Abstract
This paper discusses the Indirect Duties View implying that, when our actions have no negative effects on humans, we can treat animals any way we wish. I offer several criticisms of this view. Subsequently, I explore some implications of rejecting this view that rise in the contexts of animal research and veterinarian ethics.
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Notes
This way of defining “moral standing” is standard in English speaking world. Regan (1982), p. 203 adopts a nearly identical definition. Similarly, according to Beauchamp and Childress (2009, p. 66), to have moral status is “to deserve the respect and protection accorded by moral norms and this can only be accorded to entities that can be morally wronged by actions”.
Interestingly enough, in here exploration of virtue ethics Rosalind Hursthouse prefers to avoid the concept of moral status. She argues, nevertheless, that some way of treating animals would be automatically included into various forms of virtuous activities. See Hursthouse (2006, pp. 136ff).
It is highly controversial whether Kant’s most basic principles really imply that we do not have direct duties to animals. On this topic see, for example, very influential interpretations by Korsgard (2004 and 2012) who argues that Kant and Kantians should include animals into the sphere of morality.
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Sencerz, S. Moral Standing of Animals and Some Problems in Veterinarian Ethics. J Agric Environ Ethics 33, 37–48 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10806-019-09811-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10806-019-09811-1