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Strong Time-Consistent Core for a Class of Linear-State Games

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Abstract

Time consistency is an important property of any solution to a cooperative dynamic game. If the solution satisfies this property, players do not need to revise it and break a cooperative agreement. Strong time consistency is a stricter property which is applicable to cooperative set solutions. In this paper, the authors examine a class of linear-state games which come into use in many applications of dynamic games. Considering the core as the solution of the game, the authors provide sufficient conditions for its strong time consistency. In case of its inconsistency, the authors show how core elements can be realized using a strong time-consistent imputation distribution procedure.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Saint Petersburg State University, 7/9 Universitetskaya nab., Saint Petersburg, 199034, Russia

    Artem Sedakov

  2. School of Mathematics and Statistics, Qingdao University, Qingdao, 266071, China

    Artem Sedakov

  3. Institute of Applied Mathematics of Shandong, Qingdao, 266071, China

    Artem Sedakov

  4. School of Economics and Management, University of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, 100190, China

    Han Qiao

Authors
  1. Artem Sedakov
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  2. Han Qiao
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Han Qiao.

Additional information

The research was supported by the Shandong Province “Double-Hundred Talent Plan” under Grant No. WST2017009, the Visiting Fellowship Program of the Chinese Academy of Sciences for Outstanding Young Scientists, the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No. 71872171.

This paper was recommended for publication by Editor WANG Shouyang.

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Sedakov, A., Qiao, H. Strong Time-Consistent Core for a Class of Linear-State Games. J Syst Sci Complex 33, 1080–1107 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11424-020-8249-2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11424-020-8249-2

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