Decoding an urban myth: An inquiry into the Van line 4 system in Beirut, Lebanon

Abstract

In Beirut, Lebanon, the failure of state-led transport strategies enabled the rise of private initiatives that appear to be monopolies organized through overlapping political, geographic, and sectarian power structures. Underneath this seemingly haphazard informality, lies a system that presents itself as a viable model for urban mobility. This paper discusses the case of Van Line 4 (56,250 daily users) in Beirut. A multidimensional assessment of the empirical findings enables an evaluation of the efficiency, arguably success, and vital socio-economic role of the Van Line 4 across sharp boundaries of the capital's diverse and segregated districts. It also suggests alternative lessons in informal urban mobility. The foundations of this form of public transport diverge from the dominant Western trend of thinking about technology and planning in the discipline. Rather, what is notable is the construction of a cost effective and reliable service balanced on coercion, sectarianism, and agility. Through decoding the process of service provision to a diverse satisfied customer base, we aim to contest the stigma of inefficiency tied to informal transport systems, while putting forth other “success” factors and indicators to be considered. We uncover how Van Line 4 is an efficient, economically profitable, and well-organized system that challenges urban inequality and geographic divides. Finally, we highlight the necessity to consider power structures and politics with the inequalities they recreate in the discussion of informal systems especially when their continuation is directly related to, and lives on the fragmentation of the state.

Introduction

Beirut and its surroundings present a mesh of social, economic, political, and religious affiliations that reflect the devastating effects of post-war Lebanon. The socio-economic model that the postwar governments adopted strengthened the consociationalist system (Bogaards, 2019; Haddad, 2009; Lijphart, 1969), reinforced sectarian and geographic polarization, and eventually led to the fragmentation of public institutions (Salloukh et al., 2015). Adding insult to injury, austerity measures adopted by the government in 1996 contributed to the decay of most public services and infrastructure. Today, urban services provision is ruled by a mix of neoliberal and sectarian policies devised by the overlapping sectarian and economic elite of post-war Lebanon, making political reforms all the more difficult (Nucho, 2017; Salloukh et al., 2015; Verdeil, 2018). In this context, transportation services are no exception. Failure of state-led transport strategies enabled the rise of private initiatives monopolized across overlapping political, geographic, and sectarian power structures.

Taking the case of the informal Van Line 4 (56,250 daily users) in Beirutⁱ¹, this paper aims to decode such initiatives and place them within the broad discussions on mobility and informality in the Global South. The research question we aim to answer is threefold: How was this system organized and maintained, notwithstanding economic and political challenges? What role can power and politics play in that organization? Accordingly, what lessons can be drawn from its operation beyond Western technical performance standards in transportation?

While research is abundant on informality in Lebanon on sectors like housing and urban services (Fawaz, 2008, Fawaz, 2009a, Fawaz, 2009b; Fawaz et al., 2012; Verdeil, 2008, Verdeil, 2013, Verdeil, 2016), fewer researchers have looked at the informal initiatives related to transportation and mobility (Charara, 1999). In addition, the grey literature on urban mobility in Lebanon remains limited to its transport dimension with a technical approach and focus on traffic management. Understanding the case of Van Line 4 highlights the socio-economic role this system plays by connecting marginalized neighborhoods to the city. It also presents an interesting case of unorthodox urban mobility as its organization relies on a specific sectarian power structure that does not operate outside the state. Although the concept of power unfolds different layers and types of relationships among actors, we focus on the forms of power that are used by the ruling authorities in Lebanon and that are passed through to the lower end of their clientelistic channels. As we argue in this paper, this serves to blur further the formal-informal binary whereby the same actors operate on both sides creating instead a formal-informal continuum.

In this case, technical expertise, or lack thereof, becomes secondary relative to the role that power and politics play in the provision of transportation services in Beirut. As such, the mobility crisis in the Global South, and particularly in Lebanon, is not simply a result of the absence of “formal” public transport strategies, but rather is one of the symptoms of failed public institutions that materialize most in crumbling urban services and infrastructure provision. Therefore, this paper adds to the discussion of lessons offered by informality in the Global South by questioning dominant transport discourses and challenging technically oriented transport approaches and studies. But, most importantly, it highlights the need for a nuanced understanding of context-specific politics and power interests when decoding informal urban processes.