 provide for the establishment of diverse forest governance arrangements. These range from (i) hierarchical command and control systems in state-owned National Forest Reserves and National Parks to (ii) participatory arrangements with restrictions of forest use and management in state-owned Local Forest Reserves, and Game Management Areas, to (iii) inclusion of communities, customary institutions and private entities into forest conservation initiatives in customary and private forests (GRZ, 2015a, 2015b). However, there has been almost no comparative examination of the governance status within these diverse arrangements. Given the co-existence of customary and formal institutions, with overlapping jurisdictions and operating within parallel customary and formal legislation (GRZ, 2015a, 2015b), it is imperative to understand how interrelationships amongst these distinct structures of authority shape forest governance outcomes in Zambia. As hypothesised by several scholars (e.g. ANDERSON et al., 1998; Rescher, 1993), conflicts between overlapping regulations and institutions are often inevitable. As this is likely to have implications on governance progress, knowledge about forest governance performance in Zambia is crucial for the further development of policy in the context of legal and institutional pluralism, which is typical for many African countries in the post-colonial era.

This study aims to contribute to a more robust understanding of forest governance assessment tools and governance structures and purposes to identify the possible influence of overlapping formal and customary administrative structures on de facto governance. Methodologically, we aim to draw conclusion on the applicability of the GFI framework at a community level. The study addresses three key research questions: (i) How does forest governance differ across different governance arrangements with differing tenure and restrictions to forest access and use? (ii) Given the broad and very comprehensive understanding of forest governance, does the GFI framework help to differentiate distinct aspects of forest governance based on the perception of the local population? (iii) Can communities be clustered into distinct groups of similar governance conditions? If so, does the pattern of community clusters reflect the governance structure of the provincial local government administration? By answering these questions, we aim to draw conclusions on the strengths and weaknesses of different restriction regimes as instruments of national policy implementation on the ground in communities, which are influenced by customary and governmental rules and actors.

Zambia’s forest administration has been decentralized to provide citizens with more authority and power in decision-making at the local level. The central government agency with a legal mandate to manage forest resources is the Forest Department of the Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources. Forest department is responsible for formulating and reviewing all legislation related to forest management in addition to co-ordinating its implementation (Chileshe, 2001; Ministry of Tourism, Environment and Natural Resources, 2009). The sub-national government levels are structured into the provincial, district, and sub-district administration units i.e. area and ward (Fig. 1). Provincial and district units are responsible for formulating and enforcing by-laws, and facilitating the proper and smooth administration of forest estate, in accordance with the forestry policy and existing legal framework (Chileshe, 2001; Ministry of Tourism, Environment and Natural Resources, 2009). The district unit is additionally responsible for providing extension services, collecting revenues from the sale of forest products, the enforcement of regulation through licences and patrols, managing forest woodlots and plantations and coordinating and monitoring lower administrative levels (Chileshe, 2001). Currently, Zambia has 10 provinces and 117 districts, each comprising a district council, which is the main policy and decision-making body at the district level. At the sub district level, the council is represented by the Area Development Committees (ADCs). The ADCs are democratically elected, local governance structures that ought to work together with members in each ward to develop natural resource plans and participate in the management thereof (GZR, 2015). Although the ADCs are theoretically the official focal point of local collective action for the improvement of the environment and livelihoods on customary lands, these governance structures in reality appear to be dysfunctional and are not viewed as a political administrative unit in some communities (Mfune, 2013).

There is a strong customary administrative structure operating in parallel to the aforementioned political administration within each district that is guaranteed by the Constitution of the Republic of Zambia (Mason-Case, 2011). Customary administration is made up of 73 tribes headed by 240 chiefs, 8 senior chiefs and 4 paramount chiefs, who delegate rights and responsibilities to headpersons and sub-chiefs within their jurisdictions (Mason-Case, 2011). Traditional leaders are mandated to administer customary lands based on local traditions. Traditional leaders determine land use, access and user rights on customary land. The political administration often has little authority over traditional administration and must engage in consultations with traditional institutions before undertaking any activities on customary lands.

In practice, however, the central government is unwilling to relinquish power over protected forests to local governments (Mfune, 2013). Moreover, local government’s financial, human and technical capacity to manage open forests is limited. Furthermore, local government’s involvement in the governance of customary forests is constrained by the contradicting land tenure policies (Chikulo, 2009). While the Local Government Act of 1991 gives the district council a mandate to plan and lead the management of customary forests, the Land Act of 1995 places the administration of these lands under customary authority. Besides, customary authorities sometimes challenge the authority of the sub-district governance structures (Mfune, 2013).

The forest governance arrangements of Zambia are grounded in the land reform of 1924, dating back to the colonial period. During this period, land in Zambia was demarcated into crown and native reserve land, designated for exclusive use by Africans and European settlers, respectively (Van Loenen, 1999; Brown, 2005). The chiefs administered forests on native reserves based on customary law. In contrast, forests on crown land were administered by the British colonial government based on formal law (Brown, 2005). At independence, customary land administration was sub-ordinated to formal law, which previously only applied to crown land. However, the method of customary land alienation continued under customary law. Following Zambia’s independence in 1964, crown land was converted to state land and subsequently administered by the Ministry of Lands (Brown, 2005).

Zambia currently has various forest governance arrangements under the responsibility of different institutions, across different tenure categories and with differing access and use restrictions (Table 1). The majority (65.7 %) of Zambia’s forest is on customary land as either individual or communal forests. These either have or lack cultural norms, such as graveyard forests, which are governed by chiefs and their representatives including village headpersons and sub-chiefs under customary law (GRZ, 2015a; Kalinda et al., 2008). Under formal law, the commercial use of forest products without a licence on customary lands is restricted, although access and subsistence use are not (GRZ, 2015a). Other forests (23.7 %) in Zambia are located on state lands. State forests include National and Local Forest Reserves, administered by the Forest Department (GRZ, 2015a; Kalinda et al., 2008), as well as National Parks and Game Management Areas, administered by the Department of National Parks and Wildlife (GRZ, 2015b). Under formal law, access to and use of forest resources in state forests is restricted, except with special permits. Private forests also exist on state lands, which constitute 10.6 % of the total forest area. These are owned by registered individuals or companies through leasehold tenure.