Optimal business model for the monopolistic ride-hailing platform: Pooling, premier, or hybrid?
Introduction
Ride-hailing platforms have attracted much attention and achieved extraordinary growth over the past 5 years due to the dramatic advances in technology and economy. These platforms, such as Grab, Uber, and Didi, have brought substantial convenience to people’s lives, enabling them to request rides using their smartphones rather than hailing taxis on the street [1]. In June 2013, Grab claimed that it could receive an order every 8 s, and its total order volume had reached 10,000 per day [2]. In May 2014, Grab said it had 1.2 million users in Southeast Asia. In 2015, Uber completed its 1-billionth ride (Tracxn Blog, 2016), which was below the 1.43 billion rides completed by Didi at that time (Marketing Interactive, 2016). By June 2016, Uber had completed its 2-billionth ride [3]. In 2017, Didi provided nearly 8.48 million rides on the Chinese New Year holiday,1 and this grew rapidly to nearly 30.67 million rides on the 2018 holiday.2
In fact, one platform usually occupies most of the ride-hailing market of an individual country or region. For instance, in China, Didi is the dominant player in the ride-hailing market, with a market share exceeding 60% and services extending to 32 cities.3 Didi controls 80% of the private-car market and 99% of the taxi market.4 In the United States, at the beginning of 2017, Uber’s share of the ride-hailing market was 84%. In Southeast Asia, the leader of the ride-hailing platform is Grab, occupying a 97% market share in the third-party ride-hailing market and 72% in the private-vehicle market. In November 2017, Grab notched up 1 billion rides, with 66 concurrent rides in 1s across seven countries.
Unlike the traditional taxi companies that provide only unified taxi service, a ride-hailing platform offers both premium service (premier) and economy service (pooling), which makes the ride-hailing market extraordinarily complicated. On the one hand, the premier service is professional and personalized, because it is usually provided to passengers with customized demands. Examples of a premier service include Didi Premier, Didi Luxe, Uber Black, Uber XL, and Uber Black SUV. On the other hand, the economy service, such as Didi Express, Didi Express Pool, Uber Pool, and Uber X, is offered to alleviate traffic pressure by sharing idle resources, which is in line with the theme of global sustainable development. A significant difference between the economy service and the premier service is that the former divides travel expenses among all occupants of a vehicle (drivers and passengers) while the latter serves only one passenger who pays the full travel fee. Note that some ride-hailing platforms allow the traditional taxis to join the service in order to provide a convenient and conventional taxi service. For instance, Didi cooperates with 500 taxi companies to offer a traditional taxi service in China and Brazil,5 helping the traditional taxi drivers respond more quickly to passengers. However, our study does not consider this situation, since it is extremely uncommon in most regions or countries. Based on whether the service is premium or economy, ride-hailing platforms usually adopt three kinds of business models, namely, the premier service model, the pooling service model, and the hybrid service model.
Platforms adopting the premier service model, such as Grab, UCAR Inc., and Lyft Premier, have three common characteristics. First, drivers who have joined the platform are divided into hired drivers (self-operating employees) and cooperating drivers (private car owners). Second, each passenger uses one car for her personal demand and pays the full travel fee. Third, the platform needs to bear total operating costs of self-operating vehicles. Such a service is available not only to high-end business people but also to those who require professional and customized service.
Pooling service first appeared in the late 1990s and became a prevalent travel mode in the 2000s [4]. According to US Census statistics, pooling has risen stably from 10.1% to 10.7% of the total transportation market [5], [6]. These ride-hailing platforms, such as Sidecar, Via, and Kuaidi Carpooling, play a crucial role as an intermediary in rationally allocating the remaining capacity of private cars and providing information to passengers for alleviating traffic congestion and solving the difficulties associated with hailing taxis. The salient features of the platform under the pooling service model are summarized as follows. First, most of its drivers are private car owners.6 Second, a passenger always shares a car with others. Third, the platform does not need to own its self-operating vehicles, and thus, it has virtually no operating costs—a marked difference between this model and the premier service strategy.
The hybrid service model, which combines the features of the premier and pooling service models, is gaining popularity among ride-hailing platforms, such as Uber and Didi. Under this strategy, passengers can use either the premier service with paying the full fare or the pooling service by splitting the bill.
In fact, the business model decision of a ride-hailing platform depends on the passengers’ heterogeneous cost sensitivity and the cost of the platform, rather than the platform’s size or financing quota. For example, Didi and UCAR Inc. have similar scales and financing quotas, but they adopt different service strategies. Didi adopts the hybrid service strategy, while UCAR Inc. focuses on the premier service. Thus, the goal of this study is to explore which business model a ride-hailing platform should adopt in such a monopoly market. In particular, we seek to deal with the following research issues. First, what is the optimal price-setting and business model decision for the ride-hailing platform? Second, how does passengers’ heterogeneous cost sensitivity of waiting time affect market outcomes under different models of the ride-hailing platform? Third, how do differences in passengers’ heterogeneity ratio between the pooling service and premier service affect passenger surplus under different strategies of the platform? Finally, is there an absolutely dominant strategy choice for the platform?
We develop an analytical model to answer the above research questions. We consider that a ride-hailing platform can offer differentiated services with different intrinsic values in a monopoly market. A principal–agent relationship is formed between the ride-hailing platform and the driver. The platform serves as the principal and shares benefits with drivers, while the driver serves as the agent and completes various services. This paper analyzes market outcomes and price-setting by considering the time-sensitive cost of heterogeneous passengers under different models adopted by the platform. In addition, we consider passengers of different types including long distance vs. short distance and single order vs. multiple orders in the extension section.
The theoretical contribution and practical significance of this paper are as follows. Theoretically, this paper constructs the optimal pricing model of the ride-hailing platform based on game theory. Considering the pricing decision issues under the single service model and the hybrid service model, this paper fills the gaps in the related research on sharing economy and two-sided platforms. Practically, based on the model analysis, this paper provides the specific conditions and suggestions to the platform for selecting pricing and business strategy. Especially for the existing ride-hailing platform giants Didi and Uber, which use hybrid service strategy, they need to completely distinguish the inherent value of the two services and reasonably implement price discrimination strategies in order to gain more profits.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys the related literature. Section 3 describes our basic model. In Section 4, we analyze the passenger surplus and social welfare when the platform chooses different optimal strategies. Section 5 extends our model to consider the passengers with different types, including long distance vs. short distance and single order vs. multiple orders. Conclusions and future directions are presented in Section 6.
Section snippets
Literature review
Our work is primarily connected to two streams of literature: the research on ride-hailing platforms, and the research on pricing strategy with network effects in a two-sided market.
First, the literature on ride-hailing platform considers its market equilibrium in the transportation field. Yang et al. [7] establish a network model to describe the demand and supply equilibrium of taxi services under fare structure and fleet size regulation in both a competitive and a monopoly market. The authors
Basic model
Consider that a two-sided ride-hailing platform provides either a pooling service or a premier service for passengers (denoted as “she” in this paper). Based on the two services, the platform has three alternative strategies in our model setup. First, it can employ the pooling service model, in which case all passengers share rides with other people (Case POS). Second, the platform can choose to adopt the premier service model, which offers more professional and personalized services to
Consumer surplus and social welfare
In this section, we explore the implications of the optimal results on consumer surplus and social welfare. Consumer surplus is the benefit that a customer gains from participating in the platform, which equals the area to the right of the price under the demand curve (see, e.g., [45], [46]). To facilitate understanding, we use the term “passenger surplus” to represent the benefit obtained by the passenger.
For each model, passenger surplus can be calculated as follows:
Model extensions
In this section, by focusing on different behaviors of passengers and analyzing two model variations we show that results are robust under the pooling service strategy and the premier service strategy.
Conclusions and future work
The development of the sharing economy has promoted the progress of ride-hailing platforms. These platforms have brought more convenient travel experiences to humankind. In this study, we provided an analytical model that captures some important market characteristics of a monopolistic ride-hailing platform and examined the optimal business model decision for the platform in the presence of time-sensitive cost for heterogeneous passengers.
Our results yielded several main findings. First, the
CRediT authorship contribution statement
Xin Wei: Conceptualization, Methodology, Formal analysis, Writing - original draft. Guofang Nan: Writing - original draft, Formal analysis, Funding acquisition. Runliang Dou: Funding acquisition, Writing - original draft, Writing - review & editing. Minqiang Li: Supervision.
Declaration of Competing Interest
The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.
Acknowledgments
This research is partially supported by research grant from the National Social Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 18BGL095) and the Key Program of National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 71631003).
References (50)
- et al.
Demand–supply equilibrium of taxi services in a network under competition and regulation
Transp. Res. B
(2002) - et al.
Equilibria of bilateral taxi-customer searching and meeting on networks
Transp. Res. B
(2010) - et al.
Equilibrium properties of taxi markets with search frictions
Transp. Res. B
(2011) - et al.
Modeling taxi services with smartphone-based e-hailing applications
Transp. Res. C
(2015) - et al.
Pricing strategies for a taxi-hailing platform
Transp. Res. E
(2016) - et al.
Modeling the demand for a shared-ride taxi service: an application to an organization-based context
Transp. Policy
(2016) - et al.
Taxi market equilibrium with third-party hailing service
Transp. Res. B
(2017) - et al.
Robust vehicle routing problem with hard time windows under demand and travel time uncertainty
Comput. Oper. Res.
(2018) - et al.
Co-evolution of three mega-trends nurtures uncaptured GDP—Uber’s ride-sharing revolution
Technol. Soc.
(2016) - et al.
Network neutrality on the internet: a two-sided market analysis
Inf. Econ. Policy
(2012)
Network effects in online two-sided market platform: A research note
Decis. Support Syst.
The optimal pricing strategy for two-sided platform delivery in the sharing economy
Transp. Res. E
Versioning of information goods under the threat of piracy
Inf. Econ. Policy
Ridesharing in North America: past, present, and future
Transp. Rev.
Your Uber is arriving: Managing on-demand workers through surge pricing, forecast communication, and worker incentives
Manage. Sci.
Coordinating supply and demand on an on-demand service platform with impatient customers
Manuf. Serv. Oper. Manag.
Cited by (11)
Optimal instant discounts of multiple ride options at a ride-hailing aggregator
2024, European Journal of Operational ResearchDeterministic and probabilistic service-hailing mode choice for on-demand service platforms
2024, International Journal of Production EconomicsThe Sequential Pricing of Ride-Hailing System with Rental Service in the Context of Fleet Electrification
2024, Journal of Systems Science and Systems EngineeringBusiness Model for Shared Autonomous Vehicles Mobility Services
2024, Tehnicki VjesnikA Systematic Literature Review on Machine Learning in Shared Mobility
2023, IEEE Open Journal of Intelligent Transportation Systems